Although the governments of the United States and Pakistan are unlikely to agree on conditions to complete a nuclear cooperation agreement, the national, regional, and global interests that would be involved in pursuing such a deal are important enough to make even a hypothetical discussion worthwhile.
The successor agreement to the U.S.-South Korean 1974 civil nuclear cooperation accord reflects the interdependence of the American and South Korean nuclear industries as an equal partnership.
The domestic debate over the Iran deal demonstrates politicians’ increasing aversion to compromise.
U.S. missile defense policy has been remarkably stable since the end of the Cold War. This consensus represents an equilibrium between external threats, domestic politics, and technological and financial realities.
If Congress prevents the United States from implementing its part of the deal, it would undercut not only Obama in attempting to a secure a better deal with Iran, but also any future president seeking to prevent proliferation through diplomacy.
The Saudi proliferation threat is a bluff designed to put pressure on Washington. Saudi Arabia does not have the nuclear capabilities today to quickly follow through on Prince al-Faisal’s pledge.
On the basis of what has been made known so far, there is no reason to suspect that the IAEA’s conclusions about Iran won’t be sound.
The Iran nuclear deal has yielded neither a verifiable Iranian commitment to restrict its nuclear endeavors to the parameters of a peaceful energy program, nor a mechanism that reliably prevents Iran from funneling the enormous unfrozen funds provided to it to all the wrong causes.
An analysis of the Iran deal from a nonproliferation perspective.
Beyond routine safeguards, the IAEA will continue to address with Iran allegations concerning so-called “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear programme.