In the modern world, the problems of information security do not only become pivotal on the national level but also emerge as strategically important for the entire international relations system. Besides, interaction and cooperation in this sphere is becoming an important focus area of U.S.-Russia relations. While Russia and the United States disagree on some issues of cybersecurity, there has been significant progress in this sphere as well.

Introduction

The advent of the information revolution impacted the foreign policy of developed states, making the sci-tech factor especially significant. The development of information technology has become one of the key components of scientific and technological progress in the second half of the twentieth century. These processes cannot be ignored because of the rapid development and expansion of information technologies, as well as their impact on the socioeconomic and political- military aspects of human activities.

The unceasing information revolution has resulted in greater globalization. While world experts interpret this phenomenon differently, most of them agree that the spread of information technologies and the Internet in the second half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century plays a crucial role in the development of modern society.

The spread of information technologies and their penetration into the economic sphere invariably lead to increasing dependence on the information infrastruc­ture. Its malfunctions present serious challenges to economic security and may also become a threat to a state’s national security.

Thus, along with apparent benefits, globalization and the information revolution bring a number of problems mostly related to information security. These problems attract the attention of political leaders and the international community.

The Internet came into existence and started spreading slightly over twenty years ago. During this period, cyber- security threats have evolved from the issues of fraud and theft committed by hackers and other criminal elements to strategic threats coming from hostile military forces.

The specifics of how information resources are being developed and used reveal that no government is able to provide the appropriate level of cybersecurity. As evidenced by international practices, the private sector is more conducive to the development of information technologies. Information technology enterprises can be commercially successful, provided their goods and services are in demand globally. Then practically any step a state takes to ensure information security will affect the public or business interests in one way or another, thus impeding the unrestricted development of information technologies.

At the same time, new international security architecture is currently being created in response to cybersecurity threats. It appears that this process intertwines with the problems of the emerging polycentric system of international relations. A particularly dangerous threat comes from military-sponsored cyberweapon projects, given the possibility of using information technologies to destroy an adversary’s infrastructure.

American scientists pioneered the development of Internet technology, and it was the United States that spearheaded the global spread of the information space. Therefore, the United States was the first country to face numerous consequences of the information revolution, while the American government was the first government to take steps against information threats. The United States certainly has unique experience in dealing with the challenges presented by information technologies; however, one can safely say that at the present time every developed country has made these challenges its national security and foreign policy priority. The most recent developments indicate that the issues of cybersecurity are also becoming a new priority for bilateral American-Russian relations.

Information policy became a basic component of U.S. domestic politics even during Bill Clinton’s tenure in the White House. In fact, the White House believed that the American dominance in the information sphere was to be achieved through the development and expan­sion of information technologies, as well as the accelerated socioeconomic growth of the country. During the Clinton years, the state sought to create the most favorable climate for the development of commercial information technologies in order to stimulate the economy. The active development of information technologies in the United States resulted in unprecedented access to significant informa­tion resources for business and the public.

The state provided tax incentives that brought about widespread computer and eventually Internet use throughout the country. Information technologies thus became the locomotive of America’s economic growth in the 1990s. To increase revenues from the production and sales of information technologies, reforms of export control systems in the high-tech sphere were undertaken. American computers, software, and the Internet structure were imposed as the standard for global cyberspace users.

George W. Bush’s policies were driven by increased national security threats in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration strove to establish global information control—not only on the national level but also across the globe. This objective informed U.S. foreign policy decisions on international cooperation in the sphere of developing information technologies and ensuring cybersecurity.

The U.S. policy in this sphere appears to have been a balancing act between supporting free enterprise and taking the steps necessary to ensure cybersecurity. Through trial and error, American politicians eventually concluded that ensuring cybersecurity should involve close and mutually advantageous cooperation between government institutions, business interests, civil society, and the international community.

American initiatives

The Barack Obama administration articulated its infor­mation security priorities in two doctrinal documents entitled International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World1 and Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.2 The documents outline the White House position on information security, the strategic development of the global information space, and the role of the military in ensuring cybersecurity.

Notably, the documents state that the United States is prepared to use any means necessary to respond to cyberattacks. Thus, diplomatic, economic, or military responses are possible.3 The authors of the strategy claim that they are planning to contain cyber threats. However, this is only possible if the United States possesses offensive cyberweapons. Many sources allude to their development, but such information is obviously classified. Most probably, it can be found in the classified part of military cyberstrategy.

Meanwhile, open sources suggest that the U.S. intelligence community takes cyberthreats very seriously. In 2009, Director of U.S. National Intelligence Dennis Blair especially emphasized the threat of terrorist attacks against the financial sector of the American economy. Also, the intelligence reports about Russia’s and China’s technical capability to critically damage the American information infrastructure and intelligence gathering first surfaced at the 2009 hearings. Subsequently, Blair stated that international cooperation to counteract threats is required. In 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper first called counteracting cybersecurity threats an "evolving strategic concern" for the American political leadership.4 Russian and Chinese actors were singled out as key sources responsible for the cyberattacks against American computer networks and the theft of American intellectual property.

At this year’s hearings, the issues of cybersecurity were given first priority. Clapper said that state and non-state actors engage in various types of cyberattacks to achieve their goals.5 The questions of Internet governance and global cyberspace regulation were raised for the first time in the context of cybersecurity threats.

The U.S. foreign policy priorities evolve as the need to defend civilian infrastructure arises. The Americans are quite active internationally, striving for greater cooperation with their key military and political allies on the issues of cybersecurity. Unfortunately, despite numerous declarations, the United States does not see Russia as its full-fledged strategic ally.

The issues of cybersecurity are part of several inter­national legal agreements on collective security—for instance, the Pacific Security Treaty (ANZUS). According to the joint statement signed by the U.S. and Australian defense and foreign ministers on September 15, 2011, "in the event of a cyberattack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence or secu­rity of either of our nations, Australia and the United States would consult together and determine appropriate options to address the threat." 6

In this context, NATO’s increased cybersecurity efforts are of particular interest. NATO’s cybersecurity strategy is reflected in the Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 7 and also in the declaration signed after the November 2010 summit in Lisbon.8 In June 2011, a cybersecurity doctrine, which is currently inaccessible to the general public, was adopted. Besides, NATO is creating administrative and organizational structures responsible for ensuring collective cybersecurity.

The Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare published in 2013 should be treated seriously as well.9 The document deals with the extremely complicated issues of using cybertools for warfare. The authors of this manual have done a tremendous amount of research in the field of inter­national legal norms that regulate the use of information technologies by the military. In this respect, it is notable that they attempted to interpret transnational cyberattacks as violations of state sovereignty, which is essentially a pretext for applying Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

With the emergence of the polycentric world, where a number of different actors appear and evolve, the confrontation between the United States and China becomes more palpable, especially in such a new area as cyberspace. In this context, it is really interesting to observe U.S.-China cooperation in the sphere of cybersecurity. Both the United States and China have quite a few allies in cyberspace. Russia plays a special role here through its diplomats’ numerous initiatives. For instance, Russia and China participate in the Convention on International Information Security, which the Russian Federation originally proposed.

The situation is complicated by the virtual lack of common diplomatic forums where the United States and China could discuss Chinese cyberthreats to U.S. national security.

Essentially, the first U.S.-China summit at the level of heads of state where the problems of cybersecurity were discussed took place in the United States in early June this year. Barack Obama started his meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping by discussing the issues of cybersecurity within the framework of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue on the Economy and Security. At the press conference that followed the meeting, Obama announced that an agreement had been reached on the need to formulate common approaches to the issues of cybersecurity.10 For his part, Xi Jinping stated that Chinese authorities are concerned with the problems of cybersecurity.

Russia’s position on the issues of information security

The issues of cybersecurity are definitely among the top priorities for Russian foreign policy. According to Russia’s National Security Strategy until 2020,11 "threats to military security include the policies of a number of leading foreign countries, directed at achieving predominant superiority in the military sphere, primarily in terms of strategic nuclear forces, but also by developing high-precision, informational and other high-technology means of conducting armed warfare, strategic non-nuclear arms." Also, the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation states that in order to strengthen international security, Russia "will take necessary measures to ensure national and international information security, prevent political, economic and social threats to the state’s security that emerge in the information space in order to combat terrorism and other crimi­nal threats in the area of application of information and communication technologies, prevent them from being used for military and political purposes that run counter to international law, including actions aimed at interference in the internal affairs and constituting a threat to international peace, security and stability." 12

