Success in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without making governance rather than security the top priority, according to Sarah Chayes, an adviser to former ISAF Commander General David McKiernan. Chayes has run a cooperative encouraging the production of licit crops in Kandahar since 2002 and covered the fall of the Taliban for NPR prior to that. Chayes shared on-the-ground insights during a conversation moderated by George Perkovich.
Chayes emphasized that even though the violence in Afghanistan is lower than Iraq in 2006, years of war coupled with the Taliban’s violent resurgence have thoroughly traumatized the Afghan population. Property destruction, though it gets less attention in the international media, is a key tool the Taliban use to create an atmosphere of fear. The Taliban use violence strategically to convince the local population that every interaction with the government threatens their personal safety or that of their family—which explains why villagers are often unwilling to volunteer intelligence information, particularly about where improvised explosive devices (IED) are located.
Success in Afghanistan will also require debunking persistent myths about Afghanistan:
Afghanistan is an irrevocably tribal country that has never had a functional central government. Afghan tribal social organization does not exist in opposition to national loyalties: Afghans are loyal to both tribe and country.
Afghans are a purely ideological people. The Taliban’s rise was not an ideological revolution, it was the only alternative available to a people desperate for a functioning government. In fact, Chayes was offered the leadership of a shura despite being a foreigner and a woman, because the population believed that she could satisfy local governance needs. Afghans’ experience of bad governance is being repeated under the Karzai government.
Afghans don’t want our interference. People in Afghanistan want the international coalition, which has upset the domestic balance of power, to level the playing field between political forces.
Other on-the-ground insights:
Rather than debating whether or not negotiating with the Taliban is a good idea, the coalition must find ways to improve local and national governance. The insurgency is caused in large part by dissatisfaction with the chaotic Karzai government. Talk of reconciling with the Taliban makes many Afghans fear that the coalition will abandon them.
Afghans have been disappointed by the lower-the-bar rhetoric from the Obama administration in early 2009. The idea that Afghanistan is not ready for democracy is insulting.
Victory in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without a large-scale, long-term commitment, or by simply focusing on Pakistan. The key lessons from the counterinsurgency in Iraq—that intelligence assets should be used to protect the population—apply to Afghanistan, though they will not guarantee success.
The August 2009 presidential elections may be manipulated. Voter registration cards can be easily purchased, and many government officials explicitly acknowledge that their goal is to re-elect Karzai. The U.S. military should actively report electoral fraud, to show that there are consequences for government officials who manipulate elections.
Increasing the civilian presence could dramatically improve governance in the country. Chayes recommended sending 3,000 civilian mentors to assist the judicial system and public administration outgrow ingrained habits developed during the years of war and instability.
2009 is a make-or-break year for Afghanistan. Afghans do not necessarily oppose foreign troops but, increasingly frustrated by poor governance, are likely to become war weary even before Americans do, reducing the timeframe for improvement in the security situation.