This January, Donald J. Trump will return to office as the forty-seventh president of the United States of America. SoutheastAsianleaders were quick to congratulatehim on his electoral victory but the region is already bracing for Washington’s return to an America First policy. The specter of both targeted and universal tariffs and a hawkish China position will reverberate throughout Asia.

These opening salvos are reminiscent of some discomfiting aspects of the first Trump administration, when U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia was overwhelmingly refracted through the lens of China. But Southeast Asia’s propensity for pragmatism aligns with Trump’s transactional tendencies, so a deal is always possible even if approaches drastically diverge. Indonesia’s former foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, maintained that the United States was one of Indonesia’s “most important partners” when welcoming then secretary of state Mike Pompeo on his stop to Jakarta as part of a four-nation tour of Asia to discuss “how free nations can work together to thwart threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.”

Additionally, there is a pronounced preference for President-elect Donald Trump’s leadership among some in Southeast Asia. Despite the first Trump administration’s tough rhetoric against Vietnam for the country’s persistently large trade surpluses with the United States, recent polls by Vietnamese media in the run-up to the 2024 U.S. election showed respondents strongly favoring Trump to win over Vice President Kamala Harris.

However, it is important to note that Southeast Asia has also undergone leadership changes of its own, and the region—indeed, the world—is markedly different from when Trump left office four years ago. All five countries featured in this compilation—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam—have new leaders. At least three of those heads of government—Indonesia’s newly elected president, Prabowo Subianto, Malaysia’s prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, and the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos Jr.—have adopted an activist foreign policy compared to their predecessors.

Southeast Asian countries, long adept at navigating and leveraging major power competition for their own interests, are also demonstrating greater independence and confidence in engaging with newer partners through multilateral forums. Indonesia became Southeast Asia’s first member of BRICS in the first week of 2025 while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, all seeking expanded strategic maneuverability, are recently recognized BRICS partner countries.

Yet, all four countries have long-standing ties with the United States that they want to preserve, if not elevate. Prabowo, for example, traveled to the United States just weeks after he was sworn in to commemorate seventy-five years of bilateral relations between the United States and Indonesia. Although he had hoped to meet with Trump personally on his visit, the two leaders spoke warmly by telephone instead. Indonesia and the United States enjoy a newly upgraded comprehensive strategic partnership, as do Vietnam and the United States. Under Marcos Jr., Manila has been enjoying a revitalized alliance relationship with Washington and has developed closer security cooperation with other U.S. allies, including Japan and Australia.

The test for Southeast Asia’s ties with the United States will come during Trump’s first week back on the job, when he is expected to issue “a lot” of executive orders focusing on economics, energy, and immigration. To understand how countries in the region are thinking about the impact of the incoming U.S. administration on their respective priorities, Carnegie’s Asia Program invited authors from five Southeast Asian countries to respond in short-essay form to the prompt, “What does your country want from a new U.S. administration?” Authors were invited to write prior to the outcome of the November 2024 U.S. elections. As such, their viewpoints center their own country’s interests rather than the politics, policies, or personality of the American presidential candidates. The authors provide valuable insight into whether regional desires for enhanced ties with the United States can converge with the domestic imperatives of a newly elected administration in Washington.

Both the United States and Indonesia are beginning 2025 with new administrations. The new administration in the United States will surely determine the course of Indonesia’s strategic rivalry vis-à-vis China and could hugely impact the regional balance in Southeast Asia. Indonesia is wary of being further pushed or pulled in different directions, and Indonesia will remain “independent and active” as both great powers tighten their grips and spread their influence deeper into Indonesia.

The United States’ recent choices have made Indonesians wary about what it might become in the future.

First, the United States has begun to focus inward. In the past, it championed open multilateralism, free trade, and other universal norms and values that are believed to be key ingredients for maintaining international peace. But America today has become protectionist and narrow-minded. It is more interested in exclusive “minilateralism”—working only in small groups with like-mindedcountries that bandwagon with it. The United States appears more self-centered, transactional, and is only interested in working with selected countries depending on their relationship with China. This forces countries like Indonesia to choose between the two giants, even if they are reluctant to do so.

Second, the United States has been ambivalent in policy follow-through. A significant U.S. policy turnover was former president Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia, but Indonesia has questioned the concrete follow-up of this pivot. In 2022, the United States introduced a quite promising alternative economic framework—the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)—offering countries possibilities to also shape the framework. But Joe Biden’s administration has seemingly forgotten about the IPEF, and it will almost certainly be abandoned by Trump. As a result, Indonesia feels that America is still limiting its market access, a perception shared by many in Indonesia as the cost of Indonesia’s “choice” to deepen economic relations with China.

Third, America no longer champions democracy and human rights. The world, including the Indonesian public, is watching how democracy is backsliding in the United States, including the increasing racially charged sentiments that surged especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. More recently, the United States’ policy regarding Israel-Palestine and extending larger support to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy to annihilate Israel’s “enemies” through indiscriminate civilian killings hasangered the Indonesian public.

In this current environment, Indonesia hopes to see at least three things from the United States.

Indonesia wishes to see an America that genuinely listens and considers the region’s needs, focusing on common interests as the basis for strengthening the bilateral partnerships. Through deep understanding and dialogue, the United States should respect Indonesia’s choice to sustain an independent foreign policy free from external pressure.

Second, a committed United States, delivering results rather than fearmongering. If the United States is going to contest China, it must deliver on what it has promised to partners, particularly in terms of technological transfer and economic cooperation through better access to U.S. supplies and markets. At the same time, America must engage in healthy competition with China, taking concrete actions and investing resources into the region while not eschewing countries that are seeking to engage with all major powers. The U.S. policy to put extensive trade or technological barriers on China will ultimately harm other developing powers’ pursuit of economic growth. By doing so, instead of bringing a country like Indonesia closer to the United States, it is being pushed into China’s embrace.

Third, a U.S. foreign policy that champions democratic and human rights values at home and abroad. Privately, Indonesians are questioning what extra benefits they gain from the United States by being a fellow democracy. While Indonesians wish to see democracy—together with the rule of law and good governance—flourishing at home, they also hope for the United States to give room for the application of democratic processes at the international level where smaller powers can share their views on how the world should be governed. Moreover, they want the United States to remove its double-standard and condemn any countries, even allies, that blatantly violate democratic and human rights principles.

For the past two decades, as with every new U.S. administration, policymakers in Putrajaya will likely temper their outlook and play their cards carefully. That said, as one of Malaysia’s most important external partners, it is inevitable that a new U.S. administration, driven by evolving internal and external dynamics, triggers both fresh hopes and anxieties. Expectations of the new Donald Trump administration—or even a Kamala Harris administration, had she been elected—can be broadly parked under what Putrajaya hopes for but won’t get and what it will work to sustain.

What Putrajaya would prefer to see, but knows full well is unlikely to materialise, is a change in Washington’s acquiescence to Israel’s wholesale destruction of Gaza (and the West Bank and parts of Lebanon), a more constructive and inclusive U.S. approach to the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia, particularly in how Washington frames its dynamics with Beijing, and greater market access for Malaysian goods and services.

On the latter, American domestic politics make it unlikely that the Trump administration will give ground on more imports, especially to countries with which the United States has an existing trade deficit. While a change in Washington’s approach to the Middle East would significantly reduce domestic impediments faced by Malaysian policymakers in enhancing bilateral cooperation with the United States, previously articulated positions made by Trump makes this wishful thinking. Similarly, the broad consensus in Washington, across the mainstream of both political parties, openly treats China as an adversary which must be contained. This type of rhetoric is deeply concerning to Putrajaya which prioritizes relationships with both China and the United States, and prefers inclusive, cooperative mechanisms with competing powers as a more durable approach for security and stability.

That said, there are existing priorities which Putrajaya will hope to preserve, and even improve upon, with the Trump administration. Cooperation in economic, education, and defense sectors with the United States remains a significant priority for Malaysia, something that Malaysian policymakers deeply value, and hope will not be adversely impacted by the new administration.

In the defense sphere, for example, U.S. assistance has been crucial for Malaysia’s domain awareness and capacity upgrades. Washington’s approval will be necessary for the purchase of legacy F-18 fighter aircraft from Kuwait, as well as advanced U.S. equipment for additional fighters purchased from South Korea. Both are critical for Malaysia’s air force, which faces huge capability gaps.

On trade, U.S. companies have remained one of Malaysia’s largest sources of foreign direct investment, especially high-quality investments in the tech and semiconductor sectors, which are important to Malaysia’s long-term plans to upscale the economy. A major concern is that a second Trump administration might apply concentrated pressure on Malaysia to reduce its trade surplus, which stood at $35.2 billion as of 2022, similar to his first term.

