In a study commissioned jointly by the Harvard Belfer Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie's Pierre Goldschmidt presents a multi-stage process that the international community should follow to strengthen the capacity of the IAEA to resolve in a timely manner cases of non-compliance.
Decision time has arrived on the controversial nuclear cooperation proposal that was first proposed by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005. Because the NSG and IAEA traditionally operate by consensus, any one of a number of states can act to block or modify the ill-conceived arrangement. They have good reason and a responsibility to do so.
Calling for dialogue one day and firing off missiles the next, Iran has baffled many observers with its seemingly erratic behavior of late. Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explains how the Islamic Republic responds to pressure, why Mahmoud Ahmadinejad laughs in the face of danger, and what Tehran’s hard-liners think of Barack Obama.
The Financial Times recently published an op-ed by Senator John Kerry calling for the "next president [to] breathe life into an emerging bipartisan vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world." A week later the Financial Times published a countering letter by Senator Jon Kyl. The following Proliferation Analysis reproduces Senator Kyl's letter with a point-by-point rebuttal.
In briefings following North Korea's announcement to hand over details of its nuclear program, Carnegie experts noted that while it is the first of several hurdles to be overcome before North Korea may fully reintegrate into the international community, it represents the greatest understanding of the North's plutonium program in fourteen years.
The small steps achieved in the last year and a half through negotiations with North Korea in dismantling its nuclear program prove that, at least in the North Korean case, diplomacy and the path toward normalization should be given a chance.
In the Gulf Yearbook 2007-2008, George Perkovich discusses what is publicly known about GCC intentions and capabilities to acquire nuclear technology and explores how the development a GCC nuclear program would balance Iran's growing power.
It is customary for a French President to devote an entire speech to issues of nuclear deterrence – something his US or British counterparts have seldom done since the end of the Cold war, and which testifies to the importance that nuclear weapons still have for Paris. But the speech given by President Nicolas Sarkozy on March 21 was noteworthy in at least two respects. It signaled that even though Sarkozy is often keen on making “clean breaks” with past practices, continuity would prevail as far as nuclear weapons policy is concerned.
While there's good reason to believe some countries intend to harness nuclear power toward green ends, there's also good reason to believe that other nations will use global warming as a pretext for less virtuous purposes--namely, to acquire technology that would allow them to build nuclear weapons.
Australia is under pressure to make an exception to global nuclear trading rules for India. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has taken a principled stand against the further spread and use of nuclear weapons and materials. In particular, he promised that Australia -- one of the world's largest uranium exporters -- would trade only with countries that play by international nuclear rules.































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