In the spring of 2019, hundreds of millions of Indians will cast their ballots in the country’s seventeenth general election.
In agreeing to an “informal summit” in the city of Wuhan on the banks of the Yangtze, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping have chosen to take charge of the Sino-Indian relationship.
The India–France partnership could form the model for burden-sharing between India and its Western friends.
Despite popular narratives to the contrary, Muslims are losing ground in India in socioeconomic terms.
After decades of ignoring it, New Delhi now believes that a rejuvenated Commonwealth could lend greater depth to India’s global outreach.
An India that is less inhibited about trade liberalization and more open to commercial, technological, and civil society partnerships will find Nordic countries ready to accelerate its internal modernization and international rise.
Although the intricacies of the upcoming race—such as the selection of candidates and the rhetoric of campaigns—remain unknown one year out, underlying structural conditions suggest far rockier terrain may lie ahead.
As a rising power, India recognizes the Commonwealth as a valuable forum for it to redefine itself on the global stage. The Commonwealth has much to gain from India’s engagement as well.
India might be quite open to a substantive dialogue with China on the Belt and Road Initiative if Xi is prepared to address New Delhi’s concerns on sovereignty and sustainability.
Standing up against India has unfortunately become an important part of Nepal’s definition of sovereignty.