Shortly after the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president in November 2016, several prominent German politicians, journalists, and scholars began to debate the potential impact on German security of changes in U.S. policy toward NATO and Russia. With Trump arguing for conditionality on the U.S. commitment to the security of Europe during the presidential campaign, the discussion in Germany focused on the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and whether Germany ought to explore options in case of U.S. retrenchment of its security guarantees.

The debate gained steam in late November 2016 with an op-ed by the publisher of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany’s leading conservative newspaper, and prompted also by several interviews given by the chairman of the German Bundestag’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU). These and other protagonists pondered three potential options for Germany: (1) an indigenous German nuclear deterrent; (2) a pan-European deterrent (or Eurodeterrent); and (3) preserving Germany’s latent nuclear technology capacity. To be sure, most proponents underscored that these contingencies would only be applicable in the unlikely event of U.S. nuclear retrenchment from NATO. Most experts and commentators dismissed all three options for political, legal, and/or technical reasons, or otherwise brushed off the entire discourse as a “phantom debate.”

English-language media in the United Kingdom and the United States picked up the story after a lag of some weeks, which gave the debate both greater momentum and visibility, especially in the month following Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2017, but also created something of a feedback effect.

The database below provides the first detailed overview of the German nuclear debate, based on primary sources. There are three reasons to track the debate in this way. First, the database provides an open research resource for experts, scholars, and the general public. Second, this information serves as the evidentiary record and permanently accessible appendix for scholarship on the topic by Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe in Foreign Affairs and the Washington Quarterly. Third, the database enables other analysts to draw independent conclusions from the same comprehensive and transparent pool of information.

The database covers the period from November 2016 to July 2017 and lists all media content, as well as quotes and documents relevant to the debate, in ascending order, with a special emphasis on German- and English-language media and authors. The overview is coded along five sections per entry.

  • The first section lists the source and provides a link to the original online content, if available.
  • The second section lists the origin of the outlet and the author and, if possible, author’s affiliation.
  • The third section lists the type of media appearance (e.g., op-ed, reporting, or interview).
  • The fourth section provides a short, generalized assessment of the position the author or interviewee takes with regards to the three options outlined above. This section distinguishes between five positions. The first position is labeled “affirming,” meaning that the author or interviewee unconditionally affirms the need for Germany to explore one of the three nuclear policy options (German deterrent, Eurodeterrent, or latent capacity). The second position, “contemplating,” captures a position where those three policy options are pondered in case the U.S. security guarantee undergoes changes. The third position, “rejecting,” opposes to either pursue or even discuss the three options. The “denying” category is for those authors that deny the existence of the debate itself. Finally, “neutral” applies to those articles that report on a mostly neutral basis.
  • Coding of these positions is subjective and open to interpretation since some statements meander between several positions; hence the decision to make the raw information in this database transparent and readily accessible. To make the overview on positions more accessible to the reader, colors are assigned to each position (green=affirming; yellow=contemplating; red=rejecting; orange=denying; and gray=neutral).
  • In order to facilitate independent inquiry, each entry provides key quotes from most of the entries in section five (translations of quotes from German into English have been provided by Ulrich Kühn; he does not claim absolute rigor).

This database does not aim to be comprehensive and complete. For instance, we decided to exclude fringe outlets such as extreme right-wing or left-wing blogs or web pages. Instead, the focus is on the mainstream media outlets. If the debate continues and new participants join, we will update the database accordingly.

Last Update: August 2017

Code for colors:

  • Affirm
  • Contemplate
  • Deny
  • Reject
  • Neutral

Database:

  • Source: Henrik Müller, “Wie Trump Deutschland zur Aufrüstung zwingen könnte,” Der Spiegel, November 6, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/wie-donald-trump-deutschland-zur-aufruestung-zwingen-koennte-a-1119912.html#spRedirectedFrom=www&referrrer=https://t.co/J8tkDBM2kC.
    Origin: German news website; German author (academic); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “In the event of a break-up of NATO and the complete abolition of the American security guarantee, even a new arms race could be the result, as already exists elsewhere in the world. Even a debate about indigenous German nuclear weapons would then be conceivable.

    To prevent misunderstandings, all this is by no means desirable. Military instability and economic inefficiency would be the consequences. For Europe it would be much better and cheaper, the US remained involved. But in view of the isolationist sentiment on the other side of the Atlantic, we should be mindful of such a scenario.”
  • Source: Andrea Shalal, “German Lawmaker Says Europe Must Consider Own Nuclear Deterrence Plan,” Reuters, November 16, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-usa-nuclear-idUSKBN13B1GO.
    Origin: British news agency; U.S. author (journalist); German interviewee (member of the Bundestag); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Europe needs to think about developing its own nuclear deterrent strategy given concerns that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump could scale back U.S. military commitments in Europe, a senior member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives said.

    Roderich Kiesewetter, foreign policy spokesman for the conservative bloc in parliament, told Reuters that Germany could play an important role in convincing nuclear powers France and Britain to provide security guarantees for all of Europe.

    ‘The U.S. nuclear shield and nuclear security guarantees are imperative for Europe,’ he said in an interview. ‘If the United States no longer wants to provide this guarantee, Europe still needs nuclear protection for deterrent purposes.’. . .

    Kiesewetter said he was not reassured by President Barack Obama's comments on Monday that Trump would maintain core strategic relationships, including with NATO. . . .

    Kiesewetter said a Franco-British nuclear umbrella for Europe would be costly, but could be financed through a joint European military budget that is due to begin in 2019, along with joint European medical, transportation and reconnaissance commands. . . .

    Rainer Arnold, defence spokesman for the Social Democrats in parliament, dismissed Kiesewetter's suggestion as “off base,” saying Trump's own U.S. Republican Party would never accept a weakening of NATO and would be sceptical about any plans to boost European nuclear capabilities.”
  • Source: Thorsten Benner, “Germany Can Protect the Liberal Order. Damage Control After Trump’s Election,” Foreign Affairs, November 16, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2016-11-16/germany-can-protect-liberal-order.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (Global Public Policy Institute); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Positon: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “If Trump proves serious about abandoning U.S. defense guarantees, European states may be compelled to rethink their nuclear postures. Berlin will need to consider whether to develop a European nuclear umbrella based on French and British capabilities. Germany should also increase its resilience against the influence of authoritarian states such as China and Russia. It should improve its cybersecurity capabilities and its readiness to confront misinformation and leaking campaigns (such as the one orchestrated by Russia during the U.S. election), and it should impose greater costs on the Western actors that enable authoritarian influence-peddling.”
  • Source: “EU-Verteidigungspolitik nach der US-Wahl: ‘Wir werden mehr Geld für unsere Sicherheit ausgeben müssen,‘“ Deutschlandfunk, November 18, 2016, http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/eu-verteidigungspolitik-nach-der-us-wahl-wir-werden-mehr.694.de.html?dram:article_id=371737.
    Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); German interviewee (member of the Bundestag); written in German
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Zagatta: How far should cooperation go, this Union you are talking about? You are now being quoted by the news agency Reuters, that one must even organize a nuclear deterrent, a European nuclear deterrent. How is this supposed to work?

    Kiesewetter: This is not yet a question, but there must be no restrictions on free thought. If the United States, as Trump has implied, wants the Europeans to pay more for their security, or even retreat from Europe, then there should be no restrictions on free thought, and we have to strongly reach out to France and Britain then.”
  • Source: Michael Rühle, “Daydream Believers,” Berlin Policy Journal, November 23, 2016, http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/daydream-believers/.
    Origin: German foreign policy website; German author (NATO official); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Many proponents of a stronger European effort in security and defense are making the case for a conventional force strong enough to deter Russia. But they seem to overlook that Russia is a nuclear power and can therefore trump whatever conventional improvements the Europeans might be able to muster. With the United Kingdom ‘Brexiting’, the EU (unlike NATO) cannot count on London’s nuclear support. France would never let an EU body decide over the ‘force de frappe.’ And EU members Austria and Ireland have championed a global ban on nuclear weapons that is fiercely opposed by the nuclear powers and other NATO members. In short, a European nuclear deterrent is a myth; Europe’s only credible nuclear umbrella remains the one ‘made in the USA.’”
  • Source: Berthold Kohler, “Das ganz und gar Undenkbare,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 27, 2016, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/nach-donald-trump-sieg-deutschland-muss-aussenpolitik-aendern-14547858.html.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (publisher of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “For allies and antagonists alike, the belief that America is intertwining its fate with its most crucial partners in Europe and the Pacific is already shaken up. Trump’s fueling these doubts is eroding one of the most important pillars of the Western security architecture: the peace-saving power of deterrence.

    The term alone is what makes many Germans, still dreaming of ‘making peace without weapons,’ wince. But it was the policy of deterrence that prevented the Cold War from turning into nuclear apocalypse. Thanks to deterrence, stability was the basis for peaceful coexistence and those disarmament initiatives that also Steinmeier has put his hopes on. But only those who have the will, the resolve, and the capabilities to defend their interests, values, and allies can successfully negotiate with the Kremlin. . . .

    If Trump continues down his line, America will leave the defense of Europe to Europeans to an extent that they have not known since 1945. This would not be too unnatural, but for many Europeans it would be an impertinence, because it would lead to unpleasant consequences, which so far have been avoided thanks to the often demonized but comfortable American security umbrella: higher expenses for defense, the revival of conscription, the drawing of red lines – and the utterly unthinkable for German minds, the question of an indigenous nuclear deterrent which could ward off doubts about America’s guarantees. The French and British arsenals are too weak in their present condition for doing that. Meanwhile Moscow is building up arms.

    Ultimately at this point (‘No nuclear arms race!’) even those who consider Trump to be the worst mistake in American history will bet on that he will listen to his wise counselors, that he will be slowed down by the American political system or that the fairy godmother will give him political reason in his sleep. Germans and European foreign and security policy-makers who want to fulfill their responsibilities, indeed, must prepare themselves and their countries for the case that nothing of all that will happen.”
  • Source: Robin Alexander and Jacques Schuster, “Amerika wird uns nicht den Rücken zukehren,” Die Welt, December 4, 2016, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article159950957/Amerika-wird-uns-nicht-den-Ruecken-zukehren.html.
    Origin: German newspaper; German authors (journalists); German interviewee (minister of the Chancellery); written in German
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “‘NATO is the most important visible element of the transatlantic partnership. It ties the U.S. to Europe. That is why we, as Europeans, have an interest in keeping NATO alive,’ said Altmaier. However, Europe in general, Germany in particular, should increase its fighting power.

    Despite some irritating news from Trump, Altmaier is sure that ‘America will not turn its back on us, also out of its own security political interest’. The Minister of the Chancellery said: ‘There will certainly be more political continuity’ than is assumed now.

