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The futures of Lebanon and nuclear weapons in the Middle East now intertwine, and Iran is the common link. But Tehran will rebuff pressure in one area by indirectly threatening to make things worse in the other. Iran’s counterparts must step back and develop a more comprehensive diplomatic strategy.
Iran has said no to the U.N. Security Council's legally binding demand that Tehran suspend enrichment of uranium, as a first step toward resuming negotiations over the future course of its nuclear-energy program and broader relations with the West. It's now time for the U.S. to quietly rally Europe, the Middle East and Asia to develop plans for containing and deterring a nuclear-armed Iran.
On July 31, 2006 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, demanding that Iran “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” The resolution came after Iran had ignored a series of requests from the IAEA, the EU-3, and the United States for Iran to cease its enrichment program until its peaceful nature could be confirmed by the IAEA. Iran claimed that neither the IAEA nor any member of the international community had the right to prevent Iran from pursuing a domestic nuclear energy program. Resolution 1696 undermines the legal basis on which Iran has resisted suspension. As the international community awaits Iran’s response to the Security Council’s demands, it is important to understand this new legal context.
1696 was adopted after three years of negotiations between Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom failed to resolve outstanding questions regarding Iran’s compliance with its IAEA safeguard obligations and its Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons obligation under Article II “not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Throughout these negotiations, Iran has been pressed to suspend uranium enrichment activities, as a confidence-building measure to facilitate negotiations over longer-term parameters to objectively guarantee that Iran’s nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iran agreed as a voluntary, unilateral measure in November 2003 to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA. It then intermittently broke the terms of the suspension until November 2004, when a more specific agreement was made with the EU-3. Iran then breached that agreement on August 10, 2005 when it removed the IAEA seals from its conversion plant in Esfahan in preparation for manufacturing UF6 gas to be enriched. (Read More)
On July 26, the US House of Representatives passed the “
The House also demanded periodic reporting from the President on
These modifications have generated apprehension on the Indian side. Among the political parties, the CPI (M), a key leftist ally of the ruling Congress government with a traditionally anti-US stance, has expressed a heightened sense of concern about the deal’s impact on
Rather than being primarily composed of a shadowy subversive network of international terrorists, most of the central players in the A.Q. Khan proliferation network were well-to-do Anglo-Saxons. They were clever and exploited voids in national and international export control laws to sell their wares. Greed was their central motivation.
In the latest move in the wrestling match with the international community, Iran is being pushed back to the UN Security Council. Iran’s unwillingness to negotiate over the recent international incentive package was too much for France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and even Russia and China to take. This is not the last move, however, and it is important that the international community not waver on the need for Iran to resume without further delay suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.
We say this because in Washington and elsewhere, the erroneous and unhelpful impression was being promoted that the United States is the actor holding up negotiations with Iran. Seymour Hersh’s insightful article in the July 10 & 17 issue of The New Yorker begins by reporting that the Bush Administration’s offer to join talks with Iran was conditioned on the President’s demand that “‘the Iranian regime fully and verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.’” Hersh continues that in essence “Iran, which has insisted on the right to enrich uranium, was being asked to concede the main point of negotiations before they started.” Herein lies a damaging fallacy.
The facts are that the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors has called for Iranian suspension nine times in resolutions between September 2003 and February 2006, and the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of March 29, 2006 also calls for Iran to re-establish “full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development”. In each case, the demand is for immediate Iranian suspension. The logic follows the November 15, 2004 Paris Agreement between the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and Iran, whereby Iran agreed that “the suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements”. The aim of the agreement was to provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, while meeting Iran’s interests in developing peaceful nuclear technology and gaining the economic benefits of ties with Europe and the security benefits of broader rapprochement in the Middle East. Iran broke that suspension last August before it bothered to consider an offer of incentives by the EU-3. It is risible that Iran now says it needs months to analyze and respond to the more ambitious incentive package offered by the EU-3 and supported by the US, Russia and China.
In other words, the call for Iran to suspend enrichment now is an international demand, not an exceptional American one, and it does not prejudge the outcome of subsequent negotiations. (Read More)
While deterrence as a concept has always been paradoxical, it is poorly equipped to handle today’s most significant nuclear challenges: proliferation and terrorism. Nuclear arms control must move beyond the deadlock of deterrence.
In a new report, Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis argues empirically that natural uranium resources do not limit
The report states that
Tellis also addresses the contentious issue of whether the deal violates Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He states that the NPT legally allows for nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on safeguarded facilities, even if the country has not committed to full-scope safeguards. Tellis asserts that critiques that the U.S.-India nuclear deal violates Article I lead “inexorably to the conclusion that no party to the NPT should have any economic intercourse with
To access the full report, click here.
Many observers believe that Israel is pushing the U.S. to take military action against Iran's nuclear program. We asked Israel's senior defense journalist, Ze'ev Schiff, a man with outstanding contacts, to describe Israeli establishment thinking today on the Iran challenge.
When in Washington, I was amazed to hear on a number of occasions that Israel was urging the United States to go to war with Iran and that its strategic objective was to induce the United States to attack Iran, thus putting an end to that country's nuclear program. To the best of my knowledge and understanding this claim is totally false. It is an error based on ignorance or on disregard for important details in Israeli strategic thinking. It may even be founded on a deliberate lie.
To the best of my knowledge, Israel does not believe war against Iran to be the best way to eliminate the Iranian nuclear project. There is a common tendency to forget that Israel lies on the frontline of such a war. Israel stands to suffer more than anyone else, including the United States, should such a war break out. It would certainly be the prime target of Iranian retaliation should the United States decide to use force against Iran. It is a known fact that the attack on the Israeli consulate in Buenos Aires some years ago was the work of Iranian agents. Also in Buenos Aires, Iranian agents were responsible for the destruction of the Jewish community offices, causing many casualties. In fact, the Iranian government aims its violence against Jewish institutions in countries outside the Middle East. (Read More)