2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

Remarks from Ambassador William J. Burns

Good morning. Let me congratulate at the outset James, Toby, and our Carnegie colleagues for putting together another terrific conference.

With political transitions and simmering nuclear tensions dotting the international landscape, this year’s conference proved to be especially challenging to pull off. I could not be prouder of all of you. I could not be more impressed with your vision, execution, and commitment to make each nukefest even better than the last. And I could not be more honored to welcome our extraordinary speakers and audience – especially those taking part in the new young professional track. You make me feel old, but you also fill me with hope – and optimism.

For all the new energy and purpose the next generation brings to this year’s conference, I see no shortage of the more familiar ashen faces one typically sees at nuclear policy gatherings. If we’re honest, we can all concede that in the nuclear crowd, pessimism is genetic. But it has also engendered some novel – or in undiplomatic terms, dangerous – instincts in many quarters. I can understand what’s behind the frustration. The plodding pace on disarmament. The impunity in the face of stark violations of treaty obligations. And the desire for more security and assurance in a world that seems more complicated and uncertain as each day passes.

For most of my career in government, thinking the unthinkable meant reckoning with the consequences of nuclear use and doing everything possible to prevent it. But there were moments – much like today – when anxiety and fatalism ruled the day. In these moments, leaders contemplate what seemed unthinkable in the very recent past – growing arsenals, developing new nuclear weapons, discarding treaties, abrogating agreements, hollowing out international institutions, and fanning the flames of proliferation.

As some of you will recall, the mood was somewhat different at the last conference. Two years ago, we met during the final stages of negotiations for the comprehensive Iran nuclear agreement. Hope for a deal that would prevent a war and stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon was palpable. That hope was realized. That deal is now in force. All parties are in full compliance. The impending threats of a nuclear Iran and a military confrontation have been averted. And for all the debate about the agreement and for all the endless searching for a “better deal,” the JCPOA remains a significant diplomatic achievement and a model for how to resolve proliferation challenges.

While the deal was never meant to transform Iran or the region overnight, many of us hoped it might bring renewed stability to the international nuclear order. But rather than use the momentum to make progress on other proliferation challenges and build on the agreement’s innovations to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime, we’ve gotten distracted and diverted. Meanwhile, nuclear dangers have increased, and the international consensus on nonproliferation and disarmament has only frayed further.

Since we last met, North Korea has tested more nuclear weapons and made significant advances in its missile capabilities. Russia has deployed a cruise missile in violation of the INF treaty. The arms race in South Asia has accelerated. So has the interest in, and pace of, nuclear weapon modernization in a number of countries, including here in the United States. The once hypothetical risk of entanglement between the cyber, space, and nuclear domains is today a real and present danger. And doubt about the viability of the NPT is growing, together with polarization in the NPT system – most recently underscored by the determined effort of a group of states to push a treaty banning nuclear weapons through the UN.

In this environment, dismantling existing structures and institution with vague hopes of something better emerging can seem appealing. But this sort of “creative destruction” is nothing more than an illusion. In a world of imperfect institutions, imperfect information, and imperfect solutions, the only realistic path before us is to work hard to strengthen and revitalize the nonproliferation regime we have in the real world – not the one we wished we had in a more perfect world. The longer we hold to the myth of creative destruction and the fantasy of perfection, the more intractable the challenges before us will become. This, to me, is one of the key lessons of the first fifty years of the NPT regime. Now is the time to shape and strengthen the future of global nuclear order, not shred it.

This is precisely the spirit which motivates our work at Carnegie. And we’ve tried our best to give it practical meaning.

This morning, my colleagues released a new report detailing the elements of a nuclear firewall between civil and nuclear weapons programs that would patch some of the vulnerabilities of the treaty while strengthening all three of its pillars – nonproliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and disarmament. This report is the product of several years of in-depth technical research and active outreach to key states. And it’s precisely the kind of innovative thinking that can help us navigate the stormy waters we now find ourselves in. Our goal with this work is to build up, rather than tear down, the institutions that successfully managed nuclear risks in the last half century.

As we work to revitalize the regime for the next fifty years, we also have to deal with the very real challenges facing it today. This means continuing to pay very careful attention to the rigorous implementation of the Iran nuclear deal. It means drawing the right lessons to deal with the immediate and even more challenging threat posed by North Korea. It means deploying our diplomatic leverage in South Asia to reduce tensions driving strategic instability. It means maintaining what’s left of the arms control infrastructure with Russia while holding Moscow accountable for its violations. And it means leading by example with our own behavior, including the decisions we make in the coming years about the future of our nuclear posture and arsenal.

Over the coming days, we will have a chance to discuss these and many other imperatives facing the nonproliferation regime on its 50th anniversary. It’s a conversation that requires more than two days, of course, and I hope very much that it will engender further debate, dialogue, and collaboration in the months ahead.

We are very fortunate to kick off the conference with a keynote address by High Representative Federica Mogherini – a remarkable diplomat whose skill, energy, and imagination are uniquely suited to this moment of reckoning for Europe. We had the good fortune to host the High Representative last July to roll out the EU’s new global strategy and she’s very kind to come back to give us an update on the strategy and the EU’s nuclear policy priorities. We are equally fortunate to welcome my friend and former colleague, Karen Donfried, to moderate the conversation following the High Representative’s remarks. Karen has been at the frontlines of trans-Atlantic partnership over the course of many years and several administrations, and is as knowledgeable and thoughtful about this part of the world as anyone I know.

So once again, let me welcome all of you to the 2017 Nuclear Policy Conference, and please join me in welcoming our opening keynote speaker, High Representative Mogherini. Thank you very much.

Transcript from High Representative Mogherini

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Let me thank you, Bill [William Burns, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], and let me thank Carnegie and all of you for being here, and for this invitation. You know how much I care about non-proliferation and nuclear policy: even before I chaired the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, before I was High Representative or Minister, I was already engaged with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), and the broader global non-proliferation community. And I see so many friends here today I am really please to meet again.

Not only are so many of you here in the room, I also see the non-proliferation work done – a work that is key this moment. It is a life-time commitment, but in this precise moment, it is even more important to discuss nuclear policies, and to preserve the rules that were agreed in recent decades through so much hard work, vision and courage.

So I’m particularly glad to be here with you today, for at least two reasons. One, that we really need the expert community to be part of the conversation with policy-makers, to explain what the current rules have achieved, what we still have to build, and why it is so important to strengthen and preserve the global non-proliferation architecture. Second, because we can never stop looking at the way forward, as new challenges arise – as Bill was mentioning -, at the new tools we can develop, and the potential impact of any new agreement.

The European Union organises every year a “Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference” precisely for this reason. So it is just natural for me to be here with you – from a personal point of view and from an institutional one, and I would even say from a political one. And let me thank Carnegie and all of you here again for this conference and for your constant contribution to this very important debate. A debate that can and must shape the direction of policy making.

