While India's space program has largely been civilian-run, the country's military is increasingly interested in expanding operations to defend against threats to its space assets.
Success at the 2015 Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference depends on genuine progress toward disarmament by nuclear weapon states and global and regional commitment to the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.
The mutual distrust between the P5+1 and Iran can only be overcome incrementally through a succession of positive actions by both sides. However, if Iran continues to defy existing UN Security Council resolutions, further sanctions are inevitable.
Conflict has escalated in the IAEA's decision-making bodies, in part due to Iran and Syria's support in the Non-Aligned Movement and because the same states have attacked Director General Yukiya Amano's hands-off approach to Israel.
The United States has neither the intention nor need to renew nuclear testing, yet its failure to ratify the CTBT undermines both the credibility of U.S. leadership and the ability of the United States to improve the detection and deterrence of testing by others.
The modest, verifiable reductions set out in New START do not raise hard questions about the adequacy of the U.S. deterrent. Instead, ratifying the treaty is integral to the Obama administration's overall security agenda and very much in the U.S. national interest.
The biggest threat to nonproliferation remains in the Middle East. An informal, strategic dialogue could help identify steps that can build confidence before an agreement for a nuclear-weapon-free zone is reached.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review defines China as a partner for international cooperation, but also expresses concerns about the modernization of China's nuclear arsenal, the lack of transparency, and its future intentions.
Neither Australia nor Japan speaks for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, but as co-chairs of the Commission their goals complement the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review in more ways than one.
The 2010 NPT Review Conference is not a make-or-break moment for the nonproliferation regime. Countries should realize that they each have an opportunity to create positive momentum for further strengthening the regime after the Review Conference.
Insisting on the establishment a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East is unrealistic and creates counterproductive expectations. A Nuclear-Test-Free Zone, however, would be a step in the right direction.
Militarily, the antiquated tactical U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe serve little to no purpose to NATO. But they remain a valuable bargaining chip and a strong symbol of U.S. security assurance to its European allies and partners.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review offers a number of hints on how Washington might influence the future of NATO's nuclear policy.
Opponents of the START follow-on agreement are employing scare tactics to impede Senate ratification of the treaty at the long-term risk of imperiling national security.
The best way to begin accounting for and reducing obsolete U.S. and Russian battlefield nukes is to finalize the new START agreement and, as the Obama administration has suggested, begin a new and more comprehensive round of talks early next year to arrive at limits on all types of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.
Consulting the G20, rather than the G8, on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons would be a novel and intriguing approach to strengthening the nonproliferation regime.
Senator Jon Kyl relies on old and misleading arguments to claim that the resumption of nuclear testing is necessary, but there are no technical or military reasons to resume U.S. nuclear weapons testing. The Senate's reconsideration of the CTBT should be based on an honest and up-to-date analysis of the facts.
The reported agreement to refuel the Tehran research reactor by shipping Iranian-made low enriched uranium to other states for further enrichment and fuel fabrication could be a good precedent for meeting Iran's future and potentially larger nuclear fuel needs.
Better protection of U.S. forces and allies against the Iranian missile threat is reason enough to welcome the shift in U.S. missile defense policy. Improving the prospects for future progress in reducing the threat from Russia is icing on the cake.
Unity among the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany will be key during this week's nuclear talks with Iran in Geneva. But can the P5+1 convince Iran that this time the international community means business?