Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The rapidly changing security environment in Northeast Asia complicates any scholarly conjecture about the future of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in the region.
The reason why the false ballistic missile alert in Hawaii was such an issue is precisely because it took place against a background of very high tensions.
There is a serious risk that North Korea will use renewed dialogue tactically to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul and to dilute the effects of recently imposed sanctions.
North Korea has made significant progress in its missile and nuclear program, but there remains much to be done besides testing its first prototype. UN Security Council sanctions would not solve the North Korea problem, but they start to set the table for discussing it.
The president’s unilateral nuclear authority comes from decisions made at the start of the Atomic Age.
Tensions with North Korea have grown under the administration of President Donald Trump, and the danger of nuclear confrontation is now higher than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis.
On the North Korea nuclear threat, global leaders have an obligation not to avoid reality.
Sanctions are seen as an essential tool for nonproliferation and in some cases prove useful, as with Iran. However, as new challenges such as North Korea loom, are the United States and its partners using sanctions the right way to achieve their objectives?
With North Korea’s testing of what appears to be a more advanced intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), China is under great pressure to impose crippling economic sanctions against Pyongyang, including cutting off its oil supply.
As the Trump administration develops its Nuclear Posture Review, the temptation of small nuclear weapons is back.