Strengthening the NPT cannot be done by the US alone, but it certainly cannot be done without Washington’s active and constructive support. The U.S. must show that it can and will effectively use the diplomatic tools at its disposal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Junior Fellow Michael Beckley argues that a U.S. exit from Iraq is still years away.
The Carnegie Endowment and the China Reform Forum held a joint conference in Beijing to discuss the prevention and resolution of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Leading analysts from both the United States and China discussed the different dimensions of cross-strait dynamics and the views and roles of regional players --most notably, those of the U.S.
The president’s commission on intelligence delivered half a report. Like the colonel played by Jack Nicholson in "A Few Good Men," the commission acted as if America can’t handle the truth. The commissioners would have us believe that those who provided the false intelligence were solely to blame, and the senior political leaders who ordered and presented the claims to the public were passive victims. Conservative pundits have quickly declared, "case closed," and urge us to focus on rearranging the deck chairs on the intelligence ship. But buried deep inside the report is evidence that contradicts the commission’s own conclusions and raises serious questions about their recommendations. Most damning is the tale of two CIA analysts who were removed from their positions for "causing waves" when they questioned the reliability of the defector known as "Curveball." (Read More)
As painful experience in Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Iran has shown, the rules that govern nuclear exports, safeguard nuclear materials, and control and eliminate nuclear weapons are not self-enforcing. States and international agencies must struggle to mobilize the power needed to enforce and adapt these rules as conditions change.
In just over one month, representative from over 180 countries will meet in New York to review the status and condition of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This meeting, which takes place every five years as required by the agreement, occurs in an environment more negative than at anytime in its history and the potential for the month-long meeting to produce a positive result is in serious doubt. South Korea is in a unique position to improve the prospects for a successful meeting and Seoul should take active and even aggressive steps to play a large, constructive role at the meeting.
The essential ingredient the Arab spring is not what occurred in the White House. It is, instead, what occurred on the streets of Ramallah, Cairo and Beirut.