    A discussion on the question of whether Europe would have to build up nuclear arms if the United States were to withdraw is rejected by Altmaier. The nuclear capacity of America in Europe is not a ‘protection of the European countries by an act of grace’, but also serves as an ‘important strategic defense against potential nuclear threats to American territory’.

    In addition, with Great Britain and France there were two EU member states with nuclear weapons. ‘Taken together with the nuclear umbrella of the Americans within NATO, this is enough.’”
  • Source: Xanthe Hall, “Emanzipation ja, Atomwaffen nein,”Frankfurter Rundschau, December 4, 2016, http://www.fr.de/politik/meinung/gastbeitraege/ruestung-emanzipation-ja-atomwaffen-nein-a-728945.
    Origin: German newspaper; Irish/German author (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “The election victory of Donald Trump and his utterances in the election campaign frighten many people. To others, he provides a welcome opportunity to drive their own agenda forward. Some reactions to these statements are therefore to be treated with extreme caution. The ‘FAZ’ publisher Berthold Kohler pleads for German nuclear weapons, should the U.S. withdraw from Europe. This would be highly dangerous: it violates the international nuclear arms treaty as well as the German law and could lead us into a global catastrophe. Europe should see the U.S. election rather as an opportunity to develop a peace and security alternative than building up arms. Emancipating from the U.S. in terms of nuclear weapons would be good for Germany.”
  • Source: Ulrich Kühn, “The Sudden German Nuke Flirtation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 6, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/06/sudden-german-nuke-flirtation-pub-66366.
    Origin: U.S. think tank; German author (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “While the United States is still coming to terms with President-elect Donald Trump’s potential domestic and foreign policy, U.S. allies worldwide are becoming increasingly nervous about the incoming administration’s stance toward U.S. alliance commitments. Spurred by Trump’s warm words for Russian President Vladimir Putin, his implicit threat that Washington could scale back U.S. defense commitments to Europe if NATO members do not pay more for their own security, and his lax remarks that certain U.S. allies should perhaps be allowed to go nuclear, some prominent voices in Germany are suddenly openly flirting with the nuclear option.

    Given the country’s long-term support of nuclear disarmament, a debate about a possible German nuclear deterrent is virtually unprecedented. So far, these voices represent an extreme minority view—currently, neither the government nor the vast majority of German experts is even considering the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons—but with continued uncertainty about Trump’s commitment to Europe, this could change during the coming years.”
  • Source: “Europeans Debate Nuclear Self-Defense after Trump Win,” Der Spiegel, December 9, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/europe-responds-to-trump-win-with-nuclear-deterrent-debate-a-1125186.html.
    Origin: German news website; German authors (journalists); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “In European capitals, officials have been contemplating the possibility of a European nuclear deterrent since Trump's election. The hurdles—military, political and international law—are massive and there are no concrete intentions or plans. Still, French diplomats in Brussels have already been discussing the issue with their counterparts from other member states: Could the French and the British, who both possess nuclear arsenals, step in to provide protection for other countries like Germany?

    ‘It's good that this is finally being discussed,’ says Jan Techau, director of the Holbrooke Forum at the Americn Academy in Berlin. ‘The question of Europe's future nuclear defense is the elephant in the room in the European security debate. If the United States' nuclear security guarantee disappears, then it will be important to clarify who will protect us in the future. And how do we prevent ourselves from becoming blackmailable over the nuclear issue in the future?’

    Kiesewetter argues that Europe must prepare for all eventualities. ‘There can be no limits placed on our security debate,’ he says. The CDU security policy expert is a former colonel in the German armed forces and also did stints at both NATO headquarters in Brussels and at the alliance's military headquarters in Mons, Belgium. After Trump's election, he spoke not only to French and British diplomats, but also explored views within the German government.

    He says he spoke with Christoph Heusgen, Merkel's security adviser, and with Defense Ministry Policy Director Gésa von Geyr. Kiesewetter says the issue is not one that either the Chancellery or the Defense Ministry is taking up. At the same time, he says, he also didn't get the impression that his ideas had been dismissed as fantasy either.”
  • Source: Gunther Hellmann, Carlo Masala, Frank Sauer, and Reinhard Wolf, “Deutschland braucht keine Atomwaffen,” Der Spiegel, December 11, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/gastbeitrag-deutschland-braucht-keine-atomwaffen-a-1125247.html.
    Origin: German news website; German authors (academics); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “It is correct that Europeans in general and the Germans in particular must rethink their security and defense policy due to the worrisome developments in their security political neighborhood. However, neither at the beginning nor at the end of such considerations should be a nuclear power Germany. . . .

    . . . That one has to think about how the French and British nuclear arsenals might perhaps become part of a European deterrence strategy if the United States really closes Europe’s nuclear umbrella altogether, is right, but is a different story.”
  • Source: Michael Rühle, “Raketenträume,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 13, 2016, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/aussenansicht-raketentraeume-1.3292505.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (NATO official); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Is it now time to turn the hitherto only virtual ‘European option’ into reality? The answer is a clear ‘no’. The notion that a Europe weakened by economic crises and populist temptations could now crack particularly the hardest nut of a common foreign and security policy because it has become inevitable, is in the best sense of the word ‘post-factual’: a diffuse discomfort over the future foreign and security policy course of the United States does not overcome the enormous hurdles that stand in the way of European nuclear deterrent.”
  • Source: “ECFR’s World in 30 Minutes: Towards a German Nuclear Option?,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 14, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/podcasts/episode/ecfrs_world_in_30_minutes_towards_a_german_nuclear_option.
    Origin: Pan-European think tank; British author (think tanker); German interviewees (journalists/think tankers); conducted in English
    Type: Interview/Analysis
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/ Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    Ockrent: “I don’t think it [Eurodeterrent] works at all. It is a scheme because after all, both the British and the French nuclear deterrents are very much linked to NATO. It took the French many decades to agree to the fact that their own nuclear deterrence on its own was getting obsolete and that in strategic terms, it took after the discourse about nuclear independence, which runs very deep in how the French think about their own country . . . I think that the mere fact that the debate is happening in Germany is because of ‘America First,’ Mr. Trump, and it also has to do with Brexit, because there is no way at all that we as Europeans can strengthen our defense capacities, either conventional or nuclear, without the Brits.”

    Puglierin: “I think Kiesewetter addressed the elephant in the room, in my opinion. I think we have to talk about this [Eurodeterrent] and address the problem ahead. If Trump will end the nuclear option for Europe or end nuclear sharing with NATO or whatever, then we have a problem. . . . I wanted to explain that this whole debate is just a minority debate and is totally disconnected from the German public because 90 percent of the Germans out there support the idea of Global Zero, want to end nuclear sharing . . . I think that Roderich Kiesewetter has a good strategic point here, and I think we have to address this. I would prefer a NATO solution first, and the British and the French nukes are already part of a European deterrence strategy . . . so I would prefer a NATO option, but if there is none, I fear that we will have to create a European one.”

    Janning: “I don’t think we should get a German bomb, not least because in the last formal treaty that deals with Germany’s international policy, the 2 + 4 Treaty, which ended the post-war status of a divided Germany, Germany reconfirmed again that it would never seek position and control of nuclear or other conventional weapons. But I think there is a good reason for the Europeans to reflect among themselves whether they would not need a nuclear deterrent and whether they already have one, which doesn’t label as one. In particular the nuclear capabilities of the United Kingdom and France . . . I’m not so skeptical because it is not without precedent. Within NATO we have, in part driven by Washington, we had the Nuclear Planning Group and the idea to involve more NATO partners than those holding nuclear weapons to get engaged on this, to share the strategic rationality that comes with the possession of nuclear weapons with a wider group of allies. Not with everyone, but with those whose responsibility one would like to kind of shape.”
  • Source: Fredy Gsteiger, “Der atomare Schutzschild könnte fallen,” SRF News, December 30, 2016, http://m.srf.ch/news/international/der-atomare-schutzschild-koennte-fallen.
    Origin: Swiss broadcaster; Swiss author (journalist); written in German
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Ischinger, a man with much influence, finds a discussion about European nuclear weapons is the last thing that is needed. He knows that in Germany, but not only there, public opinion strongly rejects a European atomic bomb. Even less a ‘German bomb,’ which the ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’ speaks of, is under consideration.”
  • Source: Ulrich Speck, “Wenn Amerika Deutschland seinen Schutz entzieht,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 4, 2017.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (Elcano Royal Institute); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “With the election of Donald Trump, the end of the liberal international order becomes a possibility. . . . Germany as an economic giant and a military dwarf, devoid of its own nuclear weapons and endued with a deep-seated aversion to power-political, military assertiveness would face a choice: either aspiring to become a  great power itself or becoming the puppet of other great powers. The ‘German question’ would be re-opened and with it the fate of Europe.”
  • Source: Doug Bandow, “Time for a European Nuclear Deterrent?,” National Interest, January 13, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-european-nuclear-deterrent-19053?page=show.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (Cato Institute); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Rather than expect the United States to burnish NATO’s nuclear deterrent, European nations should consider expanding their nuclear arsenals and creating a continent-wide nuclear force, perhaps as part of the long-derided Common Security and Defense Policy. . . .

    One policy which deserves rethinking is extended deterrence in Europe. The continent already has two European nuclear states as members of NATO. Instead of expecting the United States to risk a nuclear exchange to protect Europe, the Europeans should take over that risk. With their continent already hosting two nuclear states, it is time to ask whether that number should grow.”
  • Source: Jost Kaiser, “Amerika, du wirst uns fehlen,” Der Spiegel, January 22, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/donald-trump-bedeutet-das-ende-der-alten-bundesrepublik-a-1130794.html.
    Origin: German news website; German author (journalist); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “For what do we do if we can no longer discuss NATO because it no longer exists? And NATO is gone, and Trump has already announced that, the second he takes the principle of collective defense guarantees off the table.

    What are we doing now in a country in which the former Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, just a few years ago, raised the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, stored in Germany, as one of the most important demands of his term of office – evidently in ignorance of their strategic function as link between German and U.S. military commands (‘nuclear sharing’)? Maybe Trump just withdraws them. Satisfied?

    What do we do in a country in which the future President of the Federal Republic is describing the tentative attempt to maintain a mild form of deterrence as ‘saber-rattling’, and thus sees himself in the tradition of Brandt's ‘Ostpolitik’ (which only had a chance being backed by nuclear arms), once the Americans no longer provide the means for saber-rattling?”
  • Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “Deutschland braucht Atomwaffen,” Tagesspiegel Causa, January 23, 2017, https://causa.tagesspiegel.de/politik/europa-und-die-weltweiten-krisen/deutschland-braucht-atomwaffen.html.
    Origin: German news website; German author (academic); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Affirm [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “If Trump were to continue its pro-Russian course in office—and it all looks like this—the central strategic basis of German security policy would be rattled, i.e., conventional and nuclear deterrence against Russia by NATO. The answer to the lack of strategic protection for our national security must therefore be that Germany needs nuclear weapons.”

    Indeed, the threat posed by Putin's Russia comes from the strategic and conventional imbalance that would arise when the [US] deterrence ceased. It is thus easy to see that Putin would relentlessly exploit such a military imbalance to his political advantage. . . .

    “A Germany, which wants to limit the power of Putin's Russia in order to be preserve Europe in an independent and unbending manner, thus preserving German domestic and foreign political leeway, has to do that militarily and thus in a nuclear way. . . .

    . . . [Talking about Germany’s neighbors to the East] The purpose of [German] nuclear power projection is legitimate because it will be shared [by those states]. . . .

    Other critics say that any consideration should be made with France and the United Kingdom. Looking at the arsenals of the two members of the Security Council, however, it is striking that they are too small, too much of a tactical nature, and partly obsolete, and thus cannot provide comprehensive deterrence. And on the other hand, the realistic realization of relying on oneself is also valid here. The concept of extended deterrence always involves the central weakness of alliances: can the weaker partner (here a non-nuclear Germany) really rely on the fact that the stronger partner (e.g., Great Britain) guarantees for him and stands up against Russia? In a worst-case scenario, however, Germany must be able to stand for itself. It owes it to its people. . . .

    . . . Comprehensively arming Germany with nuclear weapons is the central means of preserving a Europe, which is not secured by the USA anymore, one that reflects our liberal way of life. . . . Possibly, however, a German debate on nuclear weapons could have a taming effect on the United States (which does not want a nuclear Germany) and an accelerating effect on actual European defense efforts. With that, already much would have been won.”
  • Source: Roderich Kiesewetter, “Trump’s ‘Deal-Making’ Strategy and Opportunities for Europe,” European Leadership Network, January 26, 2017, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/trumps-deal-making-strategy-and-opportunities-for-europe_4401.html.
    Origin: British think tank; German author (Member of the Bundestag); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “If, against all odds, Trump put into practice his proposal that all, especially Baltic States, have to share higher financial costs to enjoy security under the nuclear umbrella, Europe must re-think some formerly taboo issues. Following this line of argumentation, Europe would have to verify if alternative models of nuclear protection are possible—not by building new nuclear capabilities, but in terms of increasing, modernizing and commonly financing existing arsenals.”
  • Source: Stefan Fröhlich, “Looking to Germany: What Berlin Can and Can’t Do for the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs, January 29, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-01-29/looking-germany?t=1487344984.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (academic); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Although boosting Europe’s nuclear deterrence capabilities seems unrealistic, it is possible that France might consider the possibility more seriously after the United Kingdom leaves the EU. French and British nuclear weapons have been part of a European strategy of deterrence since NATO’s Ottawa Declaration of 1974, in which the two nuclear powers expressed their willingness to contribute ‘to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance.’ Since Germany has agreed not to develop and acquire nuclear weapons under the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Two Plus Four Treaty, it is likely that it would be willing to pay for the French force de frappe and to do everything possible to keep the United Kingdom included in any plans for European nuclear deterrence.”
  • Source: Robert Bongen, Johannes Jolmes, and Volker Steinhoff, “Donald Trump und US-Atombomben in Deutschland,” ARD Panorama, February 2, 2017, https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/archiv/2017/US-Atombomben-in-Deutschland-und-Donald-Trump,atombombe100.html.
    Origin: German broadcaster; German authors (journalists); written in German
    Type: Reporting
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “No small number of experts urge a debate about the question, what to do if Trump withdraws nuclear protection. What if Trump withdraws nuclear weapons from Europe? . . .

    What about security? For decades Germany could slip under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and legally renounced its own nuclear weapons. Should Europe now build up its own nuclear umbrella by integrating the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France? A European option, meaning to rely on already existing nuclear arsenals, is already under debate behind closed doors in Berlin.”
  • Source: “US-Atombomben in Deutschland: Trumps unberechenbare Macht,” ARD Panorama, February 2, 2017, http://www.ardmediathek.de/tv/Panorama/US-Atombomben-in-Deutschland-und-Donald-/Das-Erste/Video?bcastId=310918&documentId=40422862.
    Origin: German broadcaster; German authors (journalists); German interviewees (think tanker); broadcasted in German
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplating [Citations on German Deterrent]/Contemplating [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    Kühn: “The idea of a German nuclear weapon or perhaps even a European nuclear weapon is not completely absurd, should the security environment in Europe and in Germany continue to seriously change to the negative. That means, Russia continues to threaten the peace in Europe and the Americans retreat at the same time – then I don’t want to exclude that people also in Germany start to think about how to really defend against Russia.”
  • Source: Karl Kaiser, “Abbruchunternehmen Trump – Eine Handlungsanweisung zur Rettung der transatlantischen Beziehungen,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, February 2, 2017, http://www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/nordamerika/artikel/detail/abbruchunternehmen-trump-1820/.
    Origin: German foreign policy website; German author (academic); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “If there was ever an ‘hour of Europe,’ then now. It is about a reorganization of Europe, in which Russia's security policy challenges, cyber threats and terrorism must be tackled. To this end, it will be necessary to develop a self-sufficient European defense structure in cooperation with NATO. The French nuclear power, which would be financially supported by Germany and other EU members, could be assigned to it.”
  • Source: Hans Kundnani, “The New Parameters of German Foreign Policy,” Transatlantic Academy, March 3, 2017, http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Kundnani%20-%20The%20New%20Parameters%20of%20German%20Foreign%20Policy_1.pdf.
    Origin: U.S. think tank; German author (Transatlantic Academy); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “The withdrawal of the U.S. security guarantee would force Germany to rethink its security policy — and perhaps even its attitude to nuclear weapons. . . .

    Germany is likely to seek to delay a more radical rethink of security policy for as long as possible—not least because it would inevitably involve the question of nuclear weapons. Since the election of Trump, several influential figures in Germany have already reopened the question. A week after the election, Roderich Kiesewetter, a Christian Democrat member of the Bundestag, proposed a European nuclear deterrent. At the end of November, Berthold Kohler, one of the publishers of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, went even further and called for an independent German nuclear deterrent. Others have since made similar arguments. But these voices are likely to remain a tiny minority. Public opinion makes it difficult to imagine—even now—Germany seeking to develop nuclear weapons.”
  • Source: Max Fisher, “For Germany, Trump Poses a Problem With No Clear Solution,” The Interpreter (blog), New York Times,February 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/world/europe/germany-prepares-for-turbulence-in-the-trump-era.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fthe-interpreter&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=1.
    Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Neutral [Citations]
    Key Quotes:
    “Behind closed doors, according to a senior German government official, officials are preparing for the day that Berlin could be forced to treat its longtime ally as a threat, necessitating radical changes in German foreign policy.

    The official asked to remain anonymous because of another predicament Berlin faces with Mr. Trump: Its leaders must prepare Germany by enunciating the stakes, but they fear that overtly stepping away from Mr. Trump would anger him, risking the very breakup they wish to avoid.

    Others are beginning to think about the day after.

    Roderich Kiesewetter, a former military officer who is now a lawmaker with the Christian Democratic Union, is among a small but growing group pushing these questions into the public debate.

    Germany should focus on persuading Mr. Trump to drop his hostility toward Europe, Mr. Kiesewetter said, but ‘we should not wait’ to consider acting.

    Mr. Kiesewetter hopes to hasten military integration across the European Union. He acknowledged that a European-only defense against Russia would be far weaker than the status quo. Still, he argued it could be a sufficient deterrent — if Germany takes enough of a role to bring along the rest of Europe.

    Though few lawmakers have joined Mr. Kiesewetter’s public calls for considering a post-American Europe, policy analysts say that such discussions are becoming widespread in official Berlin.”
  • Source: Frederick Studemann, “Thinking the Unthinkable on Germany Going Nuclear,” Financial Times, February 6, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/277695dc-ec52-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6.
    Origin: British newspaper, German author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Almost all observers have been quick to note that there is almost zero public support in Germany for nuclear weapons. Even those who have raised the issue acknowledge this. Mr Kiesewetter says that Europe does not need another nuclear power.”
  • Source: Konrad Schuller, “Es gilt, dass Frau Merkel für uns das Beste wäre,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 7, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/kaczynski-wuenscht-sich-fuer-polen-einen-sieg-merkels-14859766.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); Interviewee (Polish politician); written in German
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Affirm [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    Schuller: “The migration crisis has become a weapon between East and West, and now some are even concerned that America's nuclear umbrella is in question. Does Europe have to become a nuclear power?”
    Kaczynski: “A nuclear power Europe would have to be able to compete with Russia. We are a long way from that. But if there were something serious, I would support it. Europe would then become a super power. I would welcome this. But just one or two nuclear submarines would not be enough for that. One would have to be ready for huge expenditures, and I do not see that. I am therefore more inclined to cultivate relations with the Americans and to reform the EU.”
  • Source: Barbara Wesel, “Poland Wants Nuclear Weapons for Europe,” Deutsche Welle, February 7, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/poland-wants-nuclear-weapons-for-europe/a-37449773.
    Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “‘It’s not surprising that we’re seeing this kind of debate now,’ said Nick Witney, former head of the European Defense Agency and now a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. In principle, it’s about the question of whether US President Donald Trump is prepared to sacrifice Chicago to save Warsaw. And what would his answer to that be? The political situation has changed so quickly, and with it the current state of defense policy.

    But how credible would a European nuclear deterrent be? Thirty years ago, London and Paris would have been flattered to be chosen as the defenders of the European continent. But what EU state would be prepared to accept such a nuclear defense force now? Never mind what Britain’s decision to leave the EU has done to whatever credibility that idea still had.

