Commentary
Five problems—and solutions—to make it actually work as a tool of great power competition.
Afreen Akhter
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"Anna Péczeli"
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Source: Getty
Other
Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty
Since 2014, the United States has publicly accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In light of reports that Russia has already deployed a significant number of prohibited missiles, the Trump administration will face the tough decision about whether or not to remain committed to the treaty.
Published on Feb 28, 2017
Source: Strategic Studies Quarterly
Since 2014, the United States has publicly accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark Cold War nuclear arms control agreement. The new US president, Donald J. Trump, will face the tough decision about whether or not to remain committed to the treaty. This article recounts the history of the INF treaty and assesses Russian and US interests related to the treaty. It develops three possible future scenarios for Russian actions and their impact on, as well as possible responses by, the United States and its NATO allies. The conclusion is that NATO allies will most likely face an ambiguous Russian stance with respect to INF weapons, which will make it difficult to find a balanced response strategy, bringing together diplomatic and economic pressure as well as military means to respond to Russia’s INF violation.
This article was originally published in Strategic Studies Quarterly.
About the Authors
Ulrich Kühn
Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program
Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
Anna Péczeli
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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