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The United States’ policy of ignoring popular sentiment and depending on friendly iron men in the Muslim world might have worked until now. But with Al Qaeda and its ilk talking of a conflict that will last for generations, the United States needs to do more to win Muslim hearts and minds than it has done so far.
Protesters who marched around the world last week were wrong to assume that American inaction against Iraq will make their children safer or the Iraqi people better off. The protesters were right, however, to question whether war against Iraq will produce more security at home and real freedom for the Iraqi people.
There will certainly be a regional reaction to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but it will not be a wave of democratic revolutions. We just have to look back at the previous efforts of empires with the best of intentions -- the British, the French, and the Germans -- to understand what happens when Western nations try to bring "civilization" to the Middle East on the points of their bayonets.
Ken Pollack is a gifted analyst. But in his lengthy February 21 <i>New York Times</i> op-ed, he assembles a house of cards to prove that (1) Saddam Hussein may soon get a nuclear bomb, and (2) if he does, we cannot deter him from using it. For Pollack to be correct, all of Saddam's efforts to build a bomb must work perfectly and all of our efforts to thwart him short of war must fail miserably. Here are six of his key errors:
Arab governments and citizens are incensed at the policies of the United States toward the Middle East. The anger cuts across age, economic, social and intellectual spectrums, and it has reached alarming levels. Recent visits to the region by Carnegie experts confirm that there is little appreciation for the Bush Administration's position among the people of the Middle East.
Nuclear arms control is often considered not worth the effort now that the Cold War is over. But the nuclear threat is anything but over. Several thousand strategic nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert in U.S. and Russian arsenals; many more are insecurely stored. Moscow and Washington must pursue innovative reduction efforts.
Minxin Pei participated in a Frontline online roundtable discussion, "Democracy, Sooner or Later?" assessing the prospects for democracy in China.
CIA Director George Tenet offered a dramatic redefinition of the proliferation problem in testimony to Congress February 11, 2003. Over the past two years, administration officials have discarded major elements of the global non-proliferation regime, rejected negotiated solutions and engagement and ignored major developments in North Korea and Iran. Now as former critical situations turn into crises, Tenet warns that the non-proliferation regime is in trouble. Here is Tenet's new explanation of why.
The immediate question left hanging at the end of Colin L. Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council was: What next? Given his explanation of the problem with Iraq, immediate war is not the only answer. Is there an alternative that can both command enthusiastic international support and effectively disarm Saddam Hussein? The answer is yes, and it involves a plan for truly coercive inspections. In the following piece, Carnegie President Jessica Mathews lays out an alternative scenario to disarm Saddam Hussein. This analysis is taken from her article, "Is There a Better Way to Go?" which appeared in the Febraury 9, 2003 <i>Washington Post</i> Outlook Section.
Europe sees the U.S. as high-handed, unilateralist, and unnecessarily belligerent; the U.S. sees Europe as spent, unserious and weak. The anger and mistrust on both sides are hardening into incomprehension.