Now in particular, because I see a lot of confusion in today’s world. And even the most basic rules of our international system seem to be called into question. In an era of power-politics and realpolitik, I would like to be as realistic and as pragmatic as I can – being a woman normally this works quite well.

So let me be very clear: the security of our citizens today can only be achieved through non-proliferation and disarmament. It is a matter of security. A new arms race is not the solution to any of the security challenges or threats we face. The Cold-War era is over. The world today is much more complex, much more fragile than 25 years ago. The number of nuclear states has risen – so that there is not just one “nuclear balance” to take into account, but several and overlapping nuclear balances.

Henry Kissinger has explained it incredibly well. I come from a very different background, but I do appreciate the wisdom of the old-school Republican realism, especially in these times. In 2014 he assessed that major powers have over-invested in nuclear weapons, at their own peril. I quote: "The most fearsome of weapons, commanding large shares of each superpowers' defense budget, lost their relevance to the actual crises facing leaders".

As a result, Kissinger assessed, in many cases, I quote again: "Technological supremacy turned into geopolitical impotence". Kissinger argues that the “relatively stable nuclear order of the Cold War” simply belongs to a different era. And in today’s world, some nuclear actors might want to show that they are ready to take “apocalyptic decisions,” even if they would have disastrous consequences for everyone, including themselves.

So, the logic of deterrence could easily become outdated – and this would definitely be the case, if a criminal or terrorist group had to acquire a weapon of mass destruction. In a fragile world like ours, a nuclear balance of terror would be incredibly dangerous. And the only way to make our citizens more secure runs through non-proliferation and disarmament. The only way forward is to invest together in a strong system of truly global rules.

We, Europeans, aim at multilateral disarmament. We all want to guarantee non-proliferation through treaties and verification regimes. This is stated very clearly in our Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy - that I presented at Carnegie a few months ago – and that was agreed by all our 28 Member States – still 28 for a couple of years -, including the nuclear weapon states. So, the European Union will continue to be a strong, consistent, reliable, predictable partner, for all those who believe that security comes through non-proliferation and I guess in this room we are quite the majority. We will keep working as the European Union to preserve, strengthen and expand the current rules.

Think of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: it has been the cornerstone of the global security architecture, and today, as it turns fifty, it has become even more important – not less. Or think of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). North Korea’s nuclear tests have shown once again how urgent it is to make the Treaty enter into force. Its Organisation [CTBTO] has provided already the world with a truly global, hi-tech monitoring system for nuclear explosions – something that no single country alone would be able to do.

Not only do we need to complete this global monitoring network, we must continue to argue for all countries – including this one, the United States of America – to move towards ratification. This would be an investment in America’s security, and in our collective security. The international community needs unity in its response to nuclear threats, to North Korea’s threats. And unity can only be built and preserved if we all abide by the same rules, if our commitments are truly credible. Unity is also what brought us the deal with Iran: America and Europe, Russia and China, working together.

Whatever views you might have on the agreement – and I know here in Washington there are different views - there are some facts that no one can ignore – not opinions, facts. For five times now, five times, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has certified Iran’s compliance with the deal, and it is constantly monitoring Iran’s nuclear programme. I chair regular meetings at ministerial level with the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Iran. And we all assess the implementation of the agreement in all its parts. And the United Nations, as you know well, has thrown its weight behind the deal, endorsing it in the Security Council.

So let me state it very clearly, as I always do: It is an agreement that belongs to the entire international community and that the Europeans are determined to preserve because its full and strict implementation is key to our own security. Multilateral diplomacy has achieved something impossible to achieve by any other means - through unity. There is simply no doubt about it. And this is the path we Europeans want to continue to follow.

A renewed confrontation among world powers will not serve anyone’s interest – it will only make us more insecure, more exposed to these threats. The right path is the one marked by the new START (STrategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and its implementation. This is the kind of cooperation between Russia and the United States that we Europeans would like to see.

Any violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, on the contrary, would endanger a security architecture that, since the end of the Cold War, has made Europe a safer place. A logic of provocation or retaliation cannot apply to nuclear issues. The game has become far too complex and the field far too crowded. A new arms race, far from being a stabilising factor, would spark new tensions, destabilise entire regions and make our world much, much more dangerous.

So the answer to today’s instability, to a shifting global balance of power, is more cooperation and stronger global governance. This is what the Europeans stand for. We need to protect the rules we have, enforce them more effectively together, work on our verification regimes, agree on better rules when the situation requires it, develop new tools and mechanisms when needed. We must strengthen our partnerships, build new international alliances, new formats, new spaces for regional cooperation.

This is what the European Union believes, and this is our strategic interest. I know that other world powers might not share our views. But I also believe that we are going through a moment of transition, a very unsettled situation, and we have a chance to maybe influence the outcome of this transition.

So we need the experts and the academia, the civil society, citizens, those who are dedicated to the nuclear policy agenda to make their voice heard, to make the arguments. We need your expertise and your engagement – not only to analyse the challenges, but also to shape our response, the policy making. To make it more cooperative, which means to us Europeans to make it more effective.

What is at stake is global security. We must have learned something from our tragic history. The world today is a dangerous place – a very dangerous place. It is definitely not the time to play with fire. What is at stake is our own security. That is why you will always find the European Union engaged and committed, for nuclear non-proliferation.

I thank you very much.

Q&As

Questions from the moderator

Q. You just gave such a strong defence of the rules-based international order that Americans and Europeans built together in the post-war era. I wanted to draw you out on that because I think back to the last time you went to Carnegie when you were launching the Global Strategy, that you really were the lead creator of in the EU; you announced it almost simultaneously with the June referendum in the UK to leave the EU; since then we had the US election that's resulted in President Trump. I think there is a lot of questions today about these serious challenges to this rules-based order – both externally but also within our own societies, our public is questioning some of these foundations that have been unquestioned. The Global Strategy was released back in June: would you reassess it at all today and specifically how do you see the role of the United States in this? I was struck at the Munich Security Conference that many of the questions there seem to be about the US role in this order as much as anything else. So I would love to draw you out on that, thanks.

HR/VP Mogherini: Thank you very much for first of all being here together again, it is great and I can confirm being part of the German Marshall Fund fellowship was one of the best experiences in my life. I have learned so much and I have learned I think a lot about America beyond Washington; so that prepares you also for coming surprises in the future. But, no, I would not reassess the Global Strategy at all. And actually, yes, I was presenting the Global Strategy two or three days after the UK referendum. It is more or less nine months now after that moment – seems much longer but it is only nine months - and as we have started to implement the Global Strategy in number of fields, including European Defence, and that has gone very fast on the European Union side with decisions that we took at unanimity, at 28, including the UK. As you might have noticed, the UK has not even yet started to ask to begin the negotiations nine months after the result of the referendum. So, maybe it is not so true that the European Union is slow and bureaucratic and the others can run; because – you know - democracy needs time and procedures.

