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Many key aspects of the recent Brazilian-Argentine nuclear cooperation agreement remain unresolved. This article reviews its main obstacles and future prospects.
In this paper commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, George Perkovich and Patricia Lewis identify possible nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation steps that could take the world in the mid-term to a position from which the latter steps toward abolition of nuclear weapons could be charted.
Given Venezuela's close collaboration with Iran, those states and companies that would contemplate nuclear cooperation with the Chávez government should consider whether they might help recreate the alarming history of Iran's nuclear program and subsequent international crises.
Women's leadership in international security is moving from the sidelines to center court, but the bench is not deep enough, and too many women are taking themselves out of the game. President-elect Obama’s administration should draw on the pool of talented women to bring fresh perspective to his international security team.
"Global Zero" has become a well-known slogan to revive the decades-old idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Interest in abolition has been renewed by the concern that the use of nuclear weapons could become ever more likely. With nuclear deterrence we bought time, but it would be a tremendous mistake to believe that deterrence will always work.
The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) sought to tighten the criteria for nuclear cooperation and reshape the nuclear fuel cycle. Many of its provisions have been forgotten, but the NNPA regained notoriety this year with the approval of the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement. The objectives of the NNPA are timeless and in no danger of being achieved soon.
For the better part of three decades, U.S. policy toward Iran has largely focused on punitive measures aimed at weakening the Iranian regime and limiting its regional influence. It is high time to concede such an approach has failed to achieve its bottom line: Iran’s regional influence is greater today than ever, and hard-liners have a virtual monopoly over power in Tehran.
In this paper presented at the 7th Republic of Korea-United Nations Joint Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues, Dr. Goldschmidt recommends a number of pragmatic steps which he argues the IAEA and the UN should take to strengthen the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime.
Despite talk of a renaissance, nuclear power will account for a declining percentage of global electricity generation without aggressive financial support and significant policy changes. Before committing to a rapid expansion of nuclear energy, the next U.S. administration must address critical questions about the feasibility and safety of that expansion, and act to minimize proliferation risks.
Nuclear disarmament is not an end in itself. Rather, it should be a means to global security. Some argue that nuclear deterrence provides the best form of security. But the fact that we worry so much about proliferation suggests awareness that deterrence in a complex multi-polar order is not fail-safe. The only long-term answer is to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to zero.