Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and in anticipation of a post-oil future, the social contract in the UAE has been undergoing a disquieting metamorphosis.
A Saudi-Emirati-Israeli military alliance is unlikely and runs counter to the Gulf states’ security interests and diplomatic efforts with Iran.
Women empowerment in the Gulf has become a tool of deflection rather than a genuine effort to promote women’s full and equal participation in society.
The idea that the UAE is changing the essence of its foreign policy is a conclusion based on a series of erroneous assumptions.
The UAE is revisiting its foreign policy goals with the aim of boosting its global trade partnerships and ensuring its security and political stability, by replacing robust military intervention and proxy politics with dialogue and diplomacy.
The UAE’s $10 billion investment in Turkey is only the tip of the normalization iceberg. The warm meeting between Emirati and Turkish leaders might be an indicator of possible rapprochement, intended for both parties’ adversaries.
Maritime security plays a key role in the UAE’s recalibration of its foreign policy, particularly in the Bab al-Mandab region. The straits diplomacy embodies the transfer of Emirati policy from spreading power to protecting influence.
Measures taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to diversify their economies are beginning to undermine pre-existing social contracts that hinge on the paterfamilias figure of the ruler, the tribal care of the state, and the preservation of cultural norms and citizen privileges.
The fruitless protracted blockade of Qatar not only failed to reform Doha’s “destabilizing behaviors,” but also strengthened Iranian-Qatari relations for the foreseeable future.
GCC countries are caught up in Chinese-U.S. competition over tech infrastructure. A failure to appease both powers risks endangering critical relationships.
Military training cooperation has become a distinctive feature of the UAE’s foreign policy and a major tool for expanding geopolitical leverage.
While the Egyptian and Ethiopian dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has high stakes for local stability, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are well-positioned to play a leading role in mediating the conflict.
The shifting relationships between armies and civil society are revealing new balances within defense structures.
A renewed NATO-Middle East cooperation can strengthen the security architecture of the Middle East.
Russia’s increased involvement in Libya marks a turning point in the conflict, making an Ankara-Kremlin rapprochement all the more likely.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are trying to downplay concerns about a rift over Yemen, despite their divergent military tactics and positions on South Yemeni independence.
Military infighting between secessionist groups and forces aligned with Hadi’s government in southern Yemen reflect the deep fissures in the country’s political and military landscapes.
Abu Dhabi and Riyadh see a natural partnership with Modi’s government, a cooperation that could change the dynamics of the South Asian-Gulf nexus.
The dramatic death of the former president of Egypt, Mohammed Morsi, on June 17th, reignited debate about the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and political Islam across the region.
Wary of local inequalities that could spur dissent, Abu Dhabi is aiming to instill nationalist sentiment in northern emirates through cultivating a military ethos.