Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The United States faces a series of critically important decisions on nuclear procurement, posture, and declaratory policy. Which policies will best ensure effective deterrence while minimizing the risks of escalation and arms racing?
Differences between Russia and the United States in the Board of Governors at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may inhibit multilateral verification of Iran’s safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, all states would benefit from actions to reduce such risks.
In holding out for the big deal, unfortunately, the Trump administration—like its predecessors—sacrificed a more immediate and necessary operational objective: stopping North Korean progress toward a larger and more menacing nuclear arsenal that could reliably target the mainland United States.
NATO must prepare for the threats of tomorrow, when dynamics may be more complex than those between superpowers in the twentieth century. To plan for such a world will signal that the alliance is far from brain dead.
New START’s expiration will undermine U.S. security by removing all limits on Russia’s modernizing nuclear arsenal, by reducing our visibility into that arsenal. Extending New START will not create any new problems; the Treaty will continue to support U.S. national security goals
New evidence from the Yom Kippur War shows how growing entanglement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons could lead to dangerous escalation spirals to nuclear war.
There is a vast gap between the United States and North Korea’s expectations and visions for the denuclearization negotiations. Artful compromise is needed to avoid an acrimonious break up.
There are good reasons to question how much additional capability the DF-17 will provide. Chinese propaganda, by contrast, is the only unclassified source for the accuracy of the first-of-its-kind DF-17.
Motivating this renewed push for active defense is a growing recognition of the magnitude of the peril that cyberattacks present to the private sector, along with limits on the government’s ability to arrest its growth and bring the perpetrators to justice.
The system for launching a nuclear strike in response to an enemy attack is fraught and risky. A delayed response option would make everyone safer.