And this brings me to the rules: in the Global Strategy we say – and I know we share this analysis here - that the only way to cope with a world that is extremely complex when power is diffused is to find common ground to find solutions to problems. The only way you can try to do this is by building cooperation – regional cooperation, international cooperation – through multilateralism, strengthening this rules-based global order. And here I think we touch on one of the big political, even existential questions of our times that are true internally and globally. How do we see the rules? Do we perceive the rules as a constraint for an individual or an individual country or do we consider the rules as a guarantee for having the game played properly? A guarantee for the weaker? A guarantee for the respect of certain things we decide all together? Up to now the rules were perceived as a guarantee. My perception is that in our societies, more and more, we start to question whether the rules are not a constraint to the success of one at the detriment of – maybe - the other. But in the world, this creates chaos. That is why Europeans will and will continue to stand for rules in the global system – be it on trade, be it on diplomacy, be it on security, be it on nuclear issues.

We see this as an investment in a balanced global order. We have not yet developed a proper global order and I think we have the maturity now to see that an investment in – I will make an example – humanitarian aid in the Horn of Africa is also an investment in our own security, because out of the I do not know of many thousands of young boys and girls who suffer from hunger – a certain number of them might become radicalised, immigrate, destabilise countries or regions. So, we need rules, we need investments that are long term visions; we need to cooperate with partners and friends and we need to find this common ground even when problems seem difficult, as we did with the Iran nuclear deal at the end of the day.

So, no, I would not reassess the Global Strategy. All of that is the European way to security, out of what we have learned from our history that is somehow our shared interest.

The role of the United States – you know, it is a bit a surreal for me because now, it is a few months that be it here or in Brussels or in Munich or elsewhere, one of the first questions is what about the US policy on this and that and I say - you do not have to ask me – can I ask you? It is not for me to say. I see that there is still a certain degree of review of policies ongoing and this is one of the reasons why I am here in Washington this week. I am very pleased and honoured to have welcomed Vice-President Pence for an official visit to the EU to discuss together at an early stage what kind of direction the US policy might take in certain fields where – for us – it is priority number one to make clear where the European Union stands: the Iran nuclear deal, full strict implementation by all in all aspects, the climate change agreement, a free and fair global trade system and I could continue. Some crisis management, we need to do together – Syria, Libya, the Middle East Peace Process - we strongly believe in two states, still.

And one last thing I would like to mention – I was particularly worried to see the news coming from Washington on the budget cuts. I know that this is internal, domestic but I was the day before yesterday in Cairo for meetings with the Arab League, the previous day I was in Addis Ababa for meetings with the African Union. If the United States were to reduce significantly their investments, be it on humanitarian or development aid, peace and security operations, the world and certain regions of the world would get completely destabilised; do not forget that the major Syrian refugee crisis, couple of years ago, started because the World Food Programme was underfunded. I hope there is wisdom enough here to keep in mind that investing in America means also investing in places that are far away – it is your own interest.

Q. You mentioned Vice-President Pence's visit to the European Union which I do think was a powerful example of US commitment to the European project. The President will be going to Europe in the first half of this year, if we think about the G7 Summit in Italy, if we think about the NATO Summit, if we think about the G20 meeting in Germany, do you think there will be a US/EU Summit on the margins of any of those meetings?

HR/VP Mogherini: Could be. I know our teams are working on options. We had last summit last summer at the margins of the NATO Summit in Warsaw, but I have to tell you before that I think that the previous one was two years ago which means that we do not necessarily need to have a summit every year – it would be good but what would be more important than everything for me is to come to a summit or to our regular meetings with clear ideas of what we want to do together. What is our shared interest? Why America needs Europe and Europe needs America? From European side, we have it very clear in mind, we need to work together for our security, we need to work together for our economy, millions of jobs depend on our economic relations across the Atlantic - both in Europe and in America. Probably you can imagine how many jobs in America depend on European investments. And also for the global order, because America and Europe together represent by far, by far, the most powerful force in the world in any possible field.

So, we have clear in mind why we want and we need to work with the United States. I think that a summit would be good; I don't exclude it but I don't confirm it at this stage. The important thing for me in this moment is that we keep this dialogue very much open, frequent as it has been the case – I have seen Tillerson [Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State of the United States of America] very often, Matthis [James Matthis, Secretary of Defence of the United States of America], again Pence [Mike Pence, Vice-President of the United States of America], I will see him again during my visit here, for the second time in a month -  that we keep this channel open, that we talk and we see together again how the new US course on some policies will develop; on our side we are quite clear on what we want.

Q. If we think about challenges to the rules-based order, certainly one country that comes to mind is Russia. And there have been concerns about Russian abrogation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, certainly if you think about the European security context, there is no more fundamental challenge to the post-Cold war order than Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 – it seems thus that this scenario where we see strong transatlantic cooperation continue. The EU has renewed its sanctions against Russia, the Trump administration said it is committed to those sanctions as well. How do you see the EU's relationship with Russia moving forward? Do you see any areas to be optimistic about, the implementation of the Minsk cease-fire agreements? Tell us how you see that moving forward.

HR/VP Mogherini: Well, first of all, just a few days ago, we restated our policy on the illegal annexation of Crimea – it was the  anniversary, just two days ago. This is a very important thing to restate together that both America and Europe; for Europe – no doubt - and for America as well I understand, it is not conceivable that in our century, borders are changed by the use of force, simply unconceivable. This is a fundamental breach of international law.

Having said that, the two key points I would like to underline about this: one is that, yes, it is fundamental that we coordinate our sanctions policy, but I would also like to get out of a black and white picture where the European policy towards Russia is purely the sanctions. That does not correspond to reality. We work with the Russians intensely at my level, at all levels on the Minsk implementation but also on many other things. The sanctions are an instrument to get the full Minsk implementation. For us, the objective in itself is not keeping the sanctions; for us the objective in itself is solving the conflict and have a full implementation of Minsk. We would be happy to lift the sanctions if we had a full implementation of Minsk.

So, our main purpose is first, to continue to coordinate with our American friends on this, we’ll keep our European unity as we have done over the years regardless of different stories that were told and then, we showed that we could be more united than people expected – I think we are proving that again and again on many different files. Second, we work together to have this full implementation of Minsk which means also supporting our Ukrainian friends in their reform agenda – they are going through a complicated process, including on some reforms they need to undertake under the Minsk agreements.

And third, the European Union and Russia have a certain selective engagement. We work together on some issues very well. I give you two, three examples: we work very well on the Iran nuclear deal, constantly – I would say daily. We work very well on the Middle East Peace Process; we share for sure the same kind of perspective there about the two state solution and we worked always very well within the Quartet on the Middle East. But also on other issues, I think of the fact that just one year and a half ago, the European Union launched its military operation in the Mediterranean to save lives at sea and dismantle the smugglers and human traffickers' networks that was endorsed by the UN Security Council that Russia supported.

So, we have to get out of this picture that the European Union and Russia are not talking to each other, are not working with each other on anything. We have disagreements, we have different positons, we have a serious problem on Ukraine and with the illegal annexation of Crimea that we tackle every single day and on which we need to work together, Europeans and Americans. But on any file, including the ones that are not necessary the easiest like Syria, we do work together on a daily basis.

