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While the U.S. and its allies and associates are trying to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability, newly declassified documents on U.S.-Taiwan relations during the 1970s show what a successful, mostly secret, campaign against a national nuclear program looks like.
The U.S.-India nuclear agreement was completed in Washington. Unfortunately, the concessions made by the United States at the end of the process may damage the Bush administration's broader efforts to rein in nuclear proliferation.
The United States and India announced the completion of negotiations on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal on July 27. Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis has been widely recognized as one of the core individuals who made the U.S.-India nuclear deal possible. A recent Indian Express article by Pranab Dhal Samanta discusses the individuals and crucial moments that provided the political climate for the two countries to reach an agreement.
Dr. Ashley J. Tellis, who has been intimately involved in the negotiations of the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement, believes 'this is the last chance the two sides have to get the impasse over the 123 Agreement resolved and get going on the next phase of the deal before problems arise with the Congressional calendar.'
Brazil is betting on a “renaissance” of nuclear energy in the next few decades and, having large uranium mineral reserves, believes it could be an exporter of enrichment services in a growing market. The Brazilian program should not be considered a danger to proliferation, however, because it is under IAEA safeguards and monitored by Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control.
There are three priorities for strengthening the nonproliferation regime and combating nuclear proliferation: ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, addressing cases of non-compliance, and dissuading withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The international community must adopt and enforce three new, stronger nonproliferation rules: 1) Limit the spread of fissile material production capabilities; 2) States not in compliance with NPT obligations may not withdraw from the NPT without penalty; and 3) Agreement that states will provide nuclear cooperation to others only if the recipient is implementing the IAEA additional protocol.
United Nations Resolution 1540 would make proliferation more difficult and less attractive, facilitate the dismantlement of proliferation networks, and create momentum to strengthen other aspects of the nonproliferation regime—but major challenges preventing actual implementation need to be comprehensively addressed.
A team of leading nonproliferation experts offers a blueprint for rethinking the international nonproliferation regime. They offer a fresh approach to deal with states and terrorists, nuclear weapons, and fissile materials through a twenty-step, priority action agenda.
In a provocative new policy brief, Ashley Tellis challenges the conventional wisdom that China’s antisatellite test (ASAT) was a protest against U.S. space policy, arguing instead that it was part of a loftier strategy to combat U.S. military superiority and one that China will not trade away in any arms-control regime.