The system for launching a nuclear strike in response to an enemy attack is fraught and risky. A delayed response option would make everyone safer.
New START is the last nuclear arms control pact left between the United States and Russia. If it isn’t extended, there will be no limits on either countries’ nuclear arsenals for the first time in decades.
The New START Treaty provides a framework for limiting the most worrisome of Russia’s new nuclear weapons systems.
China has long snubbed invitations to join U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control talks. Carnegie’s George Perkovich and a top Chinese nuclear expert discuss why the United States might regret it if China said yes.
The potential collapse of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia poses significant implications for Chinese nuclear thinking
Nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security only in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Without them, deterrence fuels an endless arms race, while any serious crisis between the great powers will bring them to the brink of nuclear war.
Traditionally, Moscow has insisted on arms control agreements being enshrined in legally binding documents, while Washington has been more open to political deals. Nevertheless, a new, more flexible approach could find support with the Russian leadership.
Strategic stability has fundamentally changed in the twenty-first century. To maintain or even strengthen it requires many long-standing ideas and policies to be rethought and overhauled.
Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty is a serious problem. However, U.S. withdrawal from the treaty without an effective strategy to focus political blame and strategic pressure on Russia, and to unify allies in a shared effort to stabilize alarming military competitions, would be counterproductive.
The fate of the INF Treaty is a wake-up call to arms controllers and strategists on both sides of the East-West divide.