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A close look at official statements, interviews, and developments related to nuclear weapons provide substantive clues about the contours of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine in practice
Pakistan’s nuclear posture and the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have been subjects of considerable speculation and debate since Pakistan first tested nuclear weapons, and increasingly so in recent years.
A prerequisite to building an effective anticorruption approach is an intimate—and unflinching—examination of the specifics of corrupt operations in the individual country of interest and its physical and electronic neighborhoods.
In the current environment, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan in response to India’s limited war strategy is only a means of reinforcing deterrence and enhancing stability at the higher level of conflict by inducing instability at the lower levels.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was the latest step in Moscow’s long process of rejection of the post–Cold War Euro-Atlantic security order, reflecting a deeply held view that is unlikely to change anytime soon.
Unless India’s conventional and nuclear commands closely coordinate their operations planning, an Indian nuclear response threatens either to be unsuccessful or to escalate out of control.
China has a choice to make to ensure that its sea-based nuclear capability can be a helpful addition to its existing nuclear deterrent without destabilizing regional security.
Given the substantial tensions concerning the unresolved Sino-Indian border issue, China’s perception of India as a nuclear weapons power is important not only for the future evolution of the international nuclear regime but also for the ongoing Sino-Indian security situation.
India’s nuclear deterrence policy should work in parallel along twin tracks: continuing to enhance the quality of India’s nuclear deterrence while simultaneously working to achieve total nuclear disarmament in the shortest possible time frame.
Though there continue to be significant disagreements within the Indian strategic community about many elements of nuclear doctrine, the debate no longer produces new ideas about how to deal with the most pressing dilemma that New Delhi faces: countering Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons.