Nuclear Weapons

Analysis

    • Op-Ed

    Diplomacy for Now

    Iran has said no to the U.N. Security Council's legally binding demand that Tehran suspend enrichment of uranium, as a first step toward resuming negotiations over the future course of its nuclear-energy program and broader relations with the West. It's now time for the U.S. to quietly rally Europe, the Middle East and Asia to develop plans for containing and deterring a nuclear-armed Iran.

    • Op-Ed

    State of Rejection

    The administration's refusal to talk to Syria and Iran reflects a view of diplomacy that is at odds with the practice of most other countries and of other American administrations. If countries are directly at war, diplomatic relations are out of the question. But most countries conceive of diplomacy as a means of resolving conflicts with adversaries short of war.

    • Proliferation Analysis

    UN Resolution 1696 Moots Iranian Legal Claims

    • Amy Reed
    • August 21, 2006

    On July 31, 2006 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, demanding that Iran “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” The resolution came after Iran had ignored a series of requests from the IAEA, the EU-3, and the United States for Iran to cease its enrichment program until its peaceful nature could be confirmed by the IAEA. Iran claimed that neither the IAEA nor any member of the international community had the right to prevent Iran from pursuing a domestic nuclear energy program. Resolution 1696 undermines the legal basis on which Iran has resisted suspension. As the international community awaits Iran’s response to the Security Council’s demands, it is important to understand this new legal context.

    1696 was adopted after three years of negotiations between Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom failed to resolve outstanding questions regarding Iran’s compliance with its IAEA safeguard obligations and its Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons obligation under Article II “not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Throughout these negotiations, Iran has been pressed to suspend uranium enrichment activities, as a confidence-building measure to facilitate negotiations over longer-term parameters to objectively guarantee that Iran’s nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iran agreed as a voluntary, unilateral measure in November 2003 to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA. It then intermittently broke the terms of the suspension until November 2004, when a more specific agreement was made with the EU-3. Iran then breached that agreement on August 10, 2005 when it removed the IAEA seals from its conversion plant in Esfahan in preparation for manufacturing UF6 gas to be enriched. (Read More)

    • Article

    Inside the A.Q. Khan Network

    Rather than being primarily composed of a shadowy subversive network of international terrorists, most of the central players in the A.Q. Khan proliferation network were well-to-do Anglo-Saxons. They were clever and exploited voids in national and international export control laws to sell their wares. Greed was their central motivation.

    • Article

    Crisis in the Middle East

    This is a dangerous moment for the Middle East, because the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon could easily escalate to involve the broader region. Any strategy to address the present crisis must deal with the realities of the Middle East as they are now, not try to leapfrog over them by seeking to impose a grand new vision. Such a vision would be bound to fail as it did in the case of Iraq.

    • Op-Ed

    On Iran, Giving Futility Its Chance

    • Proliferation Analysis

    Why Iran Should Suspend First

    In the latest move in the wrestling match with the international community, Iran is being pushed back to the UN Security Council.  Iran’s unwillingness to negotiate over the recent international incentive package was too much for France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and even Russia and China to take.  This is not the last move, however, and it is important that the international community not waver on the need for Iran to  resume without further delay suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.

    We say this because in Washington and elsewhere, the erroneous and unhelpful impression was being promoted that the United States is the actor holding up negotiations with Iran.  Seymour Hersh’s insightful article in the July 10 & 17 issue of The New Yorker begins by reporting that the Bush Administration’s offer to join talks with Iran was conditioned on the President’s demand that “‘the Iranian regime fully and verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.’”  Hersh continues that in essence “Iran, which has insisted on the right to enrich uranium, was being asked to concede the main point of negotiations before they started.”  Herein lies a damaging fallacy.

    The facts are that the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors has called for Iranian suspension nine times in resolutions between September 2003 and February 2006, and the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of March 29, 2006 also calls for Iran to re-establish “full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development”.  In each case, the demand is for immediate Iranian suspension.  The logic follows the November 15, 2004 Paris Agreement between the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and Iran, whereby Iran agreed that “the suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements”. The aim of the agreement was to provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, while meeting Iran’s interests in developing peaceful nuclear technology and gaining the economic benefits of ties with Europe and the security benefits of broader rapprochement in the Middle East.  Iran broke that suspension last August before it bothered to consider an offer of incentives by the EU-3.  It is risible that Iran now says it needs months to analyze and respond to the more ambitious incentive package offered by the EU-3 and supported by the US, Russia and China. 