Given the long heldnegative perceptions of the United States among the Malaysian electorate, no Malaysian leader can afford to be too cozy with Washington. Hence, Malaysian policymakers are relatively comfortable with the current status quo of the relationship—one that is functional and reaps dividends, especially between businesses and governments, but not high-profile enough like a treaty or major ally, to require constant senior political engagement. Whether this arrangement would be tolerated by the new Trump administration is something Putrajaya cannot take for granted.

It would be tempting, given the headlines over the past two years, to paint a picture of strained Malaysia-U.S. bilateral relations, and to project a similar hue on relations with the new administration. This need not necessarily be the case, if both Putrajaya and Washington can focus on the resilient aspects of ties, while compartmentalising the pressure points. This would require a clear, empathic, and rational assessment on how to preserve mutual interests instead of succumbing to sentiment and viewing the other through a biased lens. Malaysia has been able to do this quite well with other major powers, and the belief in Putrajaya is that it’s largely up to Washington, in this case, the Trump administration, to reciprocate.

While elections are an indicator of the vibrancy of democracy, changes in top leadership often translate to an oscillating foreign policy. In the Philippines, for instance, the Benigno Aquino administration from 2010 to 2016 took a firm stand against China’s moves in the South China Sea and filed an arbitration case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (which the Philippines won in 2016). In contrast, Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency from 2016 to 2022 saw a closer bilateral relationship with China and minimized the impact of maritime security and incursions in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. At present, breaking from Duterte, Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration has reinvigorated the country’s long-standing alliance with the United States.

As the U.S. transitions from Joe Biden’s presidency, changes in American foreign policy can be expected. Despite this, the Philippines’ interests remain the same: to preserve national security, promote economic security, and protect overseas Filipinos. Securing these interests will depend on the level of the domestic push to widen international partnerships and deepen the alliance with the United States. There are three scenarios in this regard.

Assuming domestic configurations align in the Philippines with the United States’ strategic interests, a convergence can be expected in both countries’ policies toward China. This scenario is in keeping with the raison d’être of alliances, that is, that allies are drawn closer by a common threat and such a relationship will exist if the threat remains. For example, an intensification of the U.S.-China trade war could mean an escalation in the Philippines’ assertive transparency in the West Philippine Sea, which would entail a more coordinated effort with other U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific. While some segments in the Philippines and the United States may welcome this scenario, policymakers should cautiously implement these measures. The gradation of moves can spiral to the point where policymakers feel that war may be the only option, and with the Philippines yet to complete the modernization of its armed forces, its military remains ill-prepared to provide support in a potential conflict with China.

A second scenario is also likely: a divergence. For instance, disagreements can occur on how to respond to China’s coercive measures. Similarly, there may be different interpretations of the extent of the commitments enshrined in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The failure to see eye to eye may result in the breakdown of the alliance. This can involve complicating factors like developments in Europe, the Middle East, a Taiwan contingency, or the turnout of the 2025 midterm elections in the Philippines. These factors could increase the likelihood of accidents and miscalculations, where actions potentially spiral out of control, and actors can be locked into path dependencies.

A third scenario in which the Philippines can achieve its foreign policy objectives under a new U.S. administration is where the dynamics are business as usual. As things currently stand with the incumbent Marcos presidency, the Philippines pursues a foreign policy that continues to internationalize maritime security. Thus, Marcos has actively reached out to partners and diversified the country’s international relations to garner broad support for the country’s territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea. In many of his engagements, Marcos anchored the Philippines’ concerns in international law and the necessity of defending the rules-based order. Framing the country’s issues as international issues rebuilds the Philippines’ credibility as a trustworthy member of the international community. Moreover, the relationships built and solidified could engender institutional memories that cushion the Philippines from any future policy divergences resulting from top leadership changes.

The Philippines’ core national interest remains regardless of leadership changes. However, it is in how foreign policy architects articulate objectives and implement measures that spell out various scenarios. In short, what the Philippines wants from a new U.S. administration depends largely on the alignment of their respective domestic configurations.

Thailand and the United States formalized relations in 1833 with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, making Thailand the United States’ oldest official ally in Asia. Over the past 191 years, the relationship between the two countries has fluctuated. The importance of the U.S. domestic political trajectory and its impact on Thai-U.S. relations has never been greater. This is further emphasized when considering the changing geopolitical dynamics in Asia, ongoing multitheater conflicts, and challenges in areas such as public health and trade. Thailand’s democratic backsliding and internal polarization complicate the relationship, requiring the United States to be more politically and economically astute. As a new administration prepares to take office in the United States, here are a few observations from Thailand that will contribute to improving Thai-U.S. relations.

