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The following are excerpts from the prepared remarks by Patrick Clawson, deputy director at The Washington Institute, on "Iran's Motives and Strategies: The Role of the Economy" delivered at a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on May 17, 2006. Click here to access his full testimony.
The Limitations of Economic Instruments
Economic instruments alone are unlikely to be sufficient to persuade Iran to freeze its nuclear program. The principal levers of power in Iran are in the hands of revolutionaries who are not motivated primarily by economic concerns, while those who care about the state of the economy do not have sufficient influence on their own to persuade the real power-holders to change policies. Success at influencing Iranian policy is much more likely if action on the economic front is combined with action on other fronts...
Much as pressure should be applied on several fronts rather than just on the economy, so inducements offered Iran should take multiple forms rather than only being trade and investment incentives. Indeed, economic inducements look suspiciously like bribes paid for bad behavior. Besides being odious, such bribes give the impression that bad behavior is more profitable than good behavior...
A much more appropriate form of inducement would be security inducements. Such security inducements should be designed to counter the argument that Iran needs nuclear weapons for its defense. There are many confidence- and security-building measures and arms control measures that would provide gains for both Iran and the West, similar to the way such steps reduced tensions between the old Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. One example would be an agreement to reduce the risk of incidents at sea between the U.S. and Iranian navies.
A further security inducement which the United States could offer would be to address the reported concern that the Bush administration's real goal is regime change in Iran and that the Bush administration will use force to that end. Such complaints sound peculiar coming from an Iranian government whose president lectures President Bush on why the United States should abandon its liberal democracy and who sponsored a conference last fall on theme "The World Without Zionism and America"...
It would of course be inappropriate for the U.S. government to offer any security guarantees to the Iranian or any other government; what government is in power in another country is up to the people of that country to decide. But what Washington could offer Tehran would be a "conditional security assurance" -- jargon for the simple proposition, "We will not attack you if you do not attack us." (Read More)
At first glance, Russia's current position on the Iranian nuclear crisis is quite controversial.
At first glance, Russia's current position on the Iranian nuclear crisis is quite controversial.
The debate over the nuclear deal negotiated by the Bush Administration and the government of India is too narrow, focusing on the nonproliferation aspects of the deal and leaving larger strategic questions relatively unexamined. This is ironic, as the best argument for the deal is that it advances big strategic goals.
The international community should stand back and reflect on the lessons learned from the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) experience in implementing safeguards over the last decade, particularly in North Korea and Iran. Such review and reflection suggests that just when safeguards are getting better, the political will to use them effectively seems to be waning.
The agreement on civil nuclear cooperation that presently exists between the United States and India was the only accord possible because it remains the only framework that protects the core national security interests of both sides.
President Mahmoud Amadinejad of Iran sent a letter to President Bush raising questions about American "justice" and questioning whether the United States or Iran is more righteous. This letter should be answered in kind by the Bush administration. Unfortunately, there is likely to be no such reply.
The debate over the nuclear deal negotiated by the Bush Administration and the government of India is too narrow. If other alternatives are not explored, there is a risk that Asia will experience a dangerous and costly build up of nuclear arsenals – a nuclear bubble much more dangerous than housing or stock market bubbles.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent the following letter to President George Bush. The unorthodox letter contains no concrete diplomatic proposals, but it does suggest Ahmadinejad's confidence that by championing a moral, religious, political, and economic critique against U.S. ideology and policies he can tap populist passions swelling not only in the Middle East and other Muslim societies but also in Latin America. Ahmadinejad is inviting a contest over whether the positions he and Iran pursue are more just than those of the Bush Administration. The U.S. should not ignore this challenge, but rather take it head on. In the Foreign Affairs article, "Giving Justice Its Due," (July/August 2005), George Perkovich suggested some ways in which the U.S. could address growing international demands for justice to complement the "freedom doctrine." We have provided the full text of Ahmadinejad's letter to President Bush. (Read More)