    In other words, the call for Iran to suspend enrichment now is an international demand, not an exceptional American one, and it does not prejudge the outcome of subsequent negotiations.  (Read More)

    • Testimony

    Russia: Back to the Future?

    • Dmitri Trenin
    • June 29, 2006
    • Statement prepared for a hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

    Russia has a tsarist political system, in which all major decisions are taken by one institution, the presidency. In fact, this is the only functioning political institution in the country. Separation of powers, enshrined in the 1993 Constitution, does not exist in reality. On the contrary, unity of power and authority has become the new state-building doctrine.

    • Proliferation Analysis

    New Report Addresses Critiques of U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation

    • Caterina Dutto
    • June 27, 2006

    In a new report, Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis argues empirically that natural uranium resources do not limit India's potential nuclear arsenal and that any limitations in India's nuclear fuel stockpile stem from short-term problems that, in fact, give the U.S. little leverage over India.  Tellis argues that Indian policy-makers display no intention nor practice of dramatically building up their nuclear weapon arsenal and that the proposed U.S.-India deal will not cause India to do so or augment its capacity to do so in significant ways.

     

    The report states that India is not seeking to maximize its nuclear arsenal as demonstrated by India’s decision to produce far less fissile material than its capacity allows given its natural uranium reserves. Tellis argues that India’s short-term deficiency of uranium fuel is due to technical hindrances in its uranium mining and milling practices. He maintains that India has the capability to rectify this shortcoming independently.

     

    Tellis also addresses the contentious issue of whether the deal violates Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He states that the NPT legally allows for nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on safeguarded facilities, even if the country has not committed to full-scope safeguards. Tellis asserts that critiques that the U.S.-India nuclear deal violates Article I lead “inexorably to the conclusion that no party to the NPT should have any economic intercourse with India whatsoever, because the resulting gains from trade would inevitably free up some domestic Indian resources that would be of use to New Delhi’s weapons program.”

     

    To access the full report, click here

    • Proliferation Analysis

    Israel Urges U.S. Diplomacy on Iran

    • Ze'ev Schiff
    • May 30, 2006

    Many observers believe that Israel is pushing the U.S. to take military action against Iran's nuclear program. We asked Israel's senior defense journalist, Ze'ev Schiff, a man with outstanding contacts, to describe Israeli establishment thinking today on the Iran challenge.

    When in Washington, I was amazed to hear on a number of occasions that Israel was urging the United States to go to war with Iran and that its strategic objective was to induce the United States to attack Iran, thus putting an end to that country's nuclear program. To the best of my knowledge and understanding this claim is totally false. It is an error based on ignorance or on disregard for important details in Israeli strategic thinking. It may even be founded on a deliberate lie.

    To the best of my knowledge, Israel does not believe war against Iran to be the best way to eliminate the Iranian nuclear project. There is a common tendency to forget that Israel lies on the frontline of such a war. Israel stands to suffer more than anyone else, including the United States, should such a war break out. It would certainly be the prime target of Iranian retaliation should the United States decide to use force against Iran. It is a known fact that the attack on the Israeli consulate in Buenos Aires some years ago was the work of Iranian agents. Also in Buenos Aires, Iranian agents were responsible for the destruction of the Jewish community offices, causing many casualties. In fact, the Iranian government aims its violence against Jewish institutions in countries outside the Middle East. (Read More)

