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On January 19 French president Jacques Chirac announced slight changes to the county’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Chirac seemed to expand the definition of
In 1958, an American U-2 spy plane flying over Israel spotted an unusual construction site near the small Negev Desert town of Dimona. The facility featured a long perimeter fence, building activity and several roads. Israeli officials initially called the facility a textile plant; they later changed their minds and described it as a "metallurgical research installation."
Paul Pillar’s new Foreign Affairs article--full of stunning insights and revelations--is required reading for all concerned with accountability for the misinformation provided to the American people before the war and with the wisdom of restructuring the intelligence agencies before a full investigation had been completed.
Iran is moving to restart its suspended uranium enrichment program. Negotiations with the European Union have collapsed and the crisis is escalating. Does the United States -- or Israel -- have a military option?
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan warned in a major speech last week that “we cannot continue to lurch from crisis to crisis, until the [NPT] regime is buried beneath a cascade of nuclear proliferation.”
If you do not know the difference between uranium metal and uranium oxide, you never heard of “Green Salt” until today, and you have been more interested in Pittsburgh vs. Seattle than Tehran vs. Vienna, here’s your chance to catch up on the latest developments in the Iranian nuclear showdown.
We provide answers (with extensive quotes from the confidential IAEA report) to three key questions: What did the IAEA report say that was new, what does reporting to the Security Council mean, and what happens next?
1. What new evidence was in the January 31 IAEA confidential report on Iran?
Iran has taken some measures to attempt to assure the IAEA that it is in compliance with its safeguards agreement. Yet key issues remain unresolved, including explanation of particles of enriched uranium found on centrifuges, IAEA access to critical sites and scientists, and the interesting document detailing how to turn uranium into a metal. This later procedure has no role in fuel production; uranium in metal form is only used in nuclear weapons
The updated brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards says:
Much of this language was reported in the November 2005 IAEA Report on outstanding questions on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. New to the latest report is a direct reference to a 15-page document and the critical phrase, “…related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components.” (Read More)“Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to have been drawings, specifications and supporting documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of which are dated from the early- to mid-1980’s. Among these was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document had been provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency’s request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal.”
The Washington Post’s David Ignatius this week calls France “Bush’s new ally,” noting the increased cooperation between the two nations in several key areas. We can add one more to his list: India. France sees several benefits to opening up nuclear trade with India, as President George Bush wants. Even though it could setback global nonproliferation efforts, it would increase French-Indian trade and investment. There is a catch: while President Bush sees the deal as a way to expand U.S. influence, France sees it as a way to check that influence.
Here is the problem for both the United States and France. The U.S.-India “global partnership” proposed on July 18, 2005 by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will violate Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) comprehensive safeguard guidelines. Changing NSG guidelines to give India a permanent exception to the rules requires group consensus, but the president has run into resistance from a number of key NSG members. At an October 2005 meeting of the NSG, France, Russia and the United Kingdom showed support for dropping nuclear trade restrictions on India, but Austria, Sweden and Switzerland “registered strong reservations,” according to Wade Boese of Arms Control Today. (Read More)
In a candid January 18 press conference, Carnegie Vice-President George Perkovich and Visiting Scholar Pierre Goldschmidt discussed the current Iran crisis with reporters. Goldschmidt said he is urging officials to take a generic proactive approach that could solve other potential or actual cases of noncompliance:
“The UN Security Council should adopt a generic resolution saying that when the IAEA has found a country to be in noncompliance and if the IAEA requests more verification authority, the UN Security Council would immediately, under a Chapter 7 resolution, provide this additional authority.”
Unfortunately, the “international community” has a tendency “to only react to crisis,” Goldschmidt said, which puts him in an “uncomfortable” position trying to “solve one specific case, which is Iran.” He offered two solutions that, by involving the UN Security Council, would make Iran’s current voluntary commitments legally binding:
(Read More)“The minimum for me is to report [Iran] to the Security Council to request Iran to immediately resume the suspension of all enrichment-related activities, and, second, [for the Security Council] to provide the IAEA with a significantly increased verification mandate and authority. Once more, this has nothing to do with sanctions.”