Q. When I think back to the European Global Strategy, one of the things that struck me was the focus there of turning vision into common action. Just earlier this month, you announced that the European Union was setting up a headquarters for military training operations which seems to be part of turning a vision into concrete action. I was struck by how this was reported at the least in the US and the British press which was very much in the context of the European Union taking greater responsibility for its security in a post-Brexit environment. So, at this moment, when one of the EU's military most capable Member State is planning its exit, it seems that the other Member States in the EU itself want to step up and say they could do more. I would love to draw you out on what you see this new headquarter is signifying and what it is expect to contribute?

HR/VP Mogherini: It was indeed a historical decision. I said on that occasion we have done more in concrete terms on European defence in the last six months than the last six years. Those of you who are passionate about European history know that European defence was at the beginning the very start of the dream of integrating the continent; then for different reasons, we moved to something else. And as we will celebrate 60 years of the Rome Treaty that was the starting point of the EU, and just like on Saturday in Rome, it is quite a reason of being proud for me, to see that we bring there, 60 years after, the first very concrete operational steps for a European Union that is a much more reliable, credible actor on the military side because we have been always perceived and we have always perceived ourselves as a soft power – Venus and Mars and all those things – but actually, we have already now, 16 military or civilian operations around the world, mainly in Africa but also in the Mediterranean or elsewhere; and we do have also military power. So, this decision we have taken will allow us to plan and conduct these operations in a more coordinated manner.

But what strikes me the most is that, you are right, media-wise, it is perceived as the reaction to the UK leaving. But this decision was taken unanimously at 28 and this is going to be implemented in the coming weeks, actually days now, while the UK has not even started to ask to begin negotiations to exit which means we are moving fast, together, in a very concrete manner, still at 28. Why? Because this is not a reaction to the UK leaving; this is a reaction to the fact that for the European citizens, security matters. We are not doing this for the UK, we are not doing this for the US – sorry to disappoint you -  we are doing it for ourselves. Then, if it is good also for transatlantic relations – which I believe it is – great! But we are doing this because we know that there is no other way to have an efficient, an effective security system and defence system in Europe, if not through European Union integration and coordination processes.

I give you one example that I raised with Matthis [James Matthis, Secretary of Defence of the United States of America] and I think that was extremely interesting for him. We have all this 2% debate - and this is a NATO debate, I am not going to enter that. But, if you want Member States allies in NATO that are also Member States of the European Union, and that is the large majority of them, to go towards better and more spending on defence: first you have to have rules on our budgets that allowed that to happen and these are EU related decisions. Second, in the meantime you can work on the output. Here we are a security community, so we understand each other. In Europe we spend half - 50 per cent - of what America spends on defence. European output on defence is fifteen per cent of the American one, so we have an output gap in Europe given by the fragmentation of our investments. We do not work on the economy of scale yet. Each and every Member State has its own system and sometimes more than one because we are complicated, we Europeans – which is an advantage sometimes because in a complicated world being complicated yourself helps you to understand things.

But in the meantime the Member States figured out that if they want to get to 2 per cent in defence spending - because another thing that Europeans strongly believe is also investing in climate change or in humanitarian [aid] because this prevents conflicts, so for us that is also an investment in security, especially on the conflict prevention - you need to fill in the gap on the output. You can do it through European Union instruments, because the European Union can incentivise common projects, capability developments, industrial research projects that can bring together Member States to spend better together and have a better output, strengthen the capabilities that then are also the disposal of NATO, because it is Member States owned and Member States are the allies. This can be done only through the European Union. So all those who question the relevance of the European Union should think twice also on defence.

Q. Would you see this is as a first step to a European army?

HR/VP Mogherini: I would not say that. No, because, you know, my main objective is to make things advance. You can use nice, evocative images and words and say “you know 15 years from now”, but that vision if you say it like this might raise so many question marks on the next step to be done that you never get there. So you have to have a horizon, but I focus on the small steps that can bring us there. And again we discussed about European army for decades and we have never moved forward with a joint military command. Now we stopped talking about the army, but we have decided on the common command. I would prefer going that way.

Questions from the audience

Q. On 17 March, the Global Relations Forum International Task Force on the Sustainability of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) including different experts from 5+1 countries, including my organisation [PIR Centre], India, Turkey, Israel, Iran issued an unanimous statement saying that there is no alternative to the JCPOA and it should not be renegotiated and all the parties should fulfil their obligations in good faith. But at the same time we hear that about the recent British decision of blocking the sale of “yellow cake to Iran” and this is what really concerns Russia, it really concerns a lot of experts worldwide and I wonder what could we do in order to achieve cooperation and fulfilling all the obligations in good faith in which would be after the JCPOA.

HR/VP Mogherini: I fully share the need to fully implement, in all its parts, the JCPOA. Let me stress that this is not a deal that can be partially renegotiated. You know that for sure, but maybe our larger audience does not necessarily know: it is a more than 100 pages of very technical deal that took several years to finalise. And as I said it belongs to the entire international community, it is not a bilateral agreement that can be adjusted here or there. So I do not see the possibility to have a cosmetic or a partial change here or there. And I agree that there is no alternative if we want to avoid that Iran develops a military nuclear programme. So far, as I said, both through the IAEA’s [International Atomic Energy Agency] reports – five of them – and through the Joint Commission Assessments that looks at all the different elements of full compliance in good faith by all actors of the JCPOA, we have always assessed together that there is full compliance in all sides by all actors. And I will personally and the European Union will consistently guarantee that this continues to be the case.

This is for the European Union a key strategic interest and it is also for me a personal responsibility because I still keep the responsibility to chair the Joint Commission and monitor on the implementation. Let me say that this is not only key for security reasons; it is also key for a certain way of conceiving diplomacy and multilateralism. We have invested in this agreement first and foremost because we wanted Iran to be prevented from developing a nuclear weapon and the assessment we have is that this is effectively the case. But there is also a deeper meaning in this which means that even the most difficult and complicated issues can be dealt with by different global powers, having different views but sit together again and again for years, but finally finding a solution, a common ground and implement it together. Two years ago everybody was sceptical about us reaching the agreement and we did it. Then everybody was sceptical the agreement could ever enter into force and we did it. Then everybody was sceptical about the deal being implemented fully and constantly and we did it. So I think we will disappoint the sceptics again and again.

Q: Giving India’s impressive track record on nuclear non-proliferation and the backing it has received from countries like the US itself, you have also led some negotiations efforts in trying to talk with countries like China on the nuclear supplies issues. Do you really see India getting a seat in the table without signing the non-proliferation treaty? And a lot has been talked about the Iran’s nuclear deal, if Iran would to be forced to walk out of it, what would you see as the biggest implication of it and would be the way forward?