    For his part, Witney says he doesn’t believe in a common European nuclear power. ‘You would need institutions for that which the EU doesn’t have,’ he said. That leaves just France with its nuclear weapons which, in an emergency, could perhaps still just about ‘rip the arm off of a Russian bear.’ Witney’s conclusion: ‘The discussion is very much one that is on the fringe, if not completely out of the realm of the possible.’”
  • Source: “Stellungnahme: Donald Trump und US-Atombomben in Deutschland,” ARD Panorama, February 7, 2017, https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/Stellungnahme-Donald-Trump-und-US-Atombomben-in-Deutschland,atombombe104.html.
    Origin: German broadcaster; German authors (journalists); written in German
    Type: Response to public reactions
    Position: Neutral [comments on critiques of previous broadcasting]
    Key Quotes:
    “No question: ‘nuclear weapons’ are a sensitive and highly emotional topic about which we could argue for hours. We do understand our viewers when they write that the policy of deterrence is highly dangerous, extremely inhuman, and on top of that quite stupid.
    But the debate about nuclear deterrence is real: the logic of deterrence is dominant if one looks at the current political situation. Suppressing urgent questions and discussions will only result in the opposite: decisions will be made without consultation. We, here at ‘Panorama’ think that this is undemocratic and that is why we wanted to provide for transparency in this debate—i.e., before a new security political concept has been introduced to the parliament.”
  • Source: Vincenzo Capodici, “Europa als Atom-Supermacht?,” Basler Zeitung, February 7, 2017, http://bazonline.ch/ausland/europa/europa-als-atomsupermacht/story/21898647.
    Origin: Swiss newspaper; Swiss author (journalist); written in German
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “The idea of ​​a nuclear super power Europe is absurd and there is no serious debate about that, says Stephan Israel, correspondent of baz.ch/Newsnet in Brussels. ‘If you see how difficult it is for the EU countries to cooperate in military matters at all, this idea seems to be abstruse.’”
  • Source: Justin Huggler, “Merkel Forced to Deny Germany Planning to Lead a European Nuclear Superpower,” Telegraph, February 9, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/09/merkel-forced-deny-germany-planning-lead-european-nuclear-superpower/.
    Origin: British newspaper; British author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “The German government has been forced to deny it is interested in acquiring nuclear weapons amid calls for it to lead a European ‘nuclear superpower’.

    ‘There are no plans for nuclear armament in Europe involving the federal government,’ a spokesman for Angela Merkel said.

    The highly unusual statement comes amid growing calls for the European Union to invest in its own nuclear deterrent in the wake of President Donald Trump’s comments that Nato is ‘obsolete’.”
  • Source: Thorsten Benner, “Über Atomwaffen reden,” Wirtschaftswoche 7, February 2, 2017, 6–7, http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2017/Benner__2017__Wir_mu__ssen_u__ber_Atomwaffen_reden__Wirtschaftswoche.pdf.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (Global Public Policy Institute); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]/ Affirm [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]/Contemplate [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    See English translation in Benner, “Germany’s Necessary Nuclear Debate.”
  • Source: Hanno Kautz, Karina Mößbauer, and Peter Tiede, “Wegen Äusserungen von US-Präsident Trump zur NATO: Ist es Zeit, dass Deutschland Atommacht wird?,” BILD Zeitung, February 8, 2017, http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/inland/atombombe/sollte-deutschland-atommacht-werden-50172416.bild.html.
    Origin: German tabloid; German authors (journalists); multiple German interviewees; written in German
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [German Deterrent]/Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    Roderich Kiesewetter, member of the German Bundestag (CDU/CSU), chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs: “We have to preserve the nuclear umbrella for Europe. For that, we need the United States. […] A German nuclear bomb would be a disaster because it would lead to a new nuclear arms race.”

    Hans-Lothar Domröse, former NATO general: “With that we would open Pandora’s Box and start a race. It would be even harder to deny other states, such as Iran, nuclear weapons.”

    Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin office (think tank): “Europeans have to clearly re-define their nuclear interests. Should the United States not be willing anymore, to contribute its part to nuclear deterrence, particularly Germany and France have to fill that vacuum.”

    Horst Teltschik, former adviser to Helmut Kohl: “The debate is not surprising, given the current state of affairs: The U.S. President questions NATO and the protective status of the United States for Europe, Great Britain as a nuclear power opts out and also it’s still not clear what to expect from France in the future.” But nuclear weapons? “That is the completely wrong answer to the right question.”
  • Source: Thorsten Benner, “Germany’s Necessary Nuclear Debate,” Global Public Policy Institute, February 10, 2017, http://www.gppi.net/publications/peace-security/article/germanys-necessary-nuclear-debate/.
    Origin: German think tank; German author (Global Public Policy Institute); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]/ Affirm [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]/Contemplate [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Yes, any debate on nuclear strategy should proceed with great caution and care, but it is one Germany cannot and should not avoid. Those rushing to argue that Germany needs to quickly acquire nuclear weapons disregard the need for caution and care. Yes, Germany should preserve its latent capability to build nuclear weapons. But a German bomb can only be the last resort in case of a total breakdown of the Euro-Atlantic security arrangements. . . . A European nuclear umbrella, as demanded by Polish governing party leader Jarosław Kaczynski this week, is not in the cards politically at this stage. But that does not mean that Germany should not push in this direction. The UK as a nuclear power should remain an integral part of European security after Brexit. The decisive factor is France and its force de frappe. Should Marine Le Pen fail with her bid to move into the Élysée Palace, Germany should seek talks on nuclear cooperation with the new French president in May. Approaching Paris on an issue where Germany is needy would also help to put Franco-German relations on a more equal footing – a more than welcome side effect.”
  • Source: Katie Mansfield, “Merkel Urged to Make ‘Germany a Nuclear Superpower for Europe’ Over US-Exit Fears,” Daily Express, February 10, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/765679/angela-merkel-germany-nuclear-superpower-united-states-nato.
    Origin: British tabloid; British author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    Repeats key quotes from earlier articles.
  • Source: Malte Göttsche, ““Mehr Bomben, mehr Abschreckung”: Warum jede Diskussion um atomare Aufrustung brandgefährlich ist,” Huffington Post, February 10, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.de/malte-goettsche/atom-waffen-abruestung-deutschland-atomkrieg_b_14672440.html?utm_hp_ref=germany.
    Origin: U.S. news website (German version); German author (academic); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “The discussion of how Europe can make itself more independent from the USA in terms of security is certainly necessary, regardless of how strongly the US will ultimately turn away.

    It is nevertheless reckless, that this debate occasionally provokes thoughts about its own nuclear deterrence capacity. The equation ‘more nuclear weapons’ equals ‘more deterrence’ equals ‘more security’ is wrong. Rather, nuclear weapons are ticking time bombs.”
  • Source: Thomas Gutschker, “Nato gegen Atom-Supermacht Europa,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 12, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/f-a-s-exklusiv-nato-gegen-atom-supermacht-europa-14873920.html.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “‘Throughout the world leaders have to think about what best serves stability, security, and defense. The development of new nuclear weapons does not contribute to these objectives,’ Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Rose Gottemoeller, told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Instead, destabilization and further crises would be encouraged.”
  • Source: Alex Rosen, “Nur Deeskalation schafft Sicherheit,” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 12, 2017, http://www.fr-online.de/gastbeitraege/atomwaffen-nur-deeskalation-schafft-sicherheit,29976308,35154196.html.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “A nuclear-armed Europe cannot be the solution to our legitimate security needs. We should strive for a Europe without weapons of mass destruction, a Europe in which all countries, including Russia, diplomatically solve their differences and protect their legitimate interests. This includes security guarantees from Russia for the Baltic States as well as NATO security guarantees for Russia. It is difficult to conceive that the needs for security of the conflict parties can be satisfied by the deployment of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe or by nuclear weapons-capable short-range missiles in Kaliningrad.”
  • Source: Josef Joffe, “Germany Has Taken Itself Out of the Nuclear Running,” Financial Times, February 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4a60efd8-f1fd-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608.
    Origin: British newspaper; German author (publisher of Die ZEIT); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
    Key Quotes:
    “So, the unthinkable has become the undoable. By 2023, Germany will have none of the wherewithal for a weapons option, except a limited low-enrichment capability doomed to go when the last power reactor goes. You cannot build a bomb without a complete fuel cycle . . .”
  • Source: Christine Leah, “A European Nuclear Deterrent?,” American Interest, February 14, 2017, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/14/a-european-nuclear-deterrent/.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; Australian/French author (academic); written in English
    Type: Analysis
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “In both Europe and Asia, the overarching question looms: Can a non-superpower nuclear weapons state like France, even in league with other states in its region, provide a European deterrent? Can India, even in league with other states in the region, do so in Asia?”
  • Source: Christine Heuer, “Diese Unsicherheit löst Nervosität auf europäischer Seite aus,” Deutschlandfunk, February 15 2017, http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/treffen-der-nato-verteidigungsminister-diese-unsicherheit.694.de.html?dram:article_id=378978.
    Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); interviewee (German think tanker); written in German
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Neutral [Citations]
    Key Quotes:
    “Techau: No one would officially confirm that this is really being discussed. But of course this is something that is being discussed. Nobody would take this up at the moment as part of any official political program. Nobody writes it in official papers. But those who are concerned with these strategic questions think about these things. And as I said: a tentative debate has begun. This always shows that there is already a lot going on under the surface.

    Heuer: Can you tell us, Mr. Techau, how the federal government views that?

    Techau: The federal government is in a relatively easy position. It can always go back to the position that Germany has renounced nuclear weapons in the two-plus-four treaty, which has paved the way for unification, and that, of course, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is, of course, also an obstacle to arming Germany with nuclear weapons. No way would the federal government get involved in this discussion. In Germany this would trigger a moderate political earthquake. That is why this is not addressed, not even in an extremely cautious way.

    It has something to do with the fact that in such a debate in Europe, one would just trigger the nervousness that one does not actually need. The Federal Government is back on the assumption that the American security guarantee is stable and does everything behind the scenes to ensure that this remains the case. It has also massively extended its outreach activities to Washington, in order to make it clear how important the American presence in Europe is. At the same time, the government is trying to discuss conventional cooperation amongst the Europeans. But not only the German federal government, but also the other governments in Europe, will probably not be willing to tackle the nuclear question in the mid-term.

    Heuer: Mr. Techau, let me pose the question again: is it indeed totally unrealistic that this might happen, even though experts might deem it necessary. I hear that from your comments. You take the situation pretty serious.

    Techau: Yes, the situation is serious.”
  • Source: Wolfgang Ischinger, “How Europe Should Deal With Trump,” Project Syndicate, February 15, 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/european-security-relations-with-trump-by-wolfgang-ischinger-2017-02?barrier=accessreg.
    Origin: International foreign policy website; German author (Munich Security Conference); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Finally, calls for Europe to become a strategic counterweight to the US are purely aspirational; in reality, no such option exists. In the short and medium term, Europeans cannot do without the US security guarantee. As a result, we must work to convince the new administration of the importance of a united and peaceful Europe.

