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Last week, a group of 45 countries dealt a serious blow to the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime. Succumbing to enormous pressure exerted by President Bush and his administration, the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed to allow nuclear trade once more with India – a country that has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and tested nuclear weapons in 1974 and 1998.
On September 6, 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to break a 16-year ban and allow nuclear trade with India. Now President Bush must prove to Congress that the proposed trade deal meets the requirements of the Hyde Act.
This analysis compares U.S. law, the draft U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, the answers to the questions for the record and Indian official statements on the potential consequences of another Indian nuclear weapons test on U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation. The answers to the questions for the record reveal gaps in U.S. and Indian interpretations.
Although U.S.-Russia relations have deteriorated, options for cooperation still exist. Particularly in the area of nuclear nonproliferation, collaboration is essential and may be the best way to ameliorate relations. Russia, the U.S., and Europe should start with negotiating the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which will provide a starting point for brokering a new consensus.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group can help bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream by imposing conditions on civilian nuclear trade with India or else risk significant damage to itself and the nonproliferation regime.
Uncertainty about what the IAEA-India safeguards agreement actually means and whether India and the United States have a common understanding reinforces the need for continued close scrutiny of all aspects of the U.S.-India nuclear deal as approvals are sought from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the U.S. Congress.
The newly approved IAEA-India nuclear safeguards agreement moves to consideration by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in late August to early September, but several ambiguities in the language of the agreement continue to make it controversial and it is highly unlikely to secure U.S. congressional approval by year-end.
A revival of nuclear energy worldwide appears to be looming, but it will not take place overnight and now is the time to ensure that future nuclear expansion is as safe and secure as possible, said Pierre Goldschmidt, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
In a study commissioned jointly by the Harvard Belfer Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie's Pierre Goldschmidt presents a multi-stage process that the international community should follow to strengthen the capacity of the IAEA to resolve in a timely manner cases of non-compliance.
Decision time has arrived on the controversial nuclear cooperation proposal that was first proposed by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005. Because the NSG and IAEA traditionally operate by consensus, any one of a number of states can act to block or modify the ill-conceived arrangement. They have good reason and a responsibility to do so.