Ever since Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented his fourteen-point “Real Armenia” concept in a February 2025 address to the nation, he has promoted it at every opportunity. Like a Western motivational speaker, he regularly takes to the stage with visual aids to address a wide variety of audiences, far from all of whom are receptive to the idea, above all those from the vast Armenian diaspora.
The essence of “Real Armenia” is that Armenians should be focusing on the internationally recognized territory of Armenia—not amorphous ideas of a historical homeland. As Pashinyan emphasizes, this means what is encompassed by the former Soviet republic of Armenia. It does not include lands that were part of historical Armenian states but that now belong to Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Iran, or Georgia. First and foremost, that applies to Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, with which Armenia fought two bitter wars over the territory before ethnic Armenians were forced to evacuate it in 2023. Now, argues Pashinyan, Armenians need to forget their unrealizable dreams in order to move forward.
The Armenian leader applies the same logic to the demand that the Turkish government recognize the Armenian genocide committed by the Ottomans in 1915. Despite frequent accusations to the contrary, Pashinyan is not casting doubt on the fact of the genocide itself; simply, he believes Armenia must look to the future. Seeking international recognition of the genocide, according to Pashinyan, should no longer be one of Armenia’s foreign policy priorities.
Pashinyan links the “Real Armenia” concept with other goals of his government—in particular, the normalization of relations with Armenia’s neighbors, which could allow it to become a trade hub for the South Caucasus and pave the way to economic prosperity. Such a development would, he argues, also entrench peace. Pashinyan’s government has also promoted the cause of EU integration—albeit cautiously. Of course, without normalizing relations with Türkiye and opening the Armenia-Türkiye border, any talk of EU integration is nothing more than a pipe dream.
Finally, Pashinyan links a normalization of relations with Armenia’s neighbors and closer ties with Europe to a push to reduce the country’s long-standing dependence on Russia. Pashinyan and his supporters have even begun to use the rhetoric of anti-colonialism. While they avoid directly referring to Russia as a “colonizer,” they criticize the policies of the Soviet Union and tsarist Russia (often even this is enough to provoke an angry reaction from Moscow).
Ultimately, “Real Armenia” is an effort to align Armenian concepts of statehood and national identity with foreign policy, which radically shifted following the Second Karabakh War in 2020, and the expulsion of Armenians from the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. It’s also a bid to resolve a dilemma over national identity that has haunted Armenia since it gained independence in 1991.
From very early in the history of the post-Soviet Armenian state, national identity was bound up in conceptions of historical justice: specifically, miatsum—the unification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh—and international recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide. But such a construction of national identity was inevitably bound up with conflict, and it was conflict with its neighbors that led Armenia to seek security guarantees from Russia. This, in turn, allowed Russia to accumulate huge influence: not only militarily, but also politically, economically, and culturally.
Under Armenian leaders Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008) and Serzh Sargsyan (2008–2018), the principles of no compromise over Nagorno-Karabakh and recognition of the genocide gradually became ossified as tenets of Armenian life, as did the country’s dependence on Russia. Nor did this change following the Velvet Revolution that brought Pashinyan to power in 2018.
Ironically, it was Moscow that destroyed this political status quo, with the Armenian elite blaming Russia’s hands-off response for the country’s defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s expulsion of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh three years later. Ultimately, it was these events that led Yerevan to seek reconciliation with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
Will Pashinyan be able to convince Armenians that they should embrace his “Real Armenia” concept? At first glance, it appears to be a deeply ambitious goal. After all, the ideas Pashinyan is seeking to displace have lain at the heart of Armenia’s understanding of itself for decades. They are deeply rooted in Armenia’s education system, state and social rituals, memory politics, and culture. And they will be bitterly defended, not least by their standard bearer—the Armenian intelligentsia.
An amorphous striving for historical justice, as well as recognition of the genocide, are also important for the extensive Armenian diaspora, which has little else from which to construct an identity. Other markers, like language, have been lost for many of the several million Armenians who live outside Armenia—or are on the brink of being lost. It’s unsurprising, therefore, that every time Pashinyan talks about “Real Armenia,” he is met with howls of criticism not only from inside the country, but above all from the diaspora.
Nevertheless, the peace agreement with Azerbaijan announced in Washington earlier this year has strengthened the position of Pashinyan and the Armenian government. Apart from anger, Armenia’s political opposition offers few alternatives.
While the intelligentsia and diaspora are outraged by Pashinyan’s new approach, many Armenians still support the leader’s Civil Contract party (albeit less enthusiastically than before). In recent elections in the city of Vagharshapat (formerly known as Ejmiatsin), for example, Civil Contract won a convincing victory. There is no reason yet to assume it will not triumph in the 2026 parliamentary elections.
Even if Pashinyan were to fall from power, a new government would have little room for maneuver. There are no viable options for inflicting revenge on Azerbaijan. And there is a growing consensus that the policies pursued by previous governments were a major factor in the tragedy of 2020–2023.
Sooner or later, Armenians will have to accept the new geopolitical reality in which they live. Small countries like Armenia need to be able to survive in an unstable world, and evolution teaches us that it’s not the strongest who survive, but those who are better able to adapt.
