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In this paper presented at a high-level seminar on weapons of mass destruction in Brussels, Belgium, Pierre Goldschmidt discusses ways to increase IAEA verification authority in cases of non-compliance and how the international community should respond when a state decides to withdraw from the NPT.
In order to be successful, threat reduction programs must take into account the opinions of decisionmakers in recipient countries, as well as the lessons learned from threat reduction programs already in place.
Panel discussion and launch of the final report detailing a new international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The possibility of U.S. trade and investment offers a most effective way to enhance Iranian decision-making. Instead of imposing sanctions, which have punished Iranians for 24 years, a better strategy would be to demonstrate the benefits of economic cooperation with the U.S. The simplest first step would be for the U.S. to drop its objection to Iran’s joining the World Trade Organization. Indeed, the greatest resistance to economic reforms sought by Iranian progressives comes from the bazaar, the old-economy conservatives who also back the political-security hardliners. Prospective WTO membership would give progressives a lever to push reforms necessary to satisfy WTO terms and integrate Iran more deeply into the international political economy.
Amidst bold declarations among the regimes in North Korea and Iran, last week was a bad one for nuclear nonproliferation.
To mobilize all of the international actors opposing Iranian nuclear development, the U.S. must recognize that Iranian proliferation, Persian Gulf security, the U.S. role in the Middle East, Israel’s nuclear status, and Palestinian-Israeli relations are all linked and cannot be resolved without a more balanced U.S. stance.
We reproduced below an extended excerpt from Senator Carl Levin's speech to the Senate, January 25, 2005. Senator Levin provides a compelling analysis of Secretary Rice's statements on Iraq's weapons capabilities before the Iraq war began.
"Dr. Rice’s record on Iraq gives me great concern. In her public statements she clearly overstated and exaggerated the intelligence concerning Iraq before the war in order to support the President’s decision to initiate military action against Iraq. Since the Iraq effort has run into great difficulty, she has also attempted to revise history as to why we went into Iraq.
…Dr. Rice is not directly responsible for the intelligence failures prior to the Iraq war. The Intelligence Community’s many failures are catalogued in the 500 page report of the Senate Intelligence Committee. But she is responsible for her own distortions and exaggerations of the intelligence which was provided to her.
Here are a few of those exaggerations and distortions.
Highly touted in both Washington and Moscow as a "strategic partnership" in 2001, the relationship has drifted and the gap between glowing rhetoric and thin substance has grown. When major policy differences emerge, as over war in Iraq in 2002-2003 and recently over Ukraine, all too easily the U.S.-Russian relationship spirals into "crisis," and the threat of a "new Cold War" looms.
The very first question Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar asked Secretary of State-nominee Condoleezza Rice was on his efforts to streamline and improve the Nunn-Lugar nonproliferation and disarmament programs: "Does the administration support this legislation?" Rice responded enthusiastically, "I really can think of nothing more important than being able to proceed with the safe dismantlement of the Soviet arsenal, with nuclear safeguards to make certain that nuclear weapons facilities and the like are well secured."
Rice also agreed to put accelerating the program on the agenda of the next Bush-Putin meeting, and endorsed the early passage of the Law of the Sea Treaty. We provide, below, a full excerpt of the Lugar-Rice exchange at this hearing, held January 18, 2005, and links to the full hearing transcript.
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