On May 6, Tunisia held its first municipal elections since the 2011 revolution, and the first free and fair local elections in the country’s history, widely hoped to usher in more legitimate and transparent local authorities with greater control over regional development. Yet these potentially pivotal elections saw low turnout amid ongoing national dissatisfaction with traditional political parties, the government’s economic austerity policies, stalled anti-corruption and decentralization efforts, and partisan infighting. Have the elections positioned Tunisia to make progress on such issues, and what do they indicate about voters’ attitudes toward current policies?
Four experts examine what implications the elections may have for political parties, security forces, decentralization, and Tunisia’s democratic transition.
A Step Forward for Independents
Haifa Mzalouat
Haifa Mzalouat, a Tunisian journalist writing for Inkyfada. Follow her on Twitter @HaifaMz.
For the past seven years, Tunisian municipal elections have been repeatedly postponed due to various difficulties within the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) and the government’s delays in drafting a new Code on Local Authorities, which parliament passed only ten days before the elections. Significantly, the elections were touted as a way to give concrete powers to local representatives, especially in the poorer regions, and to sensitize the population to a new, decentralized model.
However, as predicted by opinion polls, the abstention rate was extremely high. According to the preliminary official results from the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE), total participation reached only 35.6 percent of registered voters. Among other factors, voters’ disengagement stems heavily from a lack of trust toward the electoral process and the two main parties, Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. This gave a slight benefit to smaller political forces such as the Democratic Current or the Popular Front, which collectively achieved 13.42 percent of the vote.
Thanks to its active core voter base, Ennahda managed to beat its rival Nidaa Tounes, obtaining 29.68 percent of the seats and winning a plurality in Tunis and Sfax, the two largest cities in the country. However, the Islamist party has lost momentum and voters since the last legislative election. Furthermore, it will be forced to build alliances in many municipalities, including Tunis, where it did not manage to secure an absolute majority.
Nidaa Tounes’ lower vote share of 22.17 percent—compared to 37.56 percent in the 2014 legislative elections—shows that many are critical of the policies of this dominant political force. Its coalition with Ennahda, its failure to improve the socio-economic situation of the country, and its internal divisions pushed voters away from the so-called “modernist” party.
More surprisingly, the elections showed a breakthrough of independent lists, which together accumulated 32.9 percent of votes and thus gained the highest number of seats. However, this result does not necessarily show political preference for independent candidates as much as it displays discontent toward Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. Given the discrepancies in their ideologies and programs, it is hard to predict whether or not these movements will manage to form a coherent opposition force.
Independents’ real power to shape policy will depend on the alliances they form on individual municipal councils, whose partisan composition will vary by locality, and on their local allies’ political strategies for the 2019 legislative elections.
Nominal Decentralization
Malek Lakhal
Malek Lakhal, a journalist for Nawaat and a researcher in political science.
Tunisia just saw its first local elections since the toppling of Ben Ali. However, the public’s indifference is quite palpable, as only 35.6 percent of registered voters went to the polls. These elections were meant as a first step towards what could very possibly be the most important reform in Tunisian governance since the independence: decentralization. The idea is that if local communities are given the opportunity to decide for themselves, they stand better chances of developing themselves and creating wealth.
The least developed regions have long suffered from the fact that those who make the decisions are usually in and from the coast, and do not have nor seek first-hand knowledge of the regions’ needs. However, holding local elections won’t undo hundreds of years of unfair development if not met with a clear political will to change the way the Tunisian state built itself politically, economically, and culturally—a will clearly missing in the authorities’ response to recent social movements pushing for a fairer redistribution of wealth.
Kamour and Jemna are very clear examples of this unwillingness to change. From April to June 2017, people protested in the Tataouine governorate. Most notably, at the Kamour oil and gas facility in south of the city of Tataouine, protesters stopped production, demanding that a fifth of the profits be specifically devoted to Tataouine’s development, which has the highest unemployment rate in the country. Politicians and political commentators interpreted these demands as a threat to national unity, even though the Constitution mandates the government to pursue “positive discrimination” in the distribution of wealth to achieve fairer development. Their opinion is better understood if we keep in mind that for over sixty years, the official discourse was that resources belong to the “Tunisian people” equally, and that development only happens through “unity”—even though this narrative justified decades of policies favoring the coastal regions and silencing the marginalized ones.
Inhabitants of Jemna, a small village in southwestern Tunisia, decided to occupy the state-owned oasis in 2011 and cultivate it on their own, setting up the Association for the Protection of Jemna's Oases (APJO) to manage agricultural and developmental projects in the community. Their profits from date production significantly increased, allowing them to construct new facilities in the village, such as a sports field and a new classroom. Despite the positive impact, the APJO’s bank account was frozen in October 2016 by the Tunisian authorities, who argued that they did not have the right to cultivate the land. Sovereignty and President Beji Caid Essebsi’s main electoral promise to restore “state prestige” were given priority over decentralized and self-sustained development.
Tunisian authorities have a long-standing tradition of satisfying international lenders’ political demands through legislative reforms, while not changing much in its actions on the field. Looking back at how decentralized governance initiatives and demands were received, these elections and the councils they will put in place could well be another of set of “as-if” reforms that only exist on paper.
Security Forces Balance Politics and Neutrality
Sharan Grewal
Sharan Grewal, a PhD candidate in politics at Princeton University. Follow him on Twitter @sh_grewal.