    Nonetheless, the mere speculation about decoupling European security from the US is giving rise to uncertainty, reflected in the emerging debate about a European – or even German – nuclear bomb. It’s a sham debate, because it assumes what must be questioned: Is it really in Europeans’ interest to cut the cord proactively now, before we have even been presented with any concrete US decisions that directly affect us?”
  • Source: Peter Dausend and Michael Thumann, “Braucht die EU die Bombe?,” Die Zeit, February 16, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-02/trump-nato-atomwaffen-europa/komplettansicht.
    Origin: German newspaper; German authors (journalists); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Germans could soon face a tough decision. Either they are financially involved in a modernized French Force de Frappe and get limited influence over a Europeanized French deterrent in exchange. Or they decide to suppress the problem as much as NATO currently does and see Donald Trump—no matter what he does—as a reliable partner who guarantees the security of Europe.”
  • Source: Josef Joffe, “Atommacht D?” Die Zeit, February 17, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/2017/08/ruestung-atomwaffen-atommacht-deutschland-zeitgeist.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (publisher of Die Zeit); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
    Key Quotes: For translation, see Josef Joffe, “Germany Has Taken Itself Out of the Nuclear Running,” Financial Times, February 13, 2017. Although the articles are not identical, they are largely the same in content.
  • Source: Jan Techau, “Als Moralapostel droht Deutschland zu zerreißen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 17, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/sicherheitskonferenz/als-moralapostel-droht-deutschland-zu-zerreissen-14880255.html?GEPC=s3.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (think tanker); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “How is nuclear blackmail to be prevented? And finally, what is a country going to do that is perhaps even forced to discuss the issue of its own nuclear weapons? How is nuclear blackmail to be prevented if one day the American nuclear shield is gone and Europe is again an open security political space? Who fills the vacuum? Is there enough confidence in the European political market to rely entirely on France and Great Britain? How should a country with a great hunger for moral clarity accept exactly that weapon which it views as the most immoral of all?”
  • Source: “Was Experten von einer deutschen Atombombe halten,” BILD Zeitung, February 19, 2017, http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/inland/atombombe/umfrage-sicherheitskonferenz-braucht-deutschland-die-atombombe-50505650,var=a,view=conversionToLogin.bild.html.
    Origin: German tabloid; German authors (journalists); multiple interviewees from different countries; written in German
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]/Reject [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    Ulrike Demmer, government vice spokesperson: “There are no plans for nuclear armament in Europe involving the federal government.”

    Former security policy advisor in the chancellery, Erich Vad: “A Europeanization of nuclear policy would decouple Europe from North America and is therefore not in the German interest. A participation or ‘having a say’ of Germany in French nuclear policy – apart from Berlin’s financial support – will not be accepted in Paris. A German bomb would also not be favored by either Paris or London or any other European partners. In particular, it would not be accepted by the majority of the German people. Therefore the nuclear umbrella for Germany is only possible within NATO and with the United States.”

    Wolfgang Ischinger, head of the Munich Security Conference: “Reaching for nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly through the EU, would be a major violation of international law by Germany. Germany has repeatedly renounced nuclear weapons.”

    Michael Chertoff, former U.S. secretary of homeland security: “What you mean by nuclear power is that Germany is developing nuclear weapons. I think, it makes a great deal of sense if the current number of nuclear powers does not increase. Now, Germany is a democracy and a country that we trust, but it is the wrong message, which is being sent to Iran and North Korea when Western countries suddenly decide, to join the nuclear club. In my opinion, Germany should not join the nuclear club. That would be perceived as violating the rules of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.”

    Tobias Lindner, member of the German Bundestag and defense expert of Alliance ‘90/The Greens: “No. This is not only an absurd but particularly dangerous proposal. This world does not need more but less nuclear weapons.”

    Petr Pavel, chairman of the NATO Military Committee: “There is currently no need on the part of NATO to have Germany go nuclear. The current constellation of three nuclear powers is absolutely sufficient for nuclear deterrence. But it is a fact that Germany is the strongest economic power and one of the three most important military powers in Europe and therefore needs to take on some kind of a leadership role. It is not sufficient to only lead by example; Germany has to participate in a concrete way.”
  • Source: Oliver Thränert, “No Shortcut to a European Deterrent,” ETHZ CSS, February 2017, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP5-2.pdf.
    Origin: Swiss think tank; German author (Center for Security Studies, ETHZ); written in English
    Type: Analysis
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “Even these brief considerations show that any change in the status quo of nuclear deterrence in and for Europe would not only be expensive, but also a political minefield full of undesirable potential political consequences. Europeans would have to ask themselves whether their concerns are exclusively related to Donald Trump as a person or whether they go deeper. Only if they find that their doubts in the United States’ nuclear commitments are structural in nature (that is, if they believe that Trump’s eventual successor could not be relied upon as well), should they even seriously consider the enormous difficulties and problems of European nuclear deterrence. This step would be too significant to be taken in the heat of daily politics.”
  • Source: Jakob Augstein, “Die deutsche Bombe,” Der Spiegel,February 23, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/aufruestung-die-deutsche-bombe-kolumne-von-jakob-augstein-a-1135917.html.
    Origin: German news website; German author (journalist); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/ Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Nuclear power Germany? Again and again there have been reflections on the participation of the Germans in the French Force de Frappe. But so far it was taken for granted that the home of the Holocaust does not touch the nuclear fire. And in the future? The ‘ZEIT’ already quotes the complaint of a ‘nuclear expert’ about the weakness of the Germans: They had forgotten to think in nuclear categories.

    That way, the nuclear logic returns from the crypt of history.

    The whole Dr. Strangelove insanity of nuclear game theory. The other is the enemy. You do not know what the opponent is planning. Prepare for the worst. This is the return of Cold War paranoia. For if everyone only pursues his immediate gains, the result is not the best of all worlds, but the world becomes either a madhouse or a slaughterhouse.”
  • Source: “Germany’s Nuclear Weapons,” YouTube video, posted by “Brent Goff Reports,” February 23, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfPDH2y_HKk.
    Origin: German broadcaster; U.S. author (journalist); German interviewee (Transatlantic Academy); conducted in English
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Neutral [German Deterrent]/Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    Kundnani: “I struggle to see how Germany would then suddenly decide to develop nuclear weapons on its own. There is a debate about that. All to spend the amount of money it would need to spend in order to become strategically autonomous. . . .”

    Goff: “Are you saying that the inevitable, if we play this out with what Trump wants, that Germany has to become a nuclear power if it wants to ensure its security?”

    Kundnani: “Well, I think everyone is still hoping that Trump’s foreign policy won’t be as radical as people fear, but if it does turn out to be . . . then Germany has two options: one is a kind of European nuclear deterrent, and essentially given the complication of Brexit, it means depending on the French nuclear deterrent . . . that would raise all kinds of difficult question about what France would want in exchange for that . . . Or the alternative would be for Germany to develop its own independent nuclear deterrent, and there have been some people since the election of Trump, like the publisher of the [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung] who have called for that, but I find that impossible to imagine, not least for economic reasons, but also for reasons of identity.”
  • Source: “Atomwaffen für Deutschland?,” Heise Telepolis, February 24, 2017, https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Atomwaffen-fuer-Deutschland-3633813.html.
    Origin: German news website; German author (journalist); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German latent nuclear hedge capacity]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “The last chance for an indigenous German deterrent was wasted when Angela Merkel decided in 2011 after Fukushima to get rid of nuclear energy. The nuclear fuel cycle a country would need to produce its own nuclear weapons is therewith gone in Germany. That is good.

    Now it clearly shows what blessing it was that both the peace and the anti-nuclear movements insisted on the nuclear phase out. Therewith, the danger of a nuclear-armed Germany is gone. The fast breeder is gone, the reprocessing plant as well, and so is the fuel elements firm.

    . . . The dream of a German deterrent is once and for all over, and the world won’t miss a bit.

    . . . France and England insist on their national deterrents which they do not want to share with anyone.”
  • Source: “Eine deutsche Atombombe: Germans Are Debating Getting Their Own Nuclear Weapon,” Economist, March 2, 2017, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21717981-donald-trumps-questioning-natos-credibility-has-berlin-thinking-unthinkable-germans-are?fsrc=scn/tw/te/rfd/pe.
    Origin: British journal; unknown author; written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]      
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “The different dangers posed by Mr Putin and Mr Trump have raised the question of ‘how to deter whom with what’, even though German nukes are not the best answer, says Karl-Heinz Kamp of the Federal Academy for Security Policy, a government think-tank.”
  • Source: “Brauchen wir die Bombe? Europa vor einer neuen atomaren Bedrohung,” der Freitag, March 2, 2017, 6–7.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); interviewee (think tanker); written in German
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “der Freitag: Kaczyński even wants a ‘nuclear super power’ Europe. A response to the transatlantic reluctance of the US government or more?

    Otfried Nassauer: I do not think that Kaczyński really wants what he says. In the same breath he stated that a European arsenal would have to be strong enough to compete with Russia, which is totally unrealistic. The Brits and the French have roughly a combined 550 nuclear weapons, which is a fraction of what the United States or Russia have. Where should the resources for the Europeans come from to increase their nuclear arsenals in that way? Not talking about the political will. Because of Brexit doubts about the resources of one nuclear power in Europe are likely to grow.

    der Freitag: Nevertheless, there are speculations about Germany somewhat participating in the ‘force de frappe.’

    Otfried Nassauer: Indeed, Paris has repeatedly flirted with the idea of letting Germany under the French nuclear umbrella—perhaps in the hope for a co-financing. But that was not attractive for the Federal Republic so far because Germany sees its interests better represented by NATO. There Germany is part of the nuclear planning and believes that it has a sufficient say through the principle of nuclear sharing. Whether that would be the same in cooperation with Paris is doubted by many.

    der Freitag: And what is the role of the British nuclear arsenal?

    Otfried Nassauer: The British are technically dependent on cooperating with Washington. The design of their nuclear warheads comes from the United States, parts of their submarine technology as well. The missiles for the warheads are leased from Washington—those are not good preconditions for a truly independent European nuclear power. The British contribution would be one by the grace of Washington.

    der Freitag: Is that why there are also voices calling for an indigenous German deterrent?

    Otfried Nassauer: Excuse me? A German nuclear weapon? Renouncing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the 1990 Two Plus Four Treaty was a significant condition for the victors of the Second World War to accept German unification—particularly the European victors. In addition, Germany is a non-nuclear member of the NPT. Those calling for a German nuclear weapon either do not know the international legal obligations or think that Germany could simply back out. If it would come to this, the global nonproliferation regime would unravel rather quickly.

    der Freitag: But they do exist, the proponents of a nuclear power Germany . . .

    Otfried Nassauer: Sure, extreme conservatives, nationalists or right-wingers that either have no knowledge of international law or falsely believe that Germany would profit from withdrawing from the NPT. Behind all that is either megalomania or the pure desire to open once again Pandora’s Box. Germany not having nuclear weapons is a security-political wise form of self-restraint which also contributes to our European neighbors being rather relaxed about German economic preponderance.”
  • Source: Anthony Faiola, “In the Era of Donald Trump, Germans Debate a Military Buildup,” Washington Post, March 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-the-era-of-trump-germans-debate-a-military-buildup/2017/03/05/d7fc2ef6-fd16-11e6-a51a-e16b4bcc6644_story.html?utm_term=.984561b8a6d1.
    Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for cool heads, but also for increased military spending. Her defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen, has been more forceful, saying recently that Germany cannot ‘duck away’ from its military responsibility. Although considered a distant possibility, some outlier voices are mentioning the once-inconceivable: the advent of a German nuclear bomb.”
  • Source: Max Fisher, “Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent,” The Interpreter (blog), New York Times, March 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/european-union-nuclear-weapons.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fthe-interpreter&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection.
    Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]/Analysis
    Position: Neutral [Reporting and Analysis]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Jana Puglierin of the German Council on Foreign Relations said that a handful of senior European officials had ‘for sure triggered a public debate about this, taking place in newspapers and journals, radio interviews and TV documentaries.’