Russian diplomats proposed the term "international information security" (IIS) as early as 1998, while the UN became the main forum for advancing this subject. On September 23, 1998, Russia’s foreign min­ister sent UN Secretary General Kofi Annan a special message. "The message especially emphasized the need to prevent the emergence of an entirely new area of confrontation—the informational area, which may provoke a new arms race. In this light, the emphasis was put on the creation of cyberweapons and the danger of possible cyberwars. Given the level of social informatization as well as the vulnerability of informational structures, one cannot rule out the appearance of cyberweapons whose properties may equal those of weapons of mass destruction." 13

Russia initiated the formation of the Group of UN Governmental Experts, headed by Russian diplomat Andrei Krutskikh. While the ideas of international information security were supported by the international community, they encountered serious opposition on the part of American experts. "In the U.S., information and communication technologies are a powerful means of increasing military capabilities. Americans have actively used information weapons in the course of all of the latest military conflicts. The U.S. is interested in retaining a free rein to use these technologies for military and political purposes, while essentially remaining outside of the realm of international law." 14

The Russian diplomatic efforts can indeed be considered successful in light of the fact that for many years the UN resolution on "developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security," in which Russia’s ideas on IIS were reflected, had been passed by a consensus vote of the General Assembly despite the American opposition.

Russia’s position on the issue of international legal regulation of the Internet has been formulated in international legal documents numerous times. Its distinct characteristic is an effort to prevent the militarization of global cyberspace, which appears to be the major condition necessary for ensuring international information security.

A number of other states share Russia’s position. In this context, an agreement signed by the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is of particular interest. "The inaugural meeting of the Group of IIS Experts of SCO Member States was held on October 25-27, 2006, in accordance with the June 15, 2006 resolution contained in the Declara­tion of the Heads of SCO Member States on International Information Security. The group was officially constituted in the course of the meeting, institutional basis for its work was agreed upon, and the Russian Federation expert was elected its chairman, since Russia was the state that initiated the SCO discussions on the issues of IIS. The action plan on ensuring international information security formulated by the Group was approved by the Council of the SCO Foreign Ministers on July 9, 2007 and ratified by the Council of the SCO Foreign Ministers that took place on August 16, 2007." 15 Besides, Russian diplomats can take credit for making the issues of informational security a subject of regular discussion at the Collective Security Treaty Organization summits.16

At the same time, the Russian position is being challenged within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It appears that the aforementioned challenges were to blame for the lack of consensus and failure to adopt the international agreement on cybersecurity at the end of last year.17

Currently, the Russian position is reflected in the Draft Convention on International Information Security presented at the international meeting of high-ranking officials responsible for security matters in Yekaterinburg on September 21-22, 2011. It asserts that "each State Party will determine its military potential in the information space on the basis of national procedures, with consideration for the lawful interests in security of other States, as well as the necessity of working to strengthen international peace and security. No State Party will make an attempt to achieve dominance in the information space over other States." 18

Disagreements on the issues of cybersecurity in American-Russian relations

It has taken the international community over twenty years to realize the urgent necessity of creating the universal international legal framework for the issues of cybersecurity. However, there is a significant divergence in countries’ approaches to this problem. On the one hand, some hold that the global information network is a common good of planetary proportions. In this case, an approach to ensuring information security may resemble that of solving ecological problems. International leaders who support this position strive for developing universal international legal norms that will have to be implemented by the national governments in their respective countries. This appears to be Russia’s approach, embodied in the concept of IIS.

The worldwide Internet network is hardly identical to the concept of the "information space"; nevertheless, given the diversity of modern communication technologies and communication protocols, it is the most prominent aspect of the information space. This approach engenders similar mechanisms of counteract­ing threats as the ones used in environmental protection, space exploration, or, perhaps, mutual cooperation in the Arctic.

In other words, in theory, the obligations undertaken by the national governments eliminate threat emergence and implementation. It is implied, however, that the governments possess working mechanisms of internal political control over their "sector." In addition, this approach eliminates the possibility that a common resource may be appropriated or used unilaterally; in fact, states are expected to take on a reciprocal obligation.

