Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Embroiled in a confrontation with the West, Russia cannot play the role of an effective intermediary, and Moscow’s unwillingness to subsidize North Korea means that for Pyongyang, Russia is of no interest as a potential donor.
How do Tehran and Jerusalem intend to approach the new administration; what priorities, calculations, and attitudes will shift? And how will the Biden foreign policy team deal with the complex challenge of reentering and/or renegotiating the Iran nuclear accord?
To quickly lower the risk of nuclear escalation, manage arms racing, and avoid a breakdown in future treaty negotiations, the United States, Russia, and China should consider five politically binding proposals to build transparency and confidence.
For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states have centered on the question of ‘how much is enough,’ but on the cusp of a new arms race, the urgent question has shifted to: how much is too much?
Why does President Obama—who was deeply engaged in nuclear policy issues throughout his presidency—devote so little to the topic in his memoir?
More than an effort to prevent nuclear proliferation, the killing of Iran’s top nuclear scientist was sanctioned to foment trouble between Washington’s incoming administration and Tehran.
Preventing an inadvertent nuclear disaster on the Korean Peninsula will depend not only on Kim Jong Un upgrading his nuclear software but on the United States better understanding the choices and circumstances that have driven North Korea’s nuclear posture.
The concerns that motivate interest in and demand for nuclear disarmament are formidable and deserve fuller and deeper address than they have received thus far in the policy deliberations of many States and international bodies.
A November 2020 U.S. missile defense test stands to upend strategic stability and complicate future arms control. The test marks a crossing of the Rubicon, with irreversible implications.
States and experts preoccupied with winning (or at least not losing) wars that could go nuclear have largely ignored questions of post facto accountability.