Iraq

    • Research

    Niger Uranium: Still a False Claim

    A little common sense shows that a Niger uranium sale--even if attempted--was always highly improbable and was never a serious threat.

    • Commentary

    America Must Not Stop Promoting Democracy

     

    • Research

    The Importance of Inspections

    • July 26, 2004
    • Carnegie

    The following is adapted from the remarks of Dr. Hans Blix, chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, to the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21 and 22, 2004.

    • Research

    Intelligence Patterns - and Problems

    • July 19, 2004

    Following the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee report on pre-war assessments of Iraqi WMD, Carnegie has updated the four summary tables that appear in WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications on each type of suspected weapons: nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile and delivery programs. The summary tables show several key patterns.

    • Research

    A Job Half Done

    The new reports from the Senate Intelligence Committee and the United Kingdom's parliamentary inquiry by Lord Butler offer devastating critiques of both nations' intelligence failures in Iraq.

    • Research

    US Nuclear Weapons Policy and Programs

    • July 12, 2004
    • Carnegie

    The following are excerpts from remarks by Linton F. Brooks, administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, to the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21, 2004.

    • Research

    Intelligence Failures

    • July 07, 2004

    As background for the Senate Intelligence Committee's new report, we present below excerpts from the January 2004 Carnegie report, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications. The report compared the intelligence assessments on Iraq with the UN inspectors' findings and what is now known. Why were the intelligence assessments so flawed? Were they based on faulty collection or analysis, undue politicization, or other factors? What steps could be taken to prevent a repetition? The shift between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE suggests, but does not prove, that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers' views sometime in 2002. Although such situations are not unusual, in this case, the pressure appears to have been unusually intense.

    More resources on Iraq and intelligence:

    "A Tale of Two Intelligence Estimates," by Jessica Mathews and Jeff Miller, 26 March 2004

    "Revisiting the Case for War," Foreign Policy Web Exclusive by Joseph Cirincione, Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Alexis Orton, Updated March 2004

    "The Congress Shares Responsibility for War," by Joseph Cirincione and Michael O'Hanlon, Los Angeles Times Op-Ed, 19 November 2003

    "The Intelligence Bell Curve," by Joseph Cirincione, 17 July 2003

    • Commentary

    Weapons of Mass Destruction and the United Nations

    Before attention is lost in the controversies over the war itself and in the challenges of its aftermath, the UN must capture, clarify, and publicize the record of international inspections in Iraq: for itself, for member governments, and for the public.

    • Commentary

    Allies Must Step Up

    • Research

    No Terror Ties

    • June 17, 2004

    Untitled Document In January 2004, the authors of the Carnegie Endowment report, WMD in Iraq, found there was little evidence of operational ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda but there was significant evidence indicating the opposite. This finding contributed to the authors’ conclusion that administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq. Senior officials and some independent experts and journalist repeatedly asserted direct connections, even claiming Saddam Hussein was responsible for the attacks of September 11. In light of the new finding from the 9/11 Commission that there is no evidence of a "cooperative relationship" between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, we reprint the relevant section of the Carnegie report, below.

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