Iran's failure to report its new centrifuge facility at Qom to the IAEA violates the terms of the Subsidiary Arrangements of the modified "Code 3.1," which Iran agreed to in 2003.
France is closer in agreement with other nuclear-weapon states in moving towards nuclear abolition than some might think -- but not without seeing other nuclear powers fulfill their end of the bargain.
James M. Acton, Pierre Goldschmidt, and George Perkovich argue that the position taken by Senator Jon Kyl and Richard Perle on US nuclear weapons policy is to be welcome as a stimulus to analysis and debate, but relies on a series of invalid premises.
The conventional wisdom in the West has been that Iranians support these policies and that there is at best only a difference of “tone” between the various factions in this area. This is mistaken. Recent events underline how much foreign policy has been used by hardliners for partisan purposes and how much scope there is for meaningful change in this area, explains Shahram Chubin.
Pierre Goldschmidt analyzes two IAEA reports on assurances of nuclear fuel supply. There are several inadequacies in both reports, Dr. Goldschmidt argues, and the Board of Governors should seek clarification on them before it might be asked to endorse potentially important proposals.
Pierre Goldschmidt analyzes the 2008 Safeguards Implementation Report on Egypt. He concludes that the IAEA's seeming reluctance to fully, promptly, and explicitly report on its findings on Egypt suggest that the IAEA's credibility is at stake.
Ahead of the first Obama-Netanyahu meeting, media reports have spread innuendo that the U.S. will break a long-standing nuclear accord with Israel. Yet the sensitive subject of Israel's nuclear weapons in U.S.-Israeli relations poses a more nuanced policy dilemma than the recent media hype suggests.
A team of investigators successfully detected North Korea's April 5 rocket launch using infrasound monitoring. Their experiment demonstrated the efficacy of infrasound in the detection of nuclear tests and in the verification of nonproliferation-related agreements.
The IAEA needs to move beyond requests for Syria to voluntarily provide information on its nuclear activities and make them legally binding. If Syria refuses, the Board should make a formal finding of "non-compliance."
On February 4 the United States will join France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia and China to talk about Iran. This meeting will also be the first attended by the Obama administration. In the days following, the U.S. will need to resolve both substantive and procedural issues if diplomacy is to have a chance of stopping Iran short of acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities.
Many key aspects of the recent Brazilian-Argentine nuclear cooperation agreement remain unresolved. This article reviews its main obstacles and future prospects.
Given Venezuela's close collaboration with Iran, those states and companies that would contemplate nuclear cooperation with the Chávez government should consider whether they might help recreate the alarming history of Iran's nuclear program and subsequent international crises.
"Global Zero" has become a well-known slogan to revive the decades-old idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Interest in abolition has been renewed by the concern that the use of nuclear weapons could become ever more likely. With nuclear deterrence we bought time, but it would be a tremendous mistake to believe that deterrence will always work.
<i>Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy</i> is the first to bridge nuclear technology and policy in this era and the most comprehensive reference to date on the technologies used to trace, track, and safeguard nuclear material.
On September 6, 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to break a 16-year ban and allow nuclear trade with India. Now President Bush must prove to Congress that the proposed trade deal meets the requirements of the Hyde Act.
Last week, a group of 45 countries dealt a serious blow to the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime. Succumbing to enormous pressure exerted by President Bush and his administration, the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed to allow nuclear trade once more with India – a country that has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and tested nuclear weapons in 1974 and 1998.
This analysis compares U.S. law, the draft U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, the answers to the questions for the record and Indian official statements on the potential consequences of another Indian nuclear weapons test on U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation. The answers to the questions for the record reveal gaps in U.S. and Indian interpretations.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group can help bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream by imposing conditions on civilian nuclear trade with India or else risk significant damage to itself and the nonproliferation regime.
Uncertainty about what the IAEA-India safeguards agreement actually means and whether India and the United States have a common understanding reinforces the need for continued close scrutiny of all aspects of the U.S.-India nuclear deal as approvals are sought from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the U.S. Congress.
The newly approved IAEA-India nuclear safeguards agreement moves to consideration by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in late August to early September, but several ambiguities in the language of the agreement continue to make it controversial and it is highly unlikely to secure U.S. congressional approval by year-end.