North Korea openly seeks nuclear-armed ICBMs capable of threatening the United States. Its precise military requirements for such a weapon are, however, unknown.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s faulty assumptions and unrealistic expectations could doom prospects for peacefully deescalating one nuclear standoff—and applying these misguided lessons to Iran could manufacture yet another.
Despite the positive nature of the joint statement by the Korean leaders pledging to make progress on long-standing problems, the reality is that there is much hard work to do if the U.S.-North Korean summit is to be a success and lead to real progress.
Kim Jong-un became the first North Korean leader to set foot in South Korea at the Panmunjom Summit in April 2018, setting the stage for President Trump’s meeting with Kim in June, which China will be watching closely.
Unless the United States changes its priorities, Korean diplomacy is probably doomed.
What was actually agreed at the inter-Korean Summit, and what are the roadblocks ahead? A closer look at what the Panmunjom Declaration means for the Korean Peninsula.
In the aftermath of the inter-Korean summit on April 27, and ahead of planned U.S.-North Korea talks, please join Carnegie for a deep dive on the practicalities and politics of denuclearizing North Korea.
The positive short-term outlook for a summit between Kim Jong Un, and President Donald Trump should not obscure the serious long-terms risks created by the latest spate of high-stakes diplomacy.
The circumstances of the meeting between Kim and Pompeo are far less significant than its consequences. Despite the odd timing and public exposure, the Trump administration has used a proven channel to attempt an extraordinary mission.
It is uncertain at best whether a Trump–Kim meeting will actually take place. If one does, the central issue will be the huge discrepancy between what the United States and the North Koreans mean by the phrase “committed to denuclearization.”