    She added: ‘That in itself is remarkable. I am indeed very astonished that we discuss this at all.’ . . .

    But the most important support has come from Roderich Kiesewetter, a lawmaker and foreign policy spokesman with Germany’s ruling party, who gave the nuclear option increased credibility by raising it shortly after President Trump’s election.

    In an interview in the German Bundestag, Mr. Kiesewetter, a former colonel who served in Afghanistan, calibrated his language carefully, providing just enough detail to demonstrate the option’s seriousness without offering too much and risking an outcry from German voters or encouraging the American withdrawal he is hoping to avoid.

    ‘My idea is to build on the existing weapons in Great Britain and France,’ he said, but acknowledged that Britain’s decision to leave the European Union could preclude its participation.

    The United States bases dozens of nuclear warheads in Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands as both a quick-reaction force and a symbol of its guarantee to protect the Continent. Mr. Kiesewetter said his plan would provide a replacement or parallel program.

    This would require, he said, four ingredients: a French pledge to commit its weapons to a common European defense, German financing to demonstrate the program’s collective nature, a joint command and a plan to place French warheads in other European countries.

    The number of warheads in Europe would not increase under this plan, and could even decrease if the United States withdraws.

    ‘It’s not a question of numbers,’ Mr. Kiesewetter said. ‘The reassurance and deterrence comes from the existence of the weapons and their deployability.’

    He envisioned a program designed to deter nuclear as well as conventional threats—a clear nod to Russia’s military superiority.

    This would require a doctrine, he said, allowing Europe to introduce nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear conflict. He compared it to the Israeli program, which is believed to allow for a nuclear strike against an overwhelming conventional attack.

    ‘These are political weapons. Their use must be unpredictable,’ he said. Smaller nuclear powers often maintain vague doctrines to deter more powerful adversaries.

    The goal, he said, would be to maintain Europe’s defense, seen as crucial for its internal unity, as well as its international diplomatic standing. . . .

    Mr. Kiesewetter said he had heard interest from officials in the Polish and Hungarian governments, at NATO headquarters in Brussels and within relevant German ministries, though he would not say which. . . .

    These sorts of problems are why Bruno Tertrais of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris said, ‘In other times I would have told you don’t bother, there’s no story here.’ . . .

    ‘There’s already a bit more interest in Berlin and in Paris,’ Mr. Tertrais said, though he emphasized that this talk would become action only if there were ‘a serious loss of trust in the U.S. umbrella.’

    But a joint European command or funding scheme would most likely be impossible, he warned. The French government would insist on maintaining ‘the final decision to use nuclear weapons.’”
  • Source: Theo Sommer, “Nukleare Phantomdiskussion,” Die Zeit, March 7, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/politik/2017-03/atomwaffen-deutschland-aufruestung-the-economist-5vor8/komplettansicht.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (former editor Die Zeit); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Deny [Debate]/Reject [German deterrent]/Reject [German latent nuclear hedge capacity]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “The Federal Government has now put a stop to the discussion about the delicate issue. For good reason: it is a phantom discussion. . . .

    . . . Germany no longer has the technical infrastructure for nuclear weapons production. Rebuilding the indispensable fuel cycle - uranium enrichment, fuel elements, reprocessing, fast breeder to produce fissile material - would take decades. . . .

    . . . Without the technical support of the United States, neither a German nor a European deterrent would be feasible. France and England's deterrence arsenals are still dependent on this. Detaching from America would thus be no real option.”
  • Source: Macer Hall, “‘It Is Insanity’ Plans for EU nuclear weapons arsenal Condemned by Senior Tory MP,” Express, March 7, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/776220/plans-EU-nuclear-weapons-arsenal-control-Brussels-condemned.
    Origin: British tabloid; British author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    But Tory backbencher Dr Julian Lewis, chairman of the Commons Defence Committee, condemned the plan as a federalist plot to undermine the Nato alliance.

    Dr Lewis said: ‘This is an idea that first came to attention 20 years ago—I thought it was insanity then and I think it is insanity now.

    ‘It only goes to show how determined the fanatical EU federalists are that they wish to try and create a separate from Nato and nowhere nearly as powerful as Nato.

    ‘This is all about the political ambitions of the European federalists and has nothing to do with the critical defence of Europe and deterring any possible nuclear attack.’”
  • Source: Jonathan S. Tobin, “The Price of ‘America First,’” National Review, March 8, 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445585/trump-america-first-costs-dangers-european-nuclear-deterrence.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “But the Europeans aren’t sounding reassured. Some of their leaders are publicly questioning what it would mean to live in a world in which they could no longer rely on the United States as a reliable security partner. The most graphic expression of their disquiet is the debate about whether the European Union should seek to create its own nuclear-deterrent force. The idea is a long way from being put into effect, but the mere fact that Jaroslaw Kaczynski (the head of Poland’s ruling party) and Roderick Kiesewetter (foreign-policy spokesman for German chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union) are openly advocating such a notion ought to be a wake-up call for Trump and anyone else who thinks that Trump’s rhetoric about NATO isn’t being noticed.”
  • Source: Andre Seifert, “Auslandspresse sieht Atombombenstimmung in Deutschland,” Über Medien, March 10, 2017, http://uebermedien.de/13764/auslandspresse-sieht-atombombenstimmung-in-deutschland/.
    Origin: German critical media website; German author (journalist); written in German
    Type: Reporting/incl. Citations
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Deny [Debate]/Deny [Citations on Debate]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Germany apparently is discussing whether it would need the nuclear bomb, but Germany has not even heard of it.

    Do you have to learn everything from the foreign press?

    If you missed the big nuclear discussion, like almost everyone, you are sure to ask: Why this debate, with whom, when, how and with what results so far? . . .

    The spokesperson of CDU Member of Parliament Kiesewetter explains on the telephone: Yes, indeed a journalist from the ‘Economist’ has only recently asked for an interview. And that was, because yes, one could read that Kiesewetter was seen as ‘proponent of a German nuclear bomb.’ The spokesperson explains:

    ‘This is completely out of context. Our position is very clear. One would have to withdraw from the NPT and one would encourage states, for instance like Turkey, to go nuclear. Against this background, this is totally absurd. Therefore, we are, and Kiesewetter has tried to make that clear, in favor of a multilateral coordination of the arsenals of Great Britain and France.’

    He would not see a debate in parliament or in the administration, the spokesperson said. And the Chancellor did not have to call Kiesewetter off. And anyway, there will be no German bomb. The policy of the Federal Government is clearly aimed at nuclear disarmament. . . .

    FAZ publisher Berthold Kohler sees himself correctly cited by both the ‘Washington Post’ and the ‘Economist’, as he writes in an email. However, the ‘Economist’ escalates his statements ‘obviously towards the headline “A German Nuclear Weapon.”’ As for Berthold Kohler, it is not recognizable that meanwhile there is a big debate happening:

    ‘In my op-ed, I have described the revision of German foreign policy and its security-political aspects as necessary, “if that tectonic shift is occurring which seems to announce itself in world politics.” Also the part which concerned itself with the “unpleasant consequences” for Europeans, onto which I counted the question of an indigenous nuclear deterrence capacity, started with a conditional sentence: “If Trump continues along his line…” The firmness with which the appreciated colleagues of the “Economist” found out months later that “Berlin is thinking the unthinkable” (the sub-heading of the online version) has surprised me.’”
  • Source: John R. Deni, “An EU Nuclear Deterrent Won’t Serve Western Interests,” Strategic Europe (blog), Carnegie Europe, March 10, 2017, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/68242.
    Origin: U.S. think tank; U.S. author (U.S. Army War College); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Although European deliberations over how to better provide for European security are positive, an EU nuclear deterrent wouldn’t solve inequitable burden sharing. In fact, it would do virtually nothing to enable Europe to deal with today’s most likely, most compelling security challenges on the continent and beyond.”
  • Source: Rudolph Herzog, “German Nukes Would Be a National Tragedy,” Foreign Policy, March 10, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/german-nukes-would-be-a-national-tragedy/.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (artist); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “In a post-Trump, post-Brexit world, many citizens across the globe are turning their hopes toward Chancellor Angela Merkel and her government to uphold moral principles and lead on matters such as European unity and the refugee crisis. These are major challenges. To rise to them, Germany must stick to its principles as a peaceful nation that works hard to eradicate nuclear weapons. Should it veer off this path, huge damage would be inflicted not only on the world order, but on Germany itself.”
  • Source: Max Fisher, “The Two European Nuke Plans,” newsletter, The Interpreter (blog), New York Times, March 15, 2017.
    Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting/Analysis
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “Mr. Kühn, who was the first to seriously examine this phenomenon (he published a paper on it in December and is planning more), put us on track to report it out in Germany. We found real talk, at a whisper but growing, of exactly what Mr. Kühn had described, which we wrote about last week. We wanted to elaborate, in this space, on a wonky but important detail. There are actually two versions of the ‘Euro-deterrent’ that you hear discussed. We’re calling them the ‘French plan’ and the ‘German plan,’ for the country where that version seems to be most prevalent and whose strategies it best serves.”
  • Source: Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Nuklearwaffen für Deutschland? Die Atom-Phantomdebatte,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, March 17, 2017, https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/nuklearwaffen-fuer-deutschland-die-atom-phantomdebatte-ld.151845.
    Origin: Swiss newspaper; German author (think tanker); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Nothing is more far-fetched than such considerations. For several good historical and political reasons Germany has renounced the possession of weapons of mass destruction, most recently in the two-plus-four treaty on German unity. The reservation, expressed by Konrad Adenauer, that Germany must be able to have a say in common nuclear weapons within the framework of the ‘United States of Europe’ is idle—such a European super-state will not exist. Also, the German public would probably never be able to accept the idea of German nuclear weapons. It was not for nothing that a German nuclear option had never been conceived in the last quarter of a century. The new leadership in Washington does not change this either.”
  • Source: Elizabeth Llorente, “Will Europe Form Its Own Nuclear Deterrence Program? US Experts Doubt It,” Fox News, March 17, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/03/17/will-europe-form-its-own-nuclear-deterrence-program-us-experts-doubt-it.html.
    Origin: U.S. news website; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
    Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “‘It’s an expression of nervousness on the part of the Europeans,’ Gary Samore, the executive director for research at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, told Fox News. ‘It’s floated by academics who are trying to send a message to the U.S.’”
  • Source: Hans Rühle and Michael Rühle, “German Nukes: The Phantom Menace,“ National Institute for Public Policy, March 22, 2017, http://www.nipp.org/2017/03/21/ruhle-hans-and-michael-ruhle-german-nukes-the-phantom-menace/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%203.23.17&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief.
    Origin: U.S. think tank; German authors (one is a NATO official); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Deny [Debate]
    Key Quotes:
    “According to some recent press reports, Germany is considering acquiring nuclear weapons. If this were in fact the case, the prospects for international security would indeed be grim: fears of German nuclear militarism would haunt Europe; the European integration process might well be over; NATO could be thrown into a terminal crisis; Russia’s reaction would be intense, and global nuclear non-proliferation efforts might be dealt a fatal blow.

