If the United States effectively uses its considerable residual leverage in Afghanistan, Pakistan does not try and turn Afghanistan into a weak protectorate, and the Taliban does not overreach inside Afghanistan, there is reason for optimism.
Pakistan’s nuclear policy is heavily influenced by 1960s NATO flexible response strategy, and has essentially imported its contradictions into Islamabad’s own. This emulation has raised serious questions about Pakistan’s “full-spectrum deterrence” credibility, deterrence stability and future measures to manage regional security competition.
The Trump administration’s strategy in Afghanistan is promising, but the United States must devote substantial resources and effort to ensure its success.
This summer, the Indian government informed the Lok Sabha that 881 ceasefire violations (CFVs) had taken place in 2017. On the Pakistani side, the figures given were even higher.
As belt and road investments have rolled out across the world, they have been dogged by allegations of corruption and enabled by China’s willingness to seemingly ignore poor governance in its partners.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) had its annual plenary meeting last week in Paris, where it grappled with hard cases, like Pakistan. FATF’s blacklist for nations that do not uphold its standards can effectively cut them off from the international financial system.
Two nuclear-armed rivals in South Asia—India and Pakistan—have not fought openly since the 1999 Kargil conflict, but the lack of active war has not meant the absence of violence.
The number of ceasefire violations in Kashmir has risen dramatically in recent years. These deteriorating conditions along the border may be a good measure of India-Pakistan relations.
Whatever might be the civilian rhetoric, Pakistan’s army leadership is quite conscious that making the United States an enemy and putting all the eggs in the China basket is not a smart strategy.
If China returned to genuine neutrality on the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan, it could make it a lot easier for New Delhi to set aside its sovereignty argument on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.