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(The following op-ed by Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, first appeared in Defense News on March 5, 2007.)
Following the end of U.S. nuclear testing a decade and a half ago, some scientists and policy-makers worried that the reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads could diminish as their plutonium cores age. They claimed it would take a decade or more to see if the nation’s weapon laboratories could maintain the existing stockpile of well-tested but aging weapons without further nuclear blasts.
Such concerns led many senators to withhold their support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999.
Time has addressed the skeptics’ concerns. For more than a decade, a multibillion-dollar Stockpile Stewardship program has successfully maintained the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal in the absence of testing. As the importance of nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy has diminished, there has been no need to test new types of nukes.
But now, the Bush administration is asking Congress to fund an ambitious effort to build new replacement warheads, which it claims is needed to avoid plutonium aging problems that could reduce weapon reliability. (Read More)
Russia's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty - an important and successful component of the arms control regime - threatens nonproliferation goals. Rather than unilaterally withdrawing, Russia should request exceptions to accomodate its concerns.
America's decision to target Iranian agents in Iraq is but another sign of the Iran's massive influence. Iran's increasing power has created tensions across the region, which must be managed carefully to avoid a period of protracted warfare. Fortunately, leaders may be able to work together to ease tensions, recognizing that they share a common interest in regional stability.
With he potential for future political-military crises between Washington and Beijing, America’s enormous lead in virtually all aspects of military power, the heavy U.S. reliance on satellites for military purposes, and the absence of any formal agreement on the weaponization of space, it is little wonder that the Chinese are developing anti-satellite capabilities to even the playing field.
(Guest analysis by Bruno Dupré)
One of the most useful things I learned at the Kennedy School of Government several years ago was about leadership and negotiation. Charisma, persuasiveness, and a high tolerance for ambiguity are certainly helpful for a successful negotiation, but by no means sufficient. It is also necessary to diagnose parties’ motivations, zones of potential agreement, possible alternatives, coalitions that could shift power in desired directions, and the best possible process for managing difficult negotiations. Without this methodology one can only hope for the best. But planning each element of a negotiation process increases the odds of success.
I left Harvard just as the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) entered negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Three years later, the world is still looking for the best way to get out of this crisis. Tehran keeps refusing to comply with IAEA and UN demands, using all kinds of pressure, from denying access to UN inspectors (January 27, 2007) to threatening the very existence of Israel. Many fear uncontrolled escalation in the region and beyond. The consensus maintained so far seems to be deteriorating suddenly. It is useful, at this critical moment, to recall the rationale of the EU approach. Even if success is far from being guaranteed, there is, for the time being, no better alternative. (Read More)
One of the most vexing questions regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis is that analysts are unable to determine whether or not Iran has actually decided to build nuclear weapons or whether it just wants a “hedging” option at this point.
A recent article by Roger Stern suggests that because of a likely decline in Iranian oil exports and the attendant revenues, "Iran's claim to need nuclear power could be genuine". However, the suggestion that the Iranian nuclear power program is a response to an impending decline in Iranian oil exports is surely mistaken.
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