A new nuclear state, in a major crisis with a conventionally superior nuclear-armed adversary, contemplates and prepares to move nuclear assets in the event it has to use them. Who controls the nuclear forces? Who decides when they might be assembled, mated to delivery vehicles, moved, and launched? Who has nominal authority to order those decisions? Who has the physical ability to implement them even without proper authorization? How experienced are the relevant units in these operations? What could go wrong?
These were the questions that bedeviled Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil War and again in the 10-month standoff with India in 2001-2002. They are the same challenges and issues that confront North Korea today.
As the mountain of dust settles after North Korea’s purported thermonuclear bomb, intermediate-range ballistic missile, and intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) tests this summer and it becomes an increasingly operational nuclear state, one of the many deadly serious challenges it faces is how it manages its nuclear forces, or what command and control arrangement it erects. These arrangements are the transmission belt that makes a state’s nuclear strategy operational — how and when nuclear weapons are managed and might actually be employed. As a nuclear weapons power, North Korea now has to think about how precisely it wants to implement its “asymmetric escalation” strategy. And so does the United States, since these arrangements have very real implications for when nuclear weapons might be used intentionally — or unintentionally — in a conflict.
This article was originally published in War on the Rocks
Comments(1)
North Korea, as a matter of circumstances, needs to be recognized as an International Nuclear State. If so, the United Nations could observe operations. Some of the requirements in regard to this situation should be waived in order to allow the DPRK to comply with reasonable United Nations Study. Going ahead; North Korea is effective within only a 1,000 mile perimeter as a matter of present rocket trejectory as a matter of rocket thrust and section balance in consideration of the weight of a nuclear warhead. I consider the statements of President Trump and Marshall Kim Jong Un to be tough negotiation; however rocket capability on the part of the DPRK is limited. The United States has vulnerable areas here; however these matters are limited. I continue to push the use of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to President Trump and the Secretary General of The United Nations to settle these issues. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is part of the July 27, 1953 Armistice signed by all parties, except South Korea. As you can see, diplomatic efforts in this case are not limited to the United Nations Security Council.
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