    Fortunately, this gloomy scenario will not come true because the specter of a ‘German bomb’ remains as implausible as it has been for over half a century. As a closer look reveals, Germany’s so-called nuclear debate is actually a non-debate: After one editor of the respected conservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine speculated about the fading US commitment to European security and, consequently, the need for Germany to think the ‘unthinkable’, most of those who felt compelled to comment empathically rejected his views. Only a handful of observers, including a conservative Member of Parliament, some journalists, and an associate professor, appeared to make the case for German nukes.

    At closer inspection, even this crew was not talking about the same thing. While some demanded that Germany acquire a national nuclear deterrent, others were championing a European deterrent based on the British and French nuclear arsenals. Throughout this peculiar non-debate, the German public displayed sound instincts: it ignored the talking heads. The nuclear dog didn’t bark.”
  • Source: Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, “Merkel in Washington: A Cool Reception,” Center for Eastern Studies, March 22, 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2017-03-22/merkel-washington-a-cool-reception.
    Origin: Polish think tank; Polish author (Center for Eastern Studies [OSW]); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “Germany will also make more frequent appearances in the public debate on previously taboo subjects, such as the issue of whether Germany needs its own nuclear weapons. However, Berlin is aware that this would not comply with international law, and moreover there is determined and persistent resistance to such an idea from the German public, so there is no consensus on the implementation of such ideas. Nevertheless, they have also emerged in a ‘lighter’ version; for example, the chairman of the CDU’s working group on foreign policy, security and development, Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU) has declared himself in favor of a European nuclear deterrence system, guaranteed by the British-French nuclear umbrella and co-financed by Germany.”
  • Source: Doug Bandow, “The Case for a European Nuke: Why the Continent Needs Its Own Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, March 27, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-03-27/case-european-nuke?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (Cato Institute); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Europe is also the most obvious place for Washington to close at least one of its nuclear umbrellas. None of the United States’ Asian allies possesses nuclear weapons, and their development would have unpredictable regional effects and be more likely to trigger proliferation. Further, Asia lacks a regional organization such as NATO that could manage a broader, more stable deterrent. Europe, in contrast, already contains two nuclear powers, and the European Union, despite its challenges, could provide a possible continental defense framework. More important, the U.S. nuclear umbrella makes sense only as long as it doesn’t rain. There is no reason for the United States to risk its own security when Russia is no longer an ideological, global competitor and NATO extends up to Russia’s borders.”
  • Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “If Germany Goes Nuclear, Blame Trump Before Putin,” Foreign Policy, April 3, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/03/if-germany-goes-nuclear-blame-trump/.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (academic); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Affirm [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “We might ask why the Germans don’t figure something out with the British and the French, both of whom already own nuclear weapons. But the U.K.’s and France’s nuclear stockpiles are partly outdated, too small, and largely tactical (i.e., short-range). And, critically, would the two countries really step in and shield Germany and Eastern Europe against a Russian attack? Extended deterrence is a fine thing—as long as it works when push comes to shove. The question that the U.K. and France would most likely ask themselves in such a scenario is why not stay out and make peace with Russia, rather than risk war for the sake of interests in Eastern Europe that they see as distant from their own concerns. Such a self-protective reaction would be understandable (and predictable). But it also underlines Germany’s need to acquire nuclear weapons that provide it the ability to independently protect itself and its neighbors to the east. . . .

    Nuclear weapons are expensive, contentious, potentially contagious, and dangerous. Germany is in no rush to get them. But if the shelter of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is removed while Russian weapons are still pointed at Berlin, it will have no choice.”
  • Source: Claudia Bracholdt and Jan Lüthje, “Braucht Deutschland eigene Atomwaffen?,” Die Zeit, April 5, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/politik/2017-04/verteidigung-atomwaffen-deutschland-pro-contra.
    Origin: German newspaper; German authors (journalists); conducted in German
    Type: Online Click Poll
    Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “As of now, the debate about German or European nuclear weapons is conducted in a very encoded way. As an example, the president of the federal academy for security policy, Karl-Heinz Kamp, reminds us that British and French nuclear forces contribute to deterrence. ‘It is us non-nuclear states that will have to agree amongst themselves whether that is enough.’

    Take a look at the video and then decide for yourself which position you would support.”
  • Source: Christian Mölling, “German Armed Forces Modernize, Build Cyber Defenses,” Cipher Brief, April 5, 2017, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/german-armed-forces-modernize-build-cyber-defenses-1093.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. interviewer (journalist), German interviewee (think tanker); written in English
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “[The Cipher Brief]: One thing that could frighten European neighbors is if Germany were to develop a nuclear weapon. That’s not on the table right now, but Roderich Kiesewetter, a member of the German parliament, has been talking about creating a European nuclear deterrent in case the U.S. decides to retreat from Europe. How credible is this idea of a European bomb?

    [Christian Mölling]: That’s the least feasible option I can imagine, simply because there are legal obstacles. First of all, we are bound by international treaties to not do it, so we would basically have to cut up all these treaties, which would involve Russia, as a party to the treaties. It’s not only UN Security Council resolution on that, but there’s also the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the NPT. There’s also the Two Plus Four Treaty. These international agreements bind Germany into remaining a non-nuclear state, so a bomb is definitely not in the cards.

    Plus, developing nuclear capability would meet tremendous resistance in German society. It would be many bridges too far to think of Germany as a nuclear weapon state. We would leave that to the French and to the Brits.”
  • Source: Leon Mangasarian and Jan Techau, “Germany’s Strategic Frivolousness,” Handelsblatt Global, May 10, 2017, https://global.handelsblatt.com/opinion/germanys-strategic-frivolousness-763246.
    Origin: German newspaper; U.S. and German authors (journalist/think tanker); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “. . . Germans deny the role of nuclear deterrence. They feign astonishment at Berlin’s nuclear sharing with the US and ignore the importance of the American nuclear umbrella in staving off Russian nuclear blackmail. Now the question is whether President Trump will maintain NATO and the nuclear umbrella for allies. Germany needs a discussion on what it will do if it’s dumped by its nuclear protector in Washington. Can British and French nuclear weapons serve as a European deterrent? If not, the ‘unthinkable’ will happen: the nuclear arming of Germany. Either way, German leaders need a plan against nuclear blackmail.”
  • Source: Deutscher Bundestag Wissenschaftliche Dienste, “Völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen Deutschlands beim Umgang mit Kernwaffen. Deutsche und europäische Ko-Finanzierung ausländischer Nuklearwaffenpotentiale,” May 23, 2017, http://www.bundestag.de/blob/513080/c9a903735d5ea334181c2f946d2cf8a2/wd-2-013-17-pdf-data.pdf.
    Origin: German Bundestag; Bundestag Research Service; written in German
    Type: Review by the Bundestag’s Research Service, commissioned by the office of Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU)
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “The current international obligations of Germany under the NPT and the ‘Two-Plus-Four Treaty’ are limited to prohibiting the acquisition of its own nuclear weapons (‘German bomb’). ‘Nuclear sharing’, as it is already common practice with regard to US nuclear weapons deployed in Germany, does not violate the NPT as does the co-financing of a foreign (e.g., French or British) nuclear weapons arsenal. Such funding could not be derived from the EU budget, but from the German defense budget and on the basis of a respective bilateral international agreement, which also regulates the ‘service in return’ of the financing.”
  • Source: “The New Germany: An Interview with Wolfgang Ischinger,” Economist, May 30, 2017, https://www.economist.com/blogs/kaffeeklatsch/2017/05/new-germany.
    Origin: British journal; British author (journalist); German interviewee (Head of Munich Security Conference); written in English
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neural [Interview]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    Economist: “Does Germany need a nuclear deterrent?”

    Ischinger: “No!”

    Economist: “It doesn’t?”

    Ischinger: “No. We rely on the US. It would be great if there were additional options. But there aren’t. There have been some in this country who believe that this is the time to cut the umbilical cord across the Atlantic because the Americans are the bad guys. That’s classic anti-Americanism. It goes back to the Vietnam War. But the truth of the matter is that there are no viable alternatives. We are married to the American nuclear security umbrella, whether we like it or not. Germany is legally and politically bound to remain a non-nuclear nation. Full stop.

    There have occasionally been tentative discussions with the French about the nuclear deterrent, under Mitterrand, Chirac and Sarkozy. Do I think that the French nuclear force could evolve into a serious option for Germany? Well, one should never say never. But that would require fundamental changes in how the French think about their own role and their nuclear deterrent. So not only is there no way that would open the door for a German nuclear weapon, but there is also no sensible, meaningful, reasonable European nuclear option. We don’t have a European decision maker—not even to send 1,000 soldiers to Mali.”

    Economist: “Who pushes the button?”