Carnegie Experts on
Nuclear Weapons

  • expert thumbnail - Acton
    James M. Acton
    Jessica T. Mathews Chair
    Co-director
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • expert thumbnail - Adebahr
    Cornelius Adebahr
    Nonresident Fellow
    Carnegie Europe
    Adebahr is a nonresident fellow at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on foreign and security policy, in particular regarding Iran and the Persian Gulf, on European and transatlantic affairs, and on citizens’ engagement.
  • expert thumbnail - Al-Saif
    Bader Al-Saif
    Nonresident Fellow
    Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
    Bader Mousa Al-Saif is a nonresident fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his research focuses on the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.
  • expert thumbnail - Arbatov
    Alexey Arbatov
    Alexey Arbatov is the head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations.
  • expert thumbnail - Blanc
    Jarrett Blanc
    Senior Fellow
    Geoeconomics and Strategy Program
    Jarrett Blanc is a senior fellow in the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • expert thumbnail - Dalton
    Toby Dalton
    Co-director and Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.
  • expert thumbnail - Dvorkin
    Vladimir Dvorkin
    Major General Dvorkin (retired) is a chief researcher at the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.
  • expert thumbnail - Gabuev
    Alexander Gabuev
    Senior Fellow and Chair
    Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program
    Carnegie Moscow Center
    Gabuev is a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
  • expert thumbnail - Gottemoeller
    Rose Gottemoeller
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
  • expert thumbnail - Hibbs
    Mark Hibbs
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.
  • expert thumbnail - Kassenova
    Togzhan Kassenova
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
  • expert thumbnail - Kozhanov
    Nikolay Kozhanov
    Former nonresident scholar
    Foreign and Security Policy Program
    Moscow Center
    Kozhanov is a former nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center and a contributing expert to the Moscow-based Institute of the Middle East.
  • expert thumbnail - Kühn
    Ulrich Kühn
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
  • expert thumbnail - Lee
    Chung Min Lee
    Senior Fellow
    Asia Program
    Chung Min Lee is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program. He is an expert on Korean and Northeast Asian security, defense, intelligence, and crisis management.
  • expert thumbnail - Lehne
    Stefan Lehne
    Visiting Scholar
    Carnegie Europe
    Lehne is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on the post–Lisbon Treaty development of the European Union’s foreign policy, with a specific focus on relations between the EU and member states.
  • expert thumbnail - Levite
    Ariel (Eli) Levite
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Cyber Policy Initiative
    Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.
  • expert thumbnail - MacDonald
    Thomas MacDonald
    Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • expert thumbnail - Mathews
    Jessica Tuchman Mathews
    Distinguished Fellow
    Mathews is a distinguished fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She served as Carnegie’s president for 18 years.
  • expert thumbnail - Narang
    Vipin Narang
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Vipin Narang is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • expert thumbnail - Panda
    Ankit Panda
    Stanton Senior Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • expert thumbnail - Perkovich
    George Perkovich
    Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
    Vice President for Studies
    Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.
  • expert thumbnail - Ryu
    Rexon Y. Ryu
    Nonresident Senior Fellow
    Ryu is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he leads an initiative focused on the intersection of diplomacy, technology, and innovation.
  • expert thumbnail - Sadjadpour
    Karim Sadjadpour
    Senior Fellow
    Middle East Program
    Karim Sadjadpour is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East.
  • expert thumbnail - Schoff
    James L. Schoff
    Senior Fellow
    Asia Program
    Schoff is a senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program. His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and regional engagement, Japanese technology innovation, and regional trade and security dynamics.
  • expert thumbnail - Tellis
    Ashley J. Tellis
    Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs
    Ashley J. Tellis holds the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security and U.S. foreign and defense policy with a special focus on Asia and the Indian subcontinent.
  • expert thumbnail - Trenin
    Dmitri Trenin
    Director
    Carnegie Moscow Center
    Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, has been with the center since its inception. He also chairs the research council and the Foreign and Security Policy Program.
  • expert thumbnail - Ülgen
    Sinan Ülgen
    Visiting Scholar
    Carnegie Europe
    Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.
  • expert thumbnail - Volpe
    Tristan Volpe
    Nonresident Fellow
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.
  • expert thumbnail - Wehrey
    Frederic Wehrey
    Senior Fellow
    Middle East Program
    Frederic Wehrey is a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research deals with armed conflict, security sectors, and identity politics, with a focus on Libya, North Africa, and the Gulf.
  • expert thumbnail - Yoshida
    Fumihiko Yoshida
    Nonresident Scholar
    Nuclear Policy Program
    Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • expert thumbnail - Zhao
    Tong Zhao
    Senior Fellow
    Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy
    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.

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