HR/VP Mogherini: I will not comment on the part of the question on India. On Iran I do not think personally that Iran can be forced to walk out of the agreement. I think Iran has invested a big deal of technical competences that they have, political capital of the leadership – all of the leadership, from the very top - in reaching this agreement, which was not an easy exercise. And I think they would stay committed to full implementation of the agreement. And as I said, Europeans will always be there to make sure that full implementation is taking place, but also that the environment among us – the 3+3 plus Iran or 5+1 and Iran, no matter how you want to call them – that the environment is constructive, respectful and that good faith applies as mentioned by your colleague. Europe is there to guarantee this. And I am confident that Iran will not either be forced to walk away, nor walk away.

Q: We often talk about Russia’s violations, so my readers often ask if there are concerns on the Russian side concerning the INF that Americans aren’t aware of?

HR/VP Mogherini: If we talk about of concerns of which Americans might be aware of or not, I guess the question is more for you than for me. I cannot speak for the United States yet. But as I said we see the nuclear architecture on nuclear deals as a major achievement that has to be preserved, which first of all means we count on all to stick to commitments and preserve the agreements we have also because this is essential to European security.

Q: You wisely mentioned unity. It is pretty clear that there is a large unity in states that do not have nuclear weapons to those that do to quickly get rid of them. That unity has culminated now into the negotiations that will start next week, as you know, in the United Nations, and negotiations should finish sometime in June for a possible convention to ban nuclear weapons. What do you think that outcome of these negotiations would be and how it would affect our work?

Q. In Europe there is a lot of anti-establishment parties that are getting traction. How would you envisage a message to the people that are unsatisfied with the establishment?

HR/VP Mogherini: The first question is actually easier than the second. I would not have expected that. There is indeed a lack of unity when it comes to the nuclear weapons ban within the broader international community, within the European Union, within NATO. I cannot predict how the negotiations will end up. It seems difficult to me to imagine that a few months of negotiations on this issue will deliver us unified result, I would be surprise in that case, but in Italian we have an expression that I could never translate in English: ‘Hope is the last to die’. Do you say that in English? Yes? Ok. So you never know. But indeed on that issue there is a lack of unity across different set-ups, communities, and that goes beyond the nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers. It crosses a bit lines to my understanding. We always try to facilitate unity, starting from our Member States on common ground, and again let me tell you that what I said during my remarks, there are divisions, there are different views on this issue but there is inside the European Union, including the nuclear powers, a clear common goal of going towards a multilateral disarmament on nuclear issues. This is a common and shared goal we have in the Union.

On anti-establishment, first of all thank you for putting the question this way. Because I have always been convinced that it is not about populism, it is not about far-right, it is about establishment and anti-establishment forces which is a very complicated issue to tackle and I cannot say that I am glad because I am not, but finally we go out of this narrative that this is an European thing. You see it here, it is everywhere in the world. I think it is about taking responsibility from the establishment decision-making. I can give you the European example but I guess here the dynamics might be similar. In the European Union, there is no abstract entity that shows up in Brussels, an alien coming from the moon and materialising in the Brussels’ building, taking decisions and then the 28 [Member States] have to implement. It does not exist. It is the 28 [Member States] Prime Ministers, Presidents, Chancellors, ministers, coming together to Brussels, taking decision, most of the time by unanimity and then going back home and say ‘you know, Brussels asks what we have to do’, which means not taking responsibilities for your own choices. The only place that this does not work is Brussels itself, because Belgium cannot blame Brussels but apart from that – it is true; it is sad, but it is true.

So I think the answer is in us politicians or us establishment – I have a difficult in saying that, but anyway… - not only to be a bit more concrete on the things we do and again look again at the concrete outcome options, operational decisions we take and explain them, but also taking responsibility and explaining why we are taking decisions, why it is good, or in some cases you lose a battle and you explain why you lost the battle and you get the battle next time. Being a little bit more transparent not only on the handling of the budget – which is a very important thing - but then sometimes you see the contradiction of anti-establishment forces that are completely non transparent on handling the money, including public money. So there is not really coherence there. But if we want to take more political responsibility, explaining to our citizens that in the European case Europe is us, it is not a third party. You are from a certain city, a certain country and you have a certain European identity, complementary to the others.

We need to have the political leadership that is able to exercise and explain a European responsibility also because otherwise – sorry I am too long but this is a serious thing – we run the risk of leaving the most dangerous of the paradoxes that you hear, this discourse in Europe being about regaining sovereignty from Brussels - but in the world of today how do you regain sovereignty on a smaller national scale but then you have to go and negotiate with China or the United States? Ok, good luck. But even France or Germany and I often say – I apologise, they must have heard me saying this a lot of the time – European countries are divided in two kinds: the small ones and the ones that have not yet realised they are small in the world of today. I am afraid that this is also true for other places that are a bit bigger, but still need friends, because in the world of today alone you do not go far.

So, I think and often say this, the only way for Europeans to regain sovereignty is through the European Union, through our unity, because this increases our weight. I give you one last example: trade. I know it is not nuclear security related, but do you allow me? I know it sounds strange here that single Member States of the European Union cannot negotiate a trade agreement bilaterally with a third country. This is a common decision we have taken. Why? Because we are much stronger if we negotiate a trade agreement at 28. We are the biggest market in the world, so when we negotiate at 28 or even in the future at 27 we will be the biggest market in the world. We negotiate from a position of strength so it is a matter of being at a negotiating table with more instruments to get a better deal. Obviously, the ones sitting at the other side of the table negotiating the deal might be interested in splitting us but it is not in our interest to split and this should be quite easy to understand. So that is why it is not giving up the sovereignty: it is exercising our sovereignty together which makes us stronger in the world.

Keynote

Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission

Moderator

Dr. Karen Donfried 

Keynote

Christopher Ford is the senior director for weapons of mass destruction and Counterproliferation on the National Security Council staff. 

Moderator

Robert J Einhorn, Brookings Insitution

Transcript forthcoming

Polling Question

What is the likelihood that, within the next two years, Russia and the United States will extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) or negotiate a replacement strategic arms control agreement?

Number of respondents: 143
Audience average: 30%
Audience standard deviation: 25%

This poll was taken during the conference but was not specifically linked to this session.

Keynote

Tim Kaine represents Virginia in the United States Senate, in which he serves on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. Before he was elected to the Senate in 2012, he served as governor of Virginia.

Transcript forthcoming

The global discourse about nuclear weapons tends to focus on broad cross-regional groups: nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear-weapon states, the non-aligned movement, U.S. allies. These groupings often obscure more than they reveal about the views and policies of the states that comprise them, particularly at a regional level. What security threats do states in different regions perceive to be most important? What implications do – and, as importantly, should – differences in security perception have for policy on disarmament and nonproliferation, including the proposed nuclear weapon ban and on extended nuclear deterrence? To what extent can risk reduction measures developed in one regional context, such as nuclear weapon free zones or conventional arms control arrangements, be applied to others?

Moderator

Joan Rohlfing, Nuclear Threat Initiative

Panelists

Rafael Grossi, ambassador of the Argentine Republic and permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna
Henk cor van der Kwast, ambassador of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament
Richard Sadleir, first assistant secretary in the International Security Division, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Due to technical issues, audio is not available for this panel. We apologize for the inconvenience. 

