Discussants comment on the cause of the collapse of the Doha Round, the prospects for continued negotiations, the impact of the impasse on the WTO and policy recommendations that could lead to a successful conclusion of the Round.
Sandra Polaski presented testimony at a hearing on "NAFTA at Year 12", held by the US Senate Subcommittee on International Trade on Monday, September 11, 2006. Her testimony focused on the impact of NAFTA on employment and household incomes in Mexico and highlighted the links between migration, Mexican political stability and what happens to impoverished farmers in Mexico.
The real reason more countries do not benefit from the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences is that the program excludes the very products most developing countries can competitively produce, which primarily benefits developed countries and non-GSP countries at the expense of countries with large poor populations.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently made speeches in the Rajya Sabha (August 17th) and the Lok Sabha (August 23rd), the two Houses of India’s Parliament, forcefully defending the merits of the India-US nuclear deal and clearly outlining the Indian Government’s position on various aspects of the deal. Facing criticism from opposition parties as well as the Left, Singh addressed all the concerns in turn and claimed that he had the assurance of President Bush that the final India-US nuclear deal would not represent any shifts away from the goalposts established in the agreement of July 18, 2005.
In his speeches, Singh emphatically stated that India would not bend in the face of US pressure and would not accept any conditions that would go beyond the July 18th Joint Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan. Strongly refuting the claim that the proposed US Bill, as passed by the House of Representatives, could become an instrument to influence or even dictate Indian foreign policy, Singh asserted that “the thrust of our foreign policy remains the promotion of our national interest.”
In unequivocal terms, Singh further declared that India was “not willing to accept a moratorium on the production of fissile material” and that India was not “prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing as indicated in the July statement.” Singh made it clear that the Indian Government would not accept any “dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation.” He also rejected the Senate proposal that requires the US President to report on India’s compliance with non-proliferation and other commitments on an annual basis, saying that the “element of uncertainty regarding future cooperation” was not acceptable to India. Addressing the issue of India’s nuclear weapons program being subject to international safeguards, Singh further clarified that the Indian government has registered strong opposition to “any legislative provisions that mandate scrutiny of either our nuclear weapons programme or our unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” As a sovereign nation, India was in no way bound by the legislation of any other country, Singh declared. (Read More)
The futures of Lebanon and nuclear weapons in the Middle East now intertwine, and Iran is the common link. But Tehran will rebuff pressure in one area by indirectly threatening to make things worse in the other. Iran’s counterparts must step back and develop a more comprehensive diplomatic strategy.
Iran has said no to the U.N. Security Council's legally binding demand that Tehran suspend enrichment of uranium, as a first step toward resuming negotiations over the future course of its nuclear-energy program and broader relations with the West. It's now time for the U.S. to quietly rally Europe, the Middle East and Asia to develop plans for containing and deterring a nuclear-armed Iran.


























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