According to the other approach, every state views its information resources as a matter of national sovereignty. Moreover, every state reserves the right to react to national (informational) security threats as it deems necessary. While allowing for the development of an international legal framework in the sphere of global information space regulation, this approach does not permit regulation that limits the unrestricted develop­ment of information resources inside the country.

The position of the United States is quite consistent. It appears that the United States has a different approach to the issues of global Internet and information space regulations. To a large extent, this approach is being shaped under the influence of the American business lobby, as evidenced by a letter in support of the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act sent by Ameri­can business leaders to House Speaker John Boehner and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi in April 2012. The authors of this letter reiterate that a greater government role in the development of the information space will hinder the development of the information sector. They express their concern over the problems of infor­mation security; nevertheless, they claim that "information infrastructure is privately owned, thus the only appropriate way to counteract cyberthreats is through public-private partnership." 19

Since information resources are to a large extent produced by American information and telecommunication giants, the U.S. government interprets any impediment to their development as a national economic security threat. The adoption of international legal norms proposed by the international community will necessitate the adoption of domestic regulations that may harm free competition on domestic markets. Thus, American telecommunication companies may suffer serious losses, which will definitely have a negative impact on the American economy.

At the same time, the attempts that the international community made to reform the current system of Internet governance exacerbated the differences in approaches to the problem of global governance of the information space. In reality, cyberspace and the Internet represent an extremely complex system that includes both state and commercial elements. Its existence and development depend more on popular demand and private-sector supply than on national governments.

A number of historical factors also complicate the development of the Internet. Since the inception of the Internet until the present day, the United States has had quite an effective mechanism of Internet governance in the form of ICANN—the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Since Barack Obama took office in 2009, ICANN has undergone significant reform. According to the Affirmation of Commitments, the new doctrinal document signed by the U.S. Department of Commerce and ICANN, the latter received greater independence. Besides, the ICANN Government Advisory Committee received substantial powers in the sphere of Internet governance.

In December 2012, at the International Telecommu­nication Union (ITU) World Conference on International Telecommunications in Dubai, another attempt to reform the global system of Internet governance was made. The international document adopted in the course of the conference significantly expands the powers of government agencies in the sphere of Internet regulation; consequently, they gain more power to regulate the global information space as well.20 The adoption of this document drew the ire of American lawmakers. On the eve of the conference, Congress passed a unanimous resolution that condemned the expansion of state powers in the information sphere.21 Terry Kramer, the head of the American delegation at the ITU conference, said that "[the United States] will actively oppose the Russian proposals [to reform the ITU]"and that "out of all the proposals that have come in, the Russian one is the most disappointing." 22

The discussions between the political leaders of the member states at the conference also created additional strain in U.S.-China relations. China sided with Russia, signing the new ITU treaty.

In light of increased tensions between the United States and Russia, future bilateral cooperation on issues of information security seemed unlikely.

Following a number of official visits, a joint U.S.-Russian statement on the issues of cybersecurity was prepared in June 2011.23 It is worth noting that this statement was signed by Cybersecurity Coordinator for the Obama Administration Howard Schmidt and Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Klimashin. It mentions that "mutual understanding on national security issues in cyberspace... facilitates better collaboration in responding to cyberthreats."24

In April 2013, Howard Schmidt’s successor, Michael Daniel, visited Moscow along with the State Department delegation.25 Judging by the makeup of the delegation, the United States did not plan to discuss military issues related to international cybersecurity.

Two months later, during the G8 summit in Northern Ireland, Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama signed a number of documents on cybersecurity issues. The Joint Statement on a New Field of Cooperation in Confidence Building.26 for instance, alluded to the threats to the use of information and communication technologies as some of the most serious national and international security challenges in the twenty-first century. These challenges can include political-military and criminal threats, and especially threats of a terrorist nature. Cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation in this area is extremely important, primarily for the purpose of enhancing a bilateral understanding of information security threats.

The presidents have agreed to create a mechanism for information sharing in order to better protect critical information systems. The joint statement also mentions establishing a direct communication link between high-level officials to exchange this information. In addition, a bilateral working group within the framework of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission was to be created within the next month and immediately start its practical activities.

It is evident that the problem of cybersecurity is becom­ing a new priority on the agenda of American-Russian relations. It is important to try to make the global information space an area of cooperation rather than confrontation. The agreements reached in Northern Ireland can be considered very successful, especially given the fact that the joint statement was signed while serious disagreements still remain.