Polling Question

Did the failure to agree on a consensus final document at the 2015 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference have a material effect on the long-term sustainability of the nonproliferation regime?

Number of respondents: 158

This poll was taken during the conference but was not specifically linked to this session.

Hosted by the Center for Science and Security Studies, King's College London 

The teaching of both theory and empirics can contribute to policymaking and, hopefully, to cultivating future policymakers. The previous decade, in particular, has seen a rise in post-graduate academic programs focused on nuclear issues, which include activities such as crisis simulations and policy analysis. This event will provide an overview of such programs, and explore how new approaches to nuclear education can help address specific policy challenges. Former and current students of nuclear education programs are particularly welcome to attend to discuss and draw lessons from their experiences. Policy experts and practitioners are also encouraged to participate to identify gaps between theory and policymaking and suggest how education programs can help to fill them. 

Moderator

Angela Schlater, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

Panelists

​Jennie Gromoll, Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, U.S. Department of State 
William Potter, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
Kenan Ünlü,  Radiation Science and Engineering Center and College of Engineering, Penn State 
Heather Williams, King's College London

Hosted by Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not define the term “nuclear weapon” or identify the evidence that would determine whether a state is seeking to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. For six years, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has been developing an analytic framework for demarcating activities and programs that are exclusively nuclear-weapons-related from others, in accordance with NPT obligations. This approach—a nuclear firewall—utilizes pertinent indicators relating to materials, equipment, activities, and contextual factors that delineate peaceful from nuclear weapons activities. Carnegie’s aim with the firewall concept is to enable greater confidence in civil nuclear technology cooperation; to provide timely warning of proliferation concerns in order to facilitate diplomacy; to indicate steps states could take to reassure others about the peaceful nature of a program; and, relatedly, to provide a detailed template for nuclear disarmament. At this session, Carnegie will release a paper on the nuclear firewall concept, and experts will discuss its potential contribution to the implementation of all three pillars of the NPT.

Moderator

George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists

Jim Casterton, Independent Consultant
Ariel (Eli) Levite, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Sonia Fernández Moreno, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
 

What are the most likely scenarios for the first use of nuclear weapons in the next five years on the NATO-Russia periphery, in South Asia, and in Northeast Asia? What is the likelihood that nuclear first use in these scenarios would result in humanitarian disaster? And, what are the key drivers that could increase or decrease the likelihood of first use? Assumptions about the answers to these questions underlie every debate about deterrence and disarmament—yet, analysts rarely make them explicit, let alone debate them. This session aims to fill that gap and hence clarify some of the conceptual confusion that impedes consensus on how best to reduce nuclear risks.

Moderator

Scott Sagan, Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University

Panelists

Alexey Arbatov, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
Jüri Luik, International Center for Defense and Security
Vipin Narang, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Caitlin Talmadge, George Washington University

Transcript forthcoming

Polling Question

What is the likelihood that, within the next decade, a nuclear weapon will be detonated as an act of war or as the result of an accident?

Number of respondents: 63

This poll was taken during the conference but was not specifically linked to this session.

Cyber operations, particularly against critical civilian infrastructure, military forces, or strategic command-and-control systems, are widely assumed to pose new escalation risks, which may, in extreme situations, include nuclear use. How might the proliferation of offensive cyber capabilities be strategically destabilizing? How might these risks be mitigated? More specifically, what are the implications of cyber threats to strategic command-and-control systems? What are the best ways to prevent and deter such threats? Finally, how relevant are nuclear-derived theories of deterrence to the challenges of using cyber means to influence adversaries’ conduct—not only in cyberspace, but also in the realms of terrorism, political repression, nuclear proliferation, or interference in elections?  

Moderator

Michèle Flournoy, Center for a New American Security

Panelists 

Emily Goldman, Director, U.S. Cyber Command/National Security Agency Combined Action Group
Sir David Omand, King’s College London 
Xu Manshu, National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army

Under article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states are required to accept IAEA safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to non-peaceful uses. Since the 1990s, the IAEA has become increasingly focused on the detection of non-declared activities, including in states without an additional protocol in force. How far should the IAEA go in this regard? Should non-nuclear-weapon states provide greater access to their nuclear activities, particularly fuel-cycle activities, in the future? Will they? How should the IAEA and member states respond to concerns that safeguards judgments might be influenced by high politics and become more subjective and perhaps even discriminatory?   

Moderator

​Mark Hibbs, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists

Jill Cooley, Y-12 National Security Complex
Sonia Fernández Moreno, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
Gennady Pshakin, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering
 

Three nuclear-armed states never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—India, Israel, and Pakistan. In recent years, they have enhanced their participation in international nuclear governance efforts in ways that blur the distinction between treaty members and non-members. In areas such as export control and nuclear security, these states now implement policies and practices largely consistent with the nonproliferation “mainstream.”  In 2016, India and Pakistan applied for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which has required prospective members to be signatories to the NPT, raising further questions about the practical significance of treaty membership. Does such “mainstreaming” strengthen or weaken the global nuclear order? Should non-NPT states be invited to join the NSG and similar multilateral arrangements, and if so, on what basis? If not, what incentives exist for non-NPT states to strengthen their nuclear security, safety, and export control practices?

Moderator

Magnus Hellgren, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Panelists

Federico Merke, Universidad de San Andrés
Gil Reich, Israel Atomic Energy Commission
Manpreet Sethi, Center for Air Power Studies
Sadia Tasleem, Quaid-i-Azam University

Polling Question

Apart from adherence to NSG guidelines, what is the most important criterion for non-NPT states to join the NSG?

Number of respondents: 69

Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contain states’ fundamental nonproliferation obligations and are intended to outlaw the further spread of nuclear weapons without impeding the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Despite a remarkable track record of success, however, these articles do not explicitly demarcate the boundary between peaceful and military uses. Has this omission actually been a problem? If so, is it possible to demarcate that boundary more clearly? Might new technologies, such as additive manufacturing, further blur it?

Moderator

Tristan Volpe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists 

Patricia Flor, German Federal Foreign Office
Kazuko Hikawa, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Li Bin, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Countries planning to build their first nuclear power reactors face the challenge of developing domestic regulatory regimes for nuclear security and nonproliferation. Compounding this challenge, there are no universally accepted standards for nuclear security. Furthermore, in terms of nonproliferation, the additional protocol is optional even while there are significant variations in domestic material accountancy and control systems. What measures should nuclear newcomers take to mitigate nuclear security and proliferation risks? What nuclear security and nonproliferation standards should they follow? Can or should the governments of vendors that export reactors to nuclear newcomers—particularly Russia, South Korea, and perhaps in the future, China—do more to encourage newcomers to adopt high standards? Should recipients’ adherence to stringent safeguards and security practices be a condition of supply? 