On April 29, the military and internal security forces voted in Tunisia’s municipal elections. This was a historic event, representing the first time in Tunisian history that these forces have been permitted to vote. While registration and turnout were even lower than among civilians, the vote proceeded smoothly.
Tunisia’s founding president, Habib Bourguiba, had banned the military and national guard from voting, fearing that involvement in electoral politics would politicize these forces and thereby facilitate a coup d’état. His successor, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, concurred, extending the ban to cover the remaining internal security forces. However, in 2017, the parliament, pushed by security unions and secular parties expecting to gain their votes, granted the military and security forces suffrage in the 2018 municipal elections.
To preserve their neutrality and respect their functions, Tunisia’s electoral commission developed several restrictions on the security forces’ suffrage in consultation with the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The security forces voted one week in advance of civilians, allowing them to provide full security for the May 6 election. They were not permitted to participate in any part of the electoral campaign, including attending partisan meetings—although some political parties such as Nidaa Tounes still attempted to court their votes. To prevent the public from knowing which security personnel registered and voted, there were no lists of registered voters posted outside polling stations, no inking of fingers, no media interviews, and no exit polls. The ballots themselves were mixed with those of civilians before being counted to prevent knowledge of how the security forces voted.
These restrictions received mixed reactions from the military and security forces. While one retired army Colonel-Major was optimistic that with the restrictions, “the neutrality of the military will be observed,”1 others found the restrictions “insulting.” Retired Colonel-Major Mahmoud Mezoughi, president of the retired officers association, argued that “either the military should not have been allowed to vote until the transition to democracy was complete, or they should have been allowed to do so with the full rights available to the rest of the voters.”2
The internal security forces witnessed a similar division. While the National Union of Tunisian Security Force Syndicates (UNSFST) encouraged officers to vote despite these restrictions, the National Syndicate of Internal Security Forces (SNFSI) urged their members to boycott. Chokri Hamada, spokesman for the SNFSI, explained that their right to vote was “conditional:” if they cannot participate in the campaign, “how would they know who they are voting for and what their platforms are?” The SNFSI also argued that the police should remain neutral by abstaining, though at the same time contended that politicians did not deserve their vote since they had not yet passed the “Repression of Attacks on the Armed Forces” bill. Ultimately, out of 111,152 total military and security personnel only 33 percent registered to vote, and only 12 percent of those registered (4 percent of all personnel) showed up to vote. The low turnout in part reflects these forces’ historic neutrality, frustration with the aforementioned restrictions, and—like their civilian counterparts—little general interest in the municipal elections.
Yet while turnout was low, the voting itself proceeded smoothly, with few violations of the restrictions. With this precedent set, it is possible that the security unions will push for the right to vote in upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections as well—this time, with equal rights as their civilian counterparts.
1. Correspondence with the author, April 27, 2018.
2. Correspondence with the author, April 26, 2018.
Sustaining Democracy
Emir Sfaxi
Emir Sfaxi, a Fulbright fellow at American University and a Public Policy consultant. Follow him on Twitter @EmirSX.
Despite a low turnout of 35.6 percent (compared to the 69 percent turnout in the 2014 legislative elections), the results of Tunisia’s May 6 municipal elections were positive overall. There was large representation for youth and women, local leaders emerged at the head of non-partisan and independent lists, fairness and transparency rules were respected even if minor incidents were reported, and local civil society organizations mobilized to monitor the elections. This provides hope that the only “success” of the Arab Spring can sustain democracy despite a difficult political climate and a suffocating economic situation.
Notably, a new generation of youth leaders is emerging, many of whom were already heavily involved in civil society organizations. Youth under 35 years old won 37.57 percent of the seats (and those aged 35 to 45 won an additional 25.87 percent). The high numbers of youth elected to local roles shows the increased capacity building and support that international aid and civil society organizations had called for to offer youth fertile ground for political participation. Yet paradoxically, despite high youth representation, there was low youth turnout, and observers raised their concerns about the absence of the youth at the polls.
Furthermore, women were elected to represent 47 percent of the municipal council seats—even though according to the Independent High Authority for Election statistics, women formed only 29.7 percent of the heads of electoral lists, which must alternate male and female candidates. This will help women take on leadership roles in these councils as well. Souad Abderrahim, head of the Ennahda list for the municipality of Tunis, expressed her willingness to become a mayor following her election. This has generated some controversy, not only because she would be the first woman to become the mayor of the capital, but because Abderrahim faces heavy criticism for her views that single mothers should not benefit from social help.
Other big winners of these elections were the independent lists, which secured 2,367 seats (32.9 percent of the vote). Even though these lists won the plurality of seats, they likely still underestimate the appeal of independent candidates. Ennahda in particular predicted this scenario and brilliantly capitalized on it by opening their lists to independent figures and local leaders to run under their flag and benefit from their financial and logistical support to run their campaigns. This paid off for Ennahda, which came in second with 2,135 seats (29.68 percent of the vote).
However, the low turnout and the favor shown for nonpartisan candidates as an alternative should be taken seriously by leading political parties. The municipal elections could still be considered as a test for the upcoming legislative and presidential elections of 2019. The country seems to be at its lowest point economically, with inflation reaching record levels and the dinar facing continued devaluation, which both limit investment and job creation. If the economy does not recover, dissatisfaction with the status quo will increase voter apathy and make it harder for Tunisian democracy to sustain itself.
