Geopolitical conditions in the South Caucasus have experienced a substantial shift in recent years. Washington needs to adjust assumptions in advancing U.S. interests in the region to make the most of its capabilities.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become the organizing foreign policy concept of the Xi Jinping era.
The United States has important but not vital interests in the South Caucasus, which include preserving regional stability; preventing the resumption of frozen conflicts; and supporting democratic change and better governance as well as the international integration of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is overstretched, underfunded, and assailed on all sides, yet its work has never been so essential.
Twenty-five years after Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia became independent states, the South Caucasus remains a strategically sensitive region.
Azerbaijan’s suspension from a coalition of energy-extracting countries will harm Baku’s international brand and image as a reliable place to invest.
A descent into renewed fighting in the South Caucasus is the last thing anyone wants—least of all the ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis who will be caught in the middle of it.
Azerbaijani society is changing more rapidly than the authorities realize. The country will face political turbulence if the elites do not bridge the gap between rulers and ruled.
Recent protests in Armenia are the latest example of a growing gap between the Armenian government and society at large.
A prerequisite to building an effective anticorruption approach is an intimate—and unflinching—examination of the specifics of corrupt operations in the individual country of interest and its physical and electronic neighborhoods.