Moderator

Togzhan Kassenova, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists

Nilsu Gören, University of Maryland
Francesca Giovannini, American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
Laura Holgate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Ta Minh Tuan, Vietnam Fatherland Front

Cross-border terrorism and low-intensity conflict between India and Pakistan along the Line of Control in Kashmir continue to create the risk of a crisis. While warfare in South Asia that could escalate to nuclear use is obviously risky, is making peace between India and Pakistan also too risky for political leaders? How do media organizations in India and Pakistan amplify or ameliorate the propensity for conflict escalation? Which actors in both countries successfully utilize media to mobilize political movements, either for bellicosity or for peacemaking? And what do political trends indicate about the potential for military conflict in the near future?

Moderator

Toby Dalton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists

Shashank Joshi, Royal United Services Institute
Smita Sharma, India Today TV
Huma Yusuf, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Polling Question

What is the likelihood that, by March 20, 2019, India and Pakistan will have resumed a comprehensive dialogue?

Number of respondents: 67
Audience average: 37%
Audience standard deviation: 23%

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—aka the Iran Nuclear Deal—represented the most consequential development in nuclear diplomacy in decades. While its implementation has proceeded smoothly to date, its future is uncertain. As a candidate, U.S. President Donald Trump described the deal as “disastrous,” and variously threatened to “dismantle” it, “renegotiate” it, and “police [it] so tough that they don’t have a chance.” Moreover, the new Congress might impose additional sanctions on Iran. Even if nominally unrelated to its nuclear program, Tehran would doubtless claim that these sanctions were a violation of the deal. The possibility of noncompliance by Iran, not to mention its own domestic politics and regional policies, creates further risks to deal. What are the deal’s prospects? What is the best way to manage its implementation and the pressures facing it?

Moderator

 Kim Ghattas, BBC

Panelists

Yousef Al Otaiba, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates to the United States
Yukiya Amano, International Atomic Energy Agency
Baroness Catherine Ashton, University of Warwick
Ariel (Eli) Levite, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Transcript available here

 

Hosted by Alexandra Bell and Heather Williams

Despite great advances, women are still underrepresented in the field of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policy. In this session, participants will break into small groups and discuss the challenges facing women in this area. The groups will then try to identify concrete actions to advance gender parity. These suggestions will be collated by Women in International Security with the goal of facilitating an on-going, long-term discussion. This session, to which men are welcome, is intended to provide a forum where experts from across the WMD-policy community at all career levels can work collaboratively to address a shared challenge. 

Moderators

Alexandra Bell, Independent Consultant
Chantal De Jonge Oudraat, Women in International Security
Heather Williams, King’s College London

Hosted by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) marked its twentieth anniversary in 2016. The Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation invited current and former diplomats, practitioners, and nongovernmental experts to provide authoritative and critical assessments of the history, evolution, and implementation of the treaty. The purpose of these essays is to stimulate discussion about creative and pragmatic ways for overcoming the existing hurdles to the CTBT’s entry into force. These contributions appear as a special section of the latest issue of the Nonproliferation Review, a peer-reviewed journal produced by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Moderator

Joshua H. Pollack, Nonproliferation Review

Panelists

Jenny Nielsen, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission
Jenifer Mackby, Federation of American Scientists
Laura Rockwood, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Forecasting the future is a notoriously difficult but necessary part of policymaking. Using our conference app, this session harnessed both expert judgement and the wisdom of crowds to gather opinions in real time about the global nuclear future. Topics included the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the future of the putative nuclear ban treaty. The results of a similar forecasting exercise at the 2015 conference were also be revealed. 

Moderator

James M. Acton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists

Angela Kane, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation
Laura Kennedy, World Affairs Council
Bruno Tertrais, Foundation for Strategic Research
Ramesh Thakur, Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Australian National University

Results

Before the session, the panelists responded to six forecasting questions about nuclear events over the next two years. During the session, the audience responded to the same questions using the conference app. Here are all the forecasts, which we will compare to reality at the 2019 conference:

What is the likelihood that, by 21 March 2019, the United Nations General Assembly will have adopted a treaty to ban nuclear weapons? 

Panelists’ responses

Kane: 75%
Kennedy: 90%
Tertrais: 90%
Thakur: 60%
Panelists’ average: 79%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 12%

Audience responses

Number of respondents: 281

Audience average: 33%
Audience standard deviation: 30%

What is the likelihood that, by 21 March 2019, India will be a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group? 

Panelists’ responses

Kane: 55%
Kennedy: 40%
Tertrais: 10%
Thakur: 15%
Panelists’ average: 30%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 18%

Audience responses

Number of respondents: 266

Audience average: 40%
Audience standard deviation: 24%

What is the likelihood that, by 21 March 2019, one or more of the parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will have renounced or suspended participation in the agreement?

Panelists’ responses

Kane: 15%
Kennedy: 35%
Tertrais: 30%
Thakur: 20%
Panelists’ average: 25%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 8%

Audience responses

Number of respondents: 249

Audience average:  31%
Audience standard deviation: 22%

What is the likelihood that, by 21 March 2019, the United States government will have publicly assessed that North Korea has deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or both?

Panelists’ responses

Kane: 85%
Kennedy: 60%
Tertrais: 25%
Thakur: 35%
Panelists’ average: 51%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 23%

Audience responses

Number of respondents: 236

Audience average: 52%
Audience standard deviation: 27%

What is the likelihood that, by 21 March 2019, Russia and/or the United States will have renounced or suspended participation in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty?

Panelists’ responses

Kane: 60%
Kennedy: 60%
Tertrais: 45%
Thakur: 50%
Panelists’ average: 54%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 6%

Audience responses

Number of respondents: 217

Audience average: 41%
Audience standard deviation: 24%

What is the likelihood that, by 21 March 2019, the United States will have adopted an explicit policy of developing ballistic missile defenses to defend the U.S. homeland against China?

Panelists’ responses

Kane: 10%
Kennedy: 20%
Tertrais: 20%
Thakur: 30%
Panelists’ average: 20%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 7%

Audience responses

Number of respondents: 211

Audience average: 28%
Audience standard deviation: 23%

Results from 2015  

We conducted a similar exercise at the 2015 conference. Here are the forecasts by the panelists and the audience, as well as the actual outcomes.

Is there a likelihood of more than 50% that, by March 24, 2017, either Russia or the United States will suspend its participation in, withdraw from, or announce its intention to withdraw from either the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) or the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty?

Outcome: No

Panelists
Yes: 2
No: 2

Audience
Yes: 38%
No: 62%

Is there a likelihood of more than 50% that, by March 24, 2017, India will become a participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group?

Outcome: No

Panelists
Yes: 1
No: 3

Audience
Yes: 37%
No: 63%

Is there a likelihood of more than 50% that, by March 24, 2017, North Korea will conduct at least one more nuclear test?

Outcome: Yes

Panelists
Yes: 3
No: 1

Audience
Yes: 91%
No: 9%

Is there a likelihood of more than 50% that, by March 24, 2017, at least one Annex II state that has yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty will do so? 

