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President Obama's decision to scrap the Bush administration's plans for a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic will provide more breathing room for U.S.-Russian strategic arms control negotiations.
When Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO's secretary-general, addresses an audience at Carnegie Europe on Friday, 18th September, he will speak about the possibility of a new dialogue between two former foes – NATO and Russia. Dmitri Trenin suggests that these discussions could initially take place through the NATO-Russia Council of 2002, but in time, that they might spawn a new framework altogether.
Responding to non-compliance is a promising area for progress at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, because it imposes no additional burden on states that are playing by the rules.
France is closer in agreement with other nuclear-weapon states in moving towards nuclear abolition than some might think -- but not without seeing other nuclear powers fulfill their end of the bargain.
The question is not whether the U.S. is willing to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program, but rather whether the Iranian government is at all willing to make compromises on its current nuclear posture.
Nuclear-weapon states should commission their defense ministries and think tanks to perform serious analysis on the practical steps of moving towards zero nuclear weapons.
Fully factoring concerns about proliferation into nuclear-energy policy will promote a much needed debate about whether some technologies are too proliferation-sensitive to be deployed despite potential economic benefits.
Those opposed to ridding the world of nuclear weapons have a tendency of setting up and knocking down the same old straw men, argue George Perkovich and James. M Acton. If disarmament advocates want to improve the debate, they need to stress that the US would not disarm unilaterally or leave its allies in the lurch.
This paper, presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) 50th Annual Meeting, considers the challenges and policy choices associated with verifying a North Korean declaration about its past nuclear activities.
James M. Acton, Pierre Goldschmidt, and George Perkovich argue that the position taken by Senator Jon Kyl and Richard Perle on US nuclear weapons policy is to be welcome as a stimulus to analysis and debate, but relies on a series of invalid premises.