Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Follow Carnegie
- Search
- Global Resources
Global Centers
Languages
Russian foreign policy’s modern-day motives are completely dissimilar to those of the recent Soviet and the more distant czarist past. Where-as the empire was predominantly about Eurasian geopolitics and the Soviet Union promoted a global ideological and political project backed up by military power, Russia’s business is Russia itself. Seen from a different angle, Russia’s business is business.
The failure of U.S. policy in Iraq has provided autocratic regimes in the Middle East a reprieve from the pressure to democratize, as long as they position themselves clearly on the side of Washington in its looming confrontation with Iran, Syria, and Shiite Islamists.
The International Quartet Committee's proposed roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian peace lacks enforcement mechanisms and wrongly focuses on security issues as preconditions for political progress, argues Sufyan Alissa. Organising internal Palestinian affairs is useless if Israeli policies of building settlements, the separation wall, of controlling natural resources and imposing closures, continue.
If there was one thing George W. Bush and his clique were supposed to know, it was oil. Six years later, no one--not even oil executives--could plausibly claim to be impressed with Bush's handling of energy issues.
With he potential for future political-military crises between Washington and Beijing, America’s enormous lead in virtually all aspects of military power, the heavy U.S. reliance on satellites for military purposes, and the absence of any formal agreement on the weaponization of space, it is little wonder that the Chinese are developing anti-satellite capabilities to even the playing field.
(Guest analysis by Bruno Dupré)
One of the most useful things I learned at the Kennedy School of Government several years ago was about leadership and negotiation. Charisma, persuasiveness, and a high tolerance for ambiguity are certainly helpful for a successful negotiation, but by no means sufficient. It is also necessary to diagnose parties’ motivations, zones of potential agreement, possible alternatives, coalitions that could shift power in desired directions, and the best possible process for managing difficult negotiations. Without this methodology one can only hope for the best. But planning each element of a negotiation process increases the odds of success.
I left Harvard just as the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) entered negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Three years later, the world is still looking for the best way to get out of this crisis. Tehran keeps refusing to comply with IAEA and UN demands, using all kinds of pressure, from denying access to UN inspectors (January 27, 2007) to threatening the very existence of Israel. Many fear uncontrolled escalation in the region and beyond. The consensus maintained so far seems to be deteriorating suddenly. It is useful, at this critical moment, to recall the rationale of the EU approach. Even if success is far from being guaranteed, there is, for the time being, no better alternative. (Read More)
Stay connected to the Global Think Tank with Carnegie's smartphone app for Android and iOS devices