Outcome: No

Panelists
Yes: 0
No: 4

Audience
Yes: 37%
No: 63%

The 2017 Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award was presented to Catherine McArdle Kelleher.

The award is offered every other year to an individual who has rendered exceptional service to the nongovernmental nuclear policy community. While exceptional service includes major intellectual contributions to critical debates, it also encompasses the time-consuming and often unrecognized work needed to sustain and strengthen our community: mentoring young women and men, constructively critiquing the work of others, creating fora for discussion, and building networks. Such activities benefit the community as a whole in its efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. Importantly, the award is also intended to recognize individuals who, through friendship, collegiality, and respect, help mold a collection of individual researchers into a community worthy of the name.

In short, the award recognizes exceptional creativity, integrity, humanity, and amity—four qualities embodied by Thérèse Delpech, a long-time strategic adviser to the French Atomic Energy Commission, an author, and a distinguished public intellectual. Thérèse passed away in January 2012; as we planned our 2013 conference we realized that she would be sorely missed, and that one way to celebrate her life would be to establish an award in her name.

Previous winners of the award are Michael Krepon (2015) and Amb. Linton F. Brooks (2013).

The 2017 award was decided by an adjudication panel consisting of two Carnegie staff members and three external experts. Except for members of this panel and current employees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, anyone involved in nuclear policy anywhere in the world is eligible for the award.

The award was presented at the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference.

The administrations of U.S. presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama failed to stop North Korean efforts to develop nuclear warheads and long-range missiles. While it is easy to criticize both administrations’ approaches, it is much harder to articulate an effective policy for the future. Are there any credible diplomatic approaches to containing North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs? Should the United States pursue a peace treaty with North Korea in return for denuclearization as part of a grand bargain? Would a more limited approach—such as a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests in exchange for aid—be achievable? Should the United States and its partners try to squeeze North Korea further financially? If so, how? Finally, should the United States and the Republic of Korea further bolster their defenses and alter their military strategy?

Moderator

Joshua Pollack, Nonproliferation Review

Panelists

Andrea Berger, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
Jina Kim, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University

Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and…information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Many technology holders believe that in enacting this provision they are entitled—indeed, are required—to balance the benefits of cooperation against the risks of proliferation. Would-be recipients, by contrast, often argue that restrictions on cooperation are excessive and contravene both the spirit and the letter of the treaty. What restrictions on trade are reasonable for technology holders to impose? Are existing national and multilateral export control policies too restrictive? Or not restrictive enough? Can suppliers and recipients cooperate to enable fuller nuclear exchange in ways that do not exacerbate proliferation risks?

Moderator

Caroline Jorant, SDRI Consulting

Panelists

Layla Dawood, State University of Rio de Janeiro
Ariel (Eli) Levite, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Tom Moore, Independent Consultant

A rapidly changing world continues to challenge existing notions of nuclear deterrence. Newly exacerbated territorial disputes are increasing geopolitical tensions involving nuclear-armed powers and their allies, as well as sparking new debate about the role of nuclear weapons in preventing these tensions from spilling over into war. Many leaders, some newly minted, are increasingly assertive but have never experienced nuclear crises. Meanwhile, new technologies—nuclear and non-nuclear, kinetic and non-kinetic, manned and unmanned, deployed and under development—could have significant implications for nuclear operations. How best can these trends be managed to prevent crisis escalation, nuclear use, and large-scale war?

Moderator

Elaine Bunn, Independent Consultant

Panelists

Charles Glaser, George Washington University
Kadri Liik, European Council on Foreign Relations 
Tong Zhao, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy
 

Two different approaches for pursuing the nuclear disarmament goal enshrined in article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are currently being advanced. A step-by-step approach has historically received broad support, but some non-nuclear-weapon states are increasingly unsatisfied with what they view as a lack of progress. Some of these states see an alternative approach—seeking a legal prohibition on nuclear weapons—as an increasingly necessary step to break the logjam. Negotiations on such a ban will begin in 2017. What are the consequences of these developments for the nuclear order? Is there any way to bridge the gap between these seemingly contradictory visions? What role can and should non-nuclear-weapon states play in disarmament?

Moderator

Marjolijn Van Deelen, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Panelists

Susan Burk, Independent Consultant
Beatrice Fihn, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Dell Higgie, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Transcript available here

Polling Question

What policy should the United States adopt toward the upcoming negotiations over a treaty to ban nuclear weapons?

Number of respondents: 41

This poll was taken during the conference but was not specifically linked to this session.

AGENDA

Event 1

Assessing the Policy Implications of Nuclear and Missile Technology
Young Professionals Track Roundtable

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave NW
Sunday, March 19th, 2017
1:00 to 6:00 p.m.

12:30 p.m.
Registration Begins

1:00 to 1:10 p.m.
Welcome Remarks
Tristan Volpe, Toby Dalton, and Rebecca Hersman

Nuclear Arsenals: Understanding the Technical Foundations
1:10 to 2:10 p.m.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Weapons Technology
George Anzelon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
2:10 to 3:10 p.m.
Ballistic Missile Technology
Geoffrey Ethan Forden, Sandia National Laboratory
3:10 to 3:30 p.m.
Break

Breakout Policy Discussions
3:30 to 5:00 p.m.
Group A: Inhibiting the Spread of Sensitive Nuclear Technology
Moderated by Tristan Volpe
Group B: Responding to Regional Development of Missile Technology
Moderated by Heather Williams
Group C: Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Enterprise and Strategic Deterrent
Moderated by Rebecca Hersman

5:00 to 6:00 p.m.
Reception

Event 2

Mentoring Lunch

Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center
1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Monday, March 20th, 2017
12:15 to 1:30 p.m.

Those of you who registered for the mentoring session will receive table assignment cards in you name badge when you register for the conference. Each table will be seated with eight young professionals and two experts from the field. The discussion will be informal and up to the discretion of those seated at the table. 

Event 3

Communicating Science to Policy Makers and the Interested Public

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave NW
Wednesday, March 22nd, 2017
9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

Drawing on more than seventy years of experience, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists will host a workshop on “Communicating Science to Policy Makers and the Interested Public.”  Supported in part by the MacArthur Foundation, this daylong workshop is the fifth of six workshops that the Bulletin has hosted across the United States. It is geared toward helping emerging scientists and security leaders make their research findings accessible to those who need it most.

This workshop seeks to encourage participants to engage policy makers and the general public. It offers tips and insights into writing for a public audience, using social media, and other media platforms to advance ideas central to today’s most consequential debates. It is designed to encourage participants to develop and try out new communication skills, and connect their research findings to those outside their field of expertise. Pre-registration is required as seats are limited. The morning will be devoted to plenary sessions, and the afternoon is organized around one-on-one coaching sessions with Bulletin editors and invited guests.  This workshop is put together in partnership by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Please note that due to overwhelming interest, we have closed registration for the Young Professionals Track. However, we are happy to include you on the waiting list and will provide final confirmation of your participation by March 10. If this is of interest to you, be sure to check the box for “Young Professionals Track” when registering for the conference!