Indirectly, the scandal involving former intelligence sector employee Edward Snowden may have a negative effect on American-Russian relations in the area of information security.

According to the information that Snowden disclosed, American intelligence services allegedly received different types of data from America’s largest telecommunications companies. In his answers to the questions posed by the readers of the Guardian, Snowden mentioned Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Skype, and others. It is well known that practically every modern user of Internet technologies has taken advantage of their services. The Russian user is also familiar with every one of them.

It is impossible to estimate how much confidential infor­mation these companies had access to and how much of it was handed over to the U.S. intelligence agencies. It is obvious that U.S. citizens are not the only patrons of the above-mentioned service providers. Snowden claims that PRISM collected data directly from their servers.27

In the course of the Congressional investigation surrounding the PRISM program and Snowden’s assertions, all of the top brass U.S. intelligence officials who could have access to confidential data were called to testify before Congress.28 Keith Alexander, the Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command and also the National Security Agency (NSA) director, did not deny the facts disclosed by Snowden. He stated that if terrorists had known about the ways in which American intelligence services obtain information, they would have used other means of communication, which could have led to the loss of American lives.

According to a brief statement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the American intelligence agencies did not target U.S. citizens but monitored foreigners located overseas.29 Thus, one may infer that the intelligence services dealt with a large number of Russian citizens as well. In this context, Apple’s decision to integrate the Russian Yandex search engine into its new iOS7 platform looks suspect.

Having spent almost a month in the transit zone of a Moscow airport, Snowden decided to stay in Moscow and was granted temporary asylum in Russia for a period of one year. This turn of events undermined all of the progress made by both sides in the area of cybersecurity, as well as many other important areas. The Snowden affair has significantly complicated U.S.-Russia relations, effectively negating the "reset" policy, which was put in place in 2009. It also jeopardized the U.S.-Russia summit that was scheduled to take place during the upcoming G20 meeting.

During his current (now legal) stay in Russia, Snowden keeps adding fuel to the fire by claiming that the American spy server that was used to collect data on Russian citizens is located in Moscow.30 His further revelations that along with ordinary users the National Security Agency targeted world political leaders have complicated the issue of covert operations by the American intelligence services even more.

The telecommunication companies that found themselves in the midst of the Snowden affair assert that they released information only upon following proper legal procedures. However, Snowden did not claim that the companies knowingly transferred data; he says PRISM obtained it directly from the companies’ servers.31

Further revelations may have caused NSA Director and Head of the U.S. Cyber Command Keith Alexander to offer his resignation. After making this announcement, the NSA chief said that he would rather "take the beatings [from the public and in the media] than give up a program that would result in this nation being attacked."32

The Snowden affair has also revealed some international legal flaws, which will be harder to remedy. As information technologies improve, it is getting increasingly harder to keep secrets and increasingly easier to obtain various types of information. It is unfortunate that these circumstances continuously erode trust between governments, nations, and other international actors.

It is possible that the international scandal around Snowden’s revelations may spur further increases in the development of defensive information technology for military purposes. It is imperative that diplomatic efforts to establish an international dialogue on these sensitive issues be intensified.

Conclusion

The United States and Russia need to reconcile their positions on issues of information security and explore the possibilities of mutually beneficial cooperation in cyberspace. These are the main priorities of U.S.-Russian relations in this sphere.

It is essential to overcome the recent disagreements, which intensified during the International Telecommunication Union summit on Internet governance.

The Snowden incident notwithstanding, it is important to avoid the escalation of conflict between Russia and the United States. It is possible to use this incident as a pretext for expanding the dialogue on issues of information security.

It is recommended that the military aspects of cybersecurity be given special attention in bilateral relations. The development of cyber weapons could unleash another round of the arms race and undermine strategic stability. Unlike the nuclear arms race of the Cold War era, the cyber arms race will be impossible to predict.

The United States and Russia cannot limit themselves to the agreements reached in Northern Ireland. Given the transformation of the international relations system and the emergence of a polycentric world, the problems of cybersecurity take on new significance.

First and foremost, working groups must be created and get to work in the nearest future as specified in the joint statement signed in Northern Ireland. It is important to begin the process of exchanging information on cyber threats and take further steps toward confidence building between the two countries.

