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Russia's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty - an important and successful component of the arms control regime - threatens nonproliferation goals. Rather than unilaterally withdrawing, Russia should request exceptions to accomodate its concerns.
(Guest analysis by Bruno Dupré)
One of the most useful things I learned at the Kennedy School of Government several years ago was about leadership and negotiation. Charisma, persuasiveness, and a high tolerance for ambiguity are certainly helpful for a successful negotiation, but by no means sufficient. It is also necessary to diagnose parties’ motivations, zones of potential agreement, possible alternatives, coalitions that could shift power in desired directions, and the best possible process for managing difficult negotiations. Without this methodology one can only hope for the best. But planning each element of a negotiation process increases the odds of success.
I left Harvard just as the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) entered negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Three years later, the world is still looking for the best way to get out of this crisis. Tehran keeps refusing to comply with IAEA and UN demands, using all kinds of pressure, from denying access to UN inspectors (January 27, 2007) to threatening the very existence of Israel. Many fear uncontrolled escalation in the region and beyond. The consensus maintained so far seems to be deteriorating suddenly. It is useful, at this critical moment, to recall the rationale of the EU approach. Even if success is far from being guaranteed, there is, for the time being, no better alternative. (Read More)
The international community must reject the passive notion that more countries are unavoidably destined to acquire nuclear weapons, and instead must implement further measures to dissuade and deter non-nuclear weapon states from seeking such weapons.
One of the most vexing questions regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis is that analysts are unable to determine whether or not Iran has actually decided to build nuclear weapons or whether it just wants a “hedging” option at this point.
A recent article by Roger Stern suggests that because of a likely decline in Iranian oil exports and the attendant revenues, "Iran's claim to need nuclear power could be genuine". However, the suggestion that the Iranian nuclear power program is a response to an impending decline in Iranian oil exports is surely mistaken.