The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not driven primarily by a Sunni-Shiite divide or even Arab-Persian ethnic differences. The conflict is informed by two radically different models of government and two very different visions of regional order.
Reaching a final agreement with Iran over its nuclear program is going to require some very hard compromises from hardliners both in Tehran and in Washington.
Rather than undermining nuclear negotiations, moves by Western businesses preparing to capitalize on a possible deal have the potential to spur pressure for change within Iran.
Even if the interim deal with Iran is successfully extended into a comprehensive agreement during the next twelve months, Tehran’s conduct in the Middle East will remain largely unregulated.
Recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee highlighted an interesting—and unrealistic—approach to negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.
The world would be a safer place if Iran did not enrich uranium, but neither more sanctions nor military strikes will push Iran out of the enrichment club.
The new government of President Hassan Rouhani may not be moderate, but it is practical. It would like a nuclear weapon, but it wants economic relief more.
For the first time in decades, the United States has an opportunity to test whether it can reach a settlement with Iran that would turn what may still be an active weapons program into a transparent, internationally monitored, civilian program.
A final agreement could emerge on schedule if negotiators—especially in Iran and in the United States—respond to their domestic critics by cracking whips to get fast results.
Iran’s new president has paved the way for improved relations with the West. Now, the West must determine whether Iran’s changed rhetoric signals the start of a new direction.
















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