While some policymakers argue that encryption must only be weakened to solve specific problems, most experts agree that there is no technological solution that would weaken encryption for specific law enforcement and national security purposes, while managing to maintain preexisting levels of security and confidentiality for general use.
Autocrats have bent the internet to serve anti-democratic purposes. Can democracies halt their march?
Producing automated vehicles (AVs) that are, and can be shown to be, safe is an ongoing challenge.
It is time to ensure that security for smart cities is addressed early and often, including by engaging city residents in the process.
The recent spate of ransomware attacks in the United States, including against critical infrastructure in the case of the Colonial Pipeline attack, raises questions about U.S. Cyber Command’s role in responding to this type of malicious behavior.
This volume digs deeply into what we call “the Korean way with data.” It explores Korea’s distinctive experiences, successes, failures, and recalibrations. And it aims to address the question of what can and should be learned from innovative Korean policies and practices.
As part of the EU’s strategic autonomy, the concept of technological sovereignty has risen in importance. What steps can Europe take to grow its technological capacity?
Cyber deterrence frameworks that draw from the traditional nuclear deterrence literature and the logic of deterrence by punishment are mismatched to deterrence challenges in cyberspace. Instead, a better approach would be deterrence by denial.
Major powers bear responsibility for reducing systemic risk in cyberspace, and to do this they must make offensive operations more predictable.
News of the SolarWinds hack emerged with reports the incident had triggered an emergency Saturday meeting at the National Security Council. In the weeks that followed, the story dominated headlines.