Iranian Political and Nuclear Realities and U.S. Policy Options

Given Iran’s sizable influence on issues of critical importance to the United States—namely Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and energy security—the longstanding Washington policy debate about whether or not to “engage” has been rendered obsolete. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, Karim Sadjadpour explained that the United States can best attempt to set a new tone and context for its relationship with Tehran by building confidence in areas of overlapping interest, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.     

• Attempt to discern which Iranian policies are driven by an immutable revolutionary ideology, and which are a reaction to punitive U.S. measures.

• Focus on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who steers Iran’s nuclear ship and whose constitutional authority is far greater than that of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The most influential institutions within Iran—the Revolutionary Guards, the Guardian Council, the presidency, the parliament—are all currently led by individuals who were either directly appointed by Khamenei or unfailingly loyal to him.
   
• The nuclear issue is a symptom of the mistrust between the United States and Iran, not the underlying cause of tension. Given that neither side trusts the other’s intentions, there are no technical solutions to this nuclear dispute, only political ones.  
   
• Maintain an airtight multilateral approach on the nuclear issue. Iran is adept at exploiting rifts within the international community, and the entire diplomatic approach could unravel if key countries approach Iran with divergent talking points and red lines.
   
• A small group of spoilers will likely attempt to subvert a serious dialogue, whether by committing gratuitous human rights abuses or purposefully sending easily-discovered weapons shipments. Ending confidence-building efforts in retaliation strengthens the influence of these hardliners.
   
• Project the self-assurance of a superpower. Don’t mimic Tehran’s criticism; hostile U.S. rhetoric allows Iranian leadership to depict the United States as an aggressor.
   
• Refrain from any grand overtures to Tehran that could redeem Ahmadinejad’s leadership style ahead of the country’s June 2009 presidential elections. At the same time, refrain from commenting on the Iranian presidential campaign or expressing a preference for any particular candidate.