    Ischinger: “That’s it. Britain has its PM. France and the US have their presidents. But the there are no button-pushers at the EU or Franco-German levels. I don’t see it as an option. Do I think we should keep talking with the French about possible future options? Yes. And we should also talk about the vision of a European army as a long term option. But this is a matter of decades.”
  • Source: Stanley R. Sloan, “Don’t Count on Germany to Save the West,” War on the Rocks, June 6, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/dont-count-on-germany-to-save-the-west/.
    Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (think tanker); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “One of the early German reactions to Donald Trump’s assaults on the NATO allies was speculation about Germany becoming a nuclear weapons state. Suggestions that Germany should ‘think the previously unthinkable,’ raised by a prominent German newspaper and a conservative member of the German parliament, were met with cautionary responses and alternative proposals. One proposal envisioned creating a European deterrent on French and British nuclear capabilities, with Germany funding the operation. Chances are neither an autonomous German nuclear force nor a European deterrent force are on the table. They are simply too potentially destabilizing in the former case (as well as a breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and most likely, in the latter, a bridge too far beyond sovereign control of nuclear weapons for France and the United Kingdom.”
  • Source: Francisco Aldaya, “‘Germany Can’t Run the EU as a Vehicle for Its Own interests,’” Buenos Aires Herald, June 9, 2017, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/225927/%E2%80%98germany-can%E2%80%99t-run-the-eu-as--a-vehicle-for-its-own-interests%E2%80%99.
    Origin: Argentinian newspaper; Argentinian author (journalist); German interviewee (think tanker); written in English
    Type: Interview
    Position: Neural [Interview]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    Hans Kundnani: “. . . Now that there’s this question of security as well, France is now much more powerful relative to Germany than it was before the election of Trump. France is now the only country in the EU that has significant military capability, that is a nuclear power. So, on November 9 the power balance completely changed, and suddenly Germany was much weaker than it was. Germany needs France in a way that it didn’t before, and particularly its nuclear deterrent. So, Germany needs to make even more concessions to France than it did before. It’s not just about the Eurozone anymore. It’s about: ‘What would a deal look like whereby France would be willing to extend its nuclear deterrent to include Germany, and perhaps the rest of the EU?’”
  • Source: Leon Mangasarian and Jan Techau, Führungsmacht Deutschland. Strategie ohne Angst und Anmaßung (Munich: dtv, 2017), 105–7.
    Origin: German book publisher; U.S. and German authors (journalist and think tanker); written in German
    Type: Analysis
    Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “The continued necessity of nuclear deterrence is not being understood [in Germany]. The Federal Government’s 2016 White Paper clearly laid out the problem: ‘As long as nuclear weapons can be employed in military conflicts, there will always be a need for nuclear deterrence,’ it says there. ‘The strategic nuclear capabilities of NATO, and in particular those of the United States, are the ultimate guarantee of the security of its members. NATO remains a nuclear alliance. Through nuclear sharing, Germany continues to be an integral part of NATO’s nuclear policy and planning.’ At the same time, German audiences are regularly astounded if one talks about nuclear weapons in foreign and security policy talks. Doesn’t that mean remaining in the mindset of the Cold War, one is being asked. Fact is that the countries of Europe are safe against Russian nuclear blackmail because they are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Two European countries, Great Britain and France, are nuclear powers themselves and continue, albeit with high costs, to cling on to these weapons. Whether they would suffice in order to secure Europe, in case the United States withdraws its protection, is more than questionable. As a result of the ‘Trump shock,’ Europe, and therewith Germany, is facing a debate about nuclear deterrence. It is high time to engage on that topic in a proactive and competent way. Up until now, German politicians try to avoid that debate under all circumstances. Nothing in Germany is so emotionally loaded and inaccessible to sober reflection as a discussion about ‘the bomb.’ But this is, at first, not about the question of German nuclear weapons, but about how to prevent nuclear blackmail in case the U.S. umbrella might be gone. Could it be possible to organize nuclear deterrence in a European fashion? Would British and French nuclear forces be sufficient for that task? Would they be made available for the whole of Europe? Would Europeans fully trust each other in that regard? At the end of such a debate even the nuclear arming of Germany could again become a topic. Right now, such a debate is unthinkable. Germany has renounced nuclear arms in the 2+4 Treaty and the NPT does not allow the country to acquire or produce them. But all of this is dependent on the reliability of American protection. If this is gone, and Germany, at the same time, observes its abdication, it has to give an answer to the question of how to guarantee that Europe won’t be prone to nuclear blackmail. This won’t be easy.”
  • Source: Julia Berghofer, “Euro-Atlantic Security Under the New US Administration: Will Trump Destroy the International Security Architecture?,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, June 16, 2017, https://eu.boell.org/en/2017/06/16/euro-atlantic-security-under-new-us-administration-will-trump-destroy-international.
    Origin: German political party foundation (The Greens); German author (Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “At the same time in Germany, officials from the Foreign Office, Bundestag and Chancellor’s Office resolutely rejected the idea of a European or even a German nuclear weapon. Though admittedly this topic is causing most of them a real headache, because Germany finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having some 20 US nuclear warheads on its soil, which it wants to keep in order to have a say on nuclear issues in NATO. Since approval for nuclear weapons could hardly be lower in Germany (according to a recent opinion poll, 85 percent would like to see the American bombs being removed from the military base in Büchel), they prefer not to have a broad public debate about a ‘German bomb’.

    The debate about European nuclear weapons might seem odd and unrealistic, but it becomes more understandable if you look at the fact that Trump is able and willing to erode one of NATO’s key features: its credibility. No matter if you support or oppose the concept of nuclear deterrence, it is obvious that deterrence only works if it is credible. And there is no credible deterrence if the US questions the persistence of the nuclear umbrella for its non-nuclear partners. Instead of reassuring them of US assistance, the new US president openly suggested that more countries (including Japan and South Korea) should have nuclear weapons, which would not only mean a breach of the NPT obligations but could also lead to a new nuclear arms race in Asia.”
  • Source: Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe, “Keine Atombombe, Bitte: Why Germany Should Not Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2017, 103–12, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte.
    Origin: U.S. magazine; German and U.S. authors (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
    Key Quotes:
    “. . . Germany would have to surmount major technical, political, and security hurdles before acquiring one. It would need to either repurpose its nuclear energy infrastructure for weapons production or sprint to the bomb from new military facilities. Either path would take substantial time and effort. Each would involve activities that, if detected, would ring alarm bells. Germany would struggle to keep any effort to build nuclear weapons in military facilities secret given the vast construction work this would involve. Nor could it simply rely on its civil nuclear infrastructure. In the wake of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, Merkel’s government decided to phase out all of Germany’s nuclear power plants by 2022. This decision makes it difficult for Germany to take technical steps toward the bomb under the guise of a peaceful program. Even seemingly innocuous moves, such as keeping a few large reactors online past the deadline, would raise suspicions. . . .

    Worst of all, the pursuit of a German nuclear arsenal, rather than deterring aggression, could increase the risk of conflict in Europe, since Russia would likely work to prevent Germany from acquiring the bomb.”
  • Source: Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe, “Keine Atombombe, bitte. Warum Deutschland nicht zur Nuklearmacht werden sollte,” Internationale Politik 72, no. 4 (July/August 2017): 90–97, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/jahrgang-2017/juli-august/keine-atombombe-bitte.
    Origin: German journal; German and U.S. authors (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
    Key Quotes:
    See Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe, “Keine Atombombe, Bitte. Why Germany Should Not Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2017, 103–12 for a complete translation.
  • Source: Rafael Loss, “The Folly of a German Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 26, 2017, http://thebulletin.org/folly-german-bomb10865.
    Origin: U.S. journal; German author (academic); written in English
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
    Key Quotes:
    “Shortly after the US presidential election in November 2016, several opinion pieces in German newspapers argued that Berlin should acquire nuclear weapons. Given Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric, and particularly his talk of NATO obsolescence, the authors suggested that the nuclear assurances the United States had provided for nearly seven decades were no longer credible.

    Though claiming to offer a purely rational analysis of the Trumpian new world order, these authors not only ignored German public opinion, long-standing treaty commitments, and the reality of Germany’s nuclear infrastructure, but also the lack of strategic utility for nuclear weapons within Germany’s foreign and security policy. As an instrument of force, a German nuclear weapon would be an impractical approach to deterrence, defense, and other military and political objectives.”
  • Source: Anna Sauerbrey, “Deutschland will die Bombe...,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 30, 2017, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/atomare-aufruestung-deutschland-will-die-bombe-/20000364.html.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Deny [Debate]
    Key Quotes:
    “Under the headline ‘Keine Atombombe, Bitte,’ [Kühn and Volpe] are considering how long Germany could keep construction works at nuclear sites secret and attest at the end that there is ‘a sudden desire for nuclear weapons in Germany.’

    A brief survey amongst defense policy-makers from different Bundestag groups shows: no one considers this a topic. CDU foreign policy politician Roderich Kiesewetter, who had to serve the role of a witness for the ‘Economist’, feels effectively misunderstood. The issue of arming Germany with nuclear weapons was never his to consider, he says—and actually he never spoke of nuclear weapons for Germany. His statement shortly after Trump’s election in November 2016 was meant to discuss how a European nuclear deterrent could be organized and how British-French nuclear cooperation could be financed, according to Kiesewetter: in case – and only in case – that Donald Trump would put into question the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Europe. Now, with Trump confessing himself to NATO, with U.S. forces remaining in Eastern Europe, and with no radical shift in U.S. defense policy in sight, one should not even have to talk about that anymore.”
  • Source: Max Fisher, “European Nuclear Weapons Program Would Be Legal, German Review Finds,” The Interpreter (blog), New York Times, July 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/europe/germany-nuclear-weapons.html?utm_content=buffer285c7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer&_r=0.
    Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
    Type: Reporting
    Position: Neutral
    Key Quotes:
    “A review recently commissioned by the German Parliament has determined that the country could legally finance the British or French nuclear weapons programs in exchange for their protection. The European Union could do the same if it changed its budgeting rules, the study found.

    The German assessment comes after months of discussion in Berlin over whether Europe can still rely on American security assurances, which President Trump has called into question. Some have called for considering, as a replacement, a pan-European nuclear umbrella of existing French and British warheads.

    The assessment provides a legal framework for such a plan. Britain or France, it finds, could legally base nuclear warheads on German soil. . . .

    The legal review was requested last year by Roderich Kiesewetter, a lawmaker, a former colonel and a foreign policy spokesman with Germany’s governing party. Mr. Kiesewetter’s office said it was unclear why the assessment was made only now, months later.”
  • Source: Michael Stürmer, “Das Nukleare bleibt unteilbar,” Die Welt, July 12, 2017, https://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/debatte/article166547591/Das-Nukleare-bleibt-unteilbar.html.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
    Type: Op-ed/Analysis
    Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Germany renounced to acquire, develop or possess nuclear weapons in 1954 for the first time, in 1990 for the second time, and would be wise to seek security – as long as this is possible – under the cover of the Pax Americana. Everything that could encourage the United States, be it with Trump or post-Trump, to abandon Europe to its nuclear fate would be a jump into the darkness. As Chancellor Kohl once said, alliance competence remains the German raison d’état.”
  • Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “Atom-U-Boote für die Ostsee,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 27, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/militaerpolitik-klare-strategie-und-einige-kehrtwenden-notwendig-15123726.html.
    Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
    Type: Affirm [German Deterrent]
    Key Quotes:
    “Rest assured, Germany should significantly increase its efforts to tackle the greatest security-political risks. Together with Poland and the Baltics, Germany has to use its know-how on nuclear-capable submarines, which it provides since a long time to Israel, now also for its own security. For the purpose of deterrence, such nuclear-equipped submarines should operate in the Baltic Sea. In addition, the security of Europe has to be newly conceptualized with France and Great Britain. In doing so, Germany’s contribution has to be based on its own capabilities.”