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Interest in the dark side of Soviet history is modest now compared with the nationwide yearning in the late 1980s for the truth about the Soviet regime's crimes. But it may be enough to make the Kremlin want to preempt or control such interest.
It would seem that we have a double mutiny on the great ship of state. Rakhimov showed no mercy in squashing the revolt aimed at his presidency. It remains to be seen whether Medvedev will be able to put down Rakhimov's defiance of the Kremlin.
Dmitri Trenin explains that like Putin, Dimtry Medvedev seeks to pit U.S. economic and military power against the authority of existing international law. Moscow’s ultimate objective is to “replace U.S. hegemony with an oligarchy of the new global powers.”
For the third year in a row, the G-8 summit is set to be a largely Russian show. At the St. Petersburg meeting in 2006, Russia made its debut as host, showing off its newfound prosperity on a grand scale for the first time. In 2007, in Heiligendamm, Germany, observers watched for signs of Russia's future course during Vladimir Putin's last summit as president. This year, in Hokkaido, all eyes will be on Dmitry Medvedev; they'll be looking for signs of any real difference between his presidency and that of his predecessor. They are not likely to find it.
For a second week now, people are discussing Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev's call to reinstate direct elections for governors and to strip the Russian president of the power to disband regional parliaments if they reject the gubernatorial candidate he submits for their approval. Shaimiyev's ideas come across as more proactive than reactive, and as a forecaster of future shifts in the political landscape, the occupant of Kazan's Kremlin appears to be more talented than the experts in the other Kremlin.
President Dmitry Medvedev's first month on the job has provided a good opportunity to analyze the developing relationship between the new leader and the regions. Most important, we have seen a continuation of Moscow's policy toward the regions that was initiated last autumn with the appointment of Dmitry Kozak as the regional development minister. And contrary to many predictions, no major shakedowns have taken place, and it doesn't appear that there will be any in the near future -- not in the gubernatorial ranks or the replacement of heavyweights, such as Mayor Yury Luzhkov.
When Vladimir Putin became acting president in January 2000, he appointed his trusted colleagues as presidential envoys, including many from the Federal Security Service. After his inauguration in May of that year, Putin announced federal reforms that included the appointments of presidential envoys consisting largely of military officials. Now there have been a few, insignificant changes among the president's "eyes and ears" in the federal districts. The presidential envoys, who hold equal status with the deputy prime ministers, are a continuation of Putin's policy of "divide and conquer" -- this time applied to the regions.
During Vladimir Putin's presidency, tight control of the mass media evolved as one of the Russian leadership's key political resources. It will be equally indispensable to newly inaugurated President Dmitry Medvedev.
Since the inauguration, the presidential web site has evolved into the domain of President Dmitry Medvedev, and the updated version of the White House's web site now carries information about Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's activities. But the smooth transfer of power between presidents is a complicated process, and it is important to examine how Medvedev will be able to build constructive relationships with the regions.
The vision is grand, the reality less so. Russia's foreign policy has been merely assertive and reactive up till now. Will the new President manage something more constructive?
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