With the Iranian nuclear crisis about to land in the Security Council, the events that led up to the war in Iraq point clearly to what needs to be done.
U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with India poses a danger for the international nonproliferation framework. This deal breaks thirty years of nonproliferation policy and will directly assist India's nuclear weapons program.
There are many alternatives short of war for dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions, but the wrong compromise today will only lead us all back to the brink tomorrow.
Iran is moving to restart its suspended uranium enrichment program. Negotiations with the European Union have collapsed and the crisis is escalating. Does the United States -- or Israel -- have a military option?
If you do not know the difference between uranium metal and uranium oxide, you never heard of “Green Salt” until today, and you have been more interested in Pittsburgh vs. Seattle than Tehran vs. Vienna, here’s your chance to catch up on the latest developments in the Iranian nuclear showdown.
We provide answers (with extensive quotes from the confidential IAEA report) to three key questions: What did the IAEA report say that was new, what does reporting to the Security Council mean, and what happens next?
1. What new evidence was in the January 31 IAEA confidential report on Iran?
Iran has taken some measures to attempt to assure the IAEA that it is in compliance with its safeguards agreement. Yet key issues remain unresolved, including explanation of particles of enriched uranium found on centrifuges, IAEA access to critical sites and scientists, and the interesting document detailing how to turn uranium into a metal. This later procedure has no role in fuel production; uranium in metal form is only used in nuclear weapons
The updated brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards says:
Much of this language was reported in the November 2005 IAEA Report on outstanding questions on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. New to the latest report is a direct reference to a 15-page document and the critical phrase, “…related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components.” (Read More)
“Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to have been drawings, specifications and supporting documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of which are dated from the early- to mid-1980’s. Among these was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document had been provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency’s request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal.”