Notes

1 International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (Washington, DC: May 2011).

2 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington, DC: July 2011), P. 10.

3 International Strategy, P. 14.

4 J.R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Com¬mittee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf.

5 J.R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf.

6 Ch. Pellerin, "Panetta: Regional Defense, Cyber Highlight AUSMIN Talks," American Forces Press Service, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65337.

7 Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government (Lisbon, November 19, 2010).

8 Lisbon Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Lisbon, November 20, 2010).

9 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, general ed. Michael N. Schmitt, 25 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).

10 "Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China After Bilateral Meeting," June 8, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/08/ remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-.

11 Russia’s National Security Strategy until 2020. Approved by Presidential Order No. 537 on June 9, 2009, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1/99.html.

12 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Approved by President Vladimir Putin on February 12, 2013, http://mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f 9c325787a0034c255/c32577ca0017434944257b160051bf7f!OpenDocument.

13 NTR i mirovayapolitika [The Scientific-Technological Revolution and World Politics], ed. A.V. Biriukova and A.V. Krutskikh, 122 (Moscow: MGIMO-Universitet, 2010).

14 Ibid., P. 129.

15 Innovatsionnye napravlenia sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy [Innovative Areas of Contemporary International Relations], general ed. director of hist., prof. A.V. Krutskikh, 144 (Moscow: Aspect Press, 2010).

16 For instance, http://www.dkb.gov.ru/session_fortnight/a.htm.

17 For more details see: A. Sternstein, "Cyber Early Warning Deal Collapses After Russia Balks," NextGov, December 7, 2012, http://cdn.nextgov.com/nextgov/interstitial.html?rf=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nextgov.com%2Fcybersecurity%2F2012%2F12%2Fcyber-early-warning-deal-collapses-after-russia-balks%2F60035%2F.

18 Draft Convention on International Information Security, http://cdn.nextgov.com/nextgov/interstitial.html?rf=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nextgov.com%2Fcybersecurity%2F2012%2F12%2Fcyb er-early-warning-deal-collapses-after-russia-balks%2F60035%2F.

19 Multi-industry Letter to Speaker Boehner & Minority Leader Pelosi on CISPA, April 17, 2012, http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/MultiIndustryHouseCybersecurityBoehnerPelosi.pdf.

20 Final Acts of the World Conference on International Telecommunications (Dubai, 2012), http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Documents/final-acts-wcit-12.pdf.

21 S. CON. RES. 50: Expressing the sense of Congress regarding actions to preserve and advance the multistakeholder governance model under which the Internet has thrived, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S%20Con%20Res%2050.pdf.

22 Amb. Kramer on International Telecommunications Conference, Nov. 2012, http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/11/20121129139303.html#ixzz2UZwOi5wW29.

23 Joint Statement by Cybersecurity Coordinator Schmidt and Deputy Secretary Klimashin, Washington, DC, June 23, 2011.

24 Ibid.

25 http://www.kommersant.ru/pda/kommersant.html?id=2181665.

26 Joint Statement on a New Field of Cooperation in Confidence Building, June 17, 2013, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/1479.

27 "Edward Snowden Identifies Himself as Source of NSA Leaks—as It Happened," Guardian, June 9, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/09/nsa-secret-surveillance-lawmakers-live?INTCMP=SRCH. 

28 How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans, and Why Disclosure Aids Our Adversaries, June 18, 2013, http://intelligence.house.gov/hearing/how-disclosed-nsa-programs-protect-americans-and-why-disclosure-aids-our-adversaries.

29 ODNI Statement on the Limits of Surveillance Activities, June 16, 2013, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/880-odni-statement-on-the-limits-of-surveillance-activities.

30 R. Dorokhov and A. Nikolsky, "Shpion v tsentre Moskvy" (A Spy in the Center of Moscow), Vedomosti, August 12, 2013, http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/507181/shpion-v-centre-moskvy.

31 "Edward Snowden Identifies Himself."

32 S. Ackerman, "Embattled NSA Chief Keith Alexander Rejects Calls to Limit Agency’s Power. Alexander Goes Before House Committee and Claims Reports of NSA Collecting Millions of Phone Calls Were ‘Absolutely False,’" Guardian, October 29, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/ nsa-chief-keith-alexander-house-hearing.