
More specifically, Washington should not let this new frame of "great power rivalry," which Middle East autocracies have heartily welcomed and exploited, distract it from scrutinizing the behavior of these regimes at home and from helping the region's citizens and societies address the socio-economic and political problems they face now and in the coming decades.
What Europe’s strategy should consist of remains undefined. Macron was asking for fresh thinking not patented answers. As the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has suggested recently, Europe must surely recognize its historical and politico-cultural distance from the patriotic enthusiasm so spectacularly on display in Ukraine.
In the short-term, what we are going to see happen in direct reaction to the Russian war is that there is going to be a substitution of gas from other sources from the Middle East, the United States, North Africa, and other places for Russian gas.

Even if Lukashenko gets serious about attempting a new balancing act, he will first have to earn the right to be heard.
Ukraine traditionally was closely integrated in the Soviet economy, and then the Russian economy. The military and industrial complex of the two countries were highly integrated until just the last decade.
Ultimately the EU should consider its relationship with India in the larger Indo-Pacific context and, for the moment, place any unhappiness at India’s position on Ukraine to one side.
Three countries (Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) are working their way towards accession to the EU, their clear European choice a thorn in Russia's side. In an effort to extend his sphere of influence, Russian President Vladimir Putin is de-facto occupying territory in all three countries.
It is not 9/11, Americans aren't being killed, and in this case not being deployed to combat but early polls suggest that most of our fellow citizens are actually paying quite a bit of attention to Ukraine.
First, Dimitar explains Turkey's relationship with Russia, NATO, and the US in order to illustrate the many factors behind Erdogan's foreign policy. Last, Dimitar dives into Bulgarian foreign policy, which has traditionally been Russophilic and anti-risk, but has taken a greater stand against Russia.
Looking ahead, the implications of the vicious dynamics experienced in the Russo-Ukrainian War implore us to rethink strategy for conflict. In particular, leaders must consider the likely societal reactions to rhetoric and coercion, leveraged and amplified as they are by modern instruments of popular indoctrination and mobilization.