First, the new administration needs to understand that Thailand is among the last frontiers against China’s dominance in mainland Southeast Asia. The United States cannot afford to let Thailand slip further into the Chinese sphere of influence like Cambodia, Laos, and, to some extent, Myanmar. Over the years, these countries have acted in ways that protect Chinese interests on various occasions. Privately, some foreign policy thinkers in Thailand already view their country as having a de facto border with China, given China’s significant influence over the Greater Mekong Subregion. The United States would benefit from adopting the same view as these analysts. From Thailand’s perspective, Washington has prioritized its relationships with the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam while neglecting its alliance with Thailand. For the past decade, Thai-U.S. relations have been put on the back burner due to the military junta that ruled until 2023. During this time, China developed a strong presence in Thailand, complicating a potential parting of ways between Thailand and China. Despite this complication, Washington could benefit from prioritizing its engagement with Thailand if it wants to maximize what this alliance could provide to American interests in the region.

Second, the new administration must realize that Thailand has one of the most promising democratic futures among all ASEAN countries. Unlike their peers in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, young Thais voted overwhelmingly for a party that espoused values of social democracy and human rights during the previous general election. Taking a transactional, interest-based approach to Thailand will erode the United States’ soft power and reputation among these voters. Moral values must remain at the center of how the United States conducts its relations with Thailand since the country’s future lies with its next generation of leaders, whose values are more progressive, pro-equality, and aligned with the fundamentals of human rights. Cultivating a relationship with Thailand’s future generations requires the United States to continue investing in the values that have also shaped America. Programs like the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative have proven highly effective as its alumni end up in important institutions and organizations all over Thailand. Therefore, continued advocacy for the rule of law and human rights is essential for the future of the U.S.-Thai alliance.

While geopolitical interests dictate that the United States needs to deepen its engagement with Thailand despite its democratic crisis, Thailand’s future generation suggests that the United States should consider adopting a values-based approach when engaging with Thailand as well. At first, these two approaches may seem to contradict each other, but this doesn’t have to be the case. Identifying like-minded individuals within a new cohort of elite circles and refraining from viewing all influential Thai institutions as monolithic will serve U.S. interests in Bangkok well. If forced to choose, the United States would be better off investing in the future rather than relying on an old military elite.

Third, trade wars will weaken Thai-U.S. relations and undermine security in the region. With the return of Donald Trump to the presidency, the national conversation in Thailand now revolves around predicting how U.S. trade policy will affect Thailand. Across Thailand’s political spectrum, people are questioning America’s commitment to trade, and this skepticism is not new. Many were uncertain about the direction and impact of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity introduced by Joe Biden’s administration. The new administration appears to be further dismissing the benefits of trade and even international cooperation altogether. But the United States cannot treat everyone as a potential trade adversary, as doing so would undermine its relationship with Asian countries. As a formal ally of the United States, Thailand will continue to weigh the costs imposed by any new trade policies, which could affect its commitment to security cooperation with the United States. From an economic perspective, the Trump administration should recognize that there is a strong desire in Thailand for further economic integration and investments from U.S. companies. There is much enthusiasm in Thailand for major investments from American companies, as demonstrated by recent initiatives from Microsoft, Google, and Nvidia.  Investments and improved trade relations with the U.S. are always welcome and mutually beneficial. For the Thai establishment, these moves represent the fulfillment of economic promises; while for young Thai people, they mean jobs. Building on these early successes over the next four years would strengthen Thai-U.S. relations and align their interests in the region.

Fourth, consistency in U.S. policy worldwide is essential to its soft power and influence in Thailand and the whole of Southeast Asia. Although the conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe may seem disconnected from Thailand and Southeast Asia, these events impact America’s credibility in the region. In Thailand, with a progressively minded younger population, more than 5 million Muslims, and an increasing number of political and economic refugees from Myanmar arriving in Thailand, the contrast between the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s defense and its comparatively lackluster response to civilian suffering in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict raises doubts about the U.S. commitment to peace, security, and harmony in the region. Leaders often make decisions based on comparisons and analogies. Thai and other ASEAN foreign policy thinkers notice the inconsistency in how the United States operationalizes its foreign policy and its espoused values for the so-called rules-based international order. As a result, Thailand, along with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, are considering potential geopolitical realignment by becoming partner countries in BRICS.  This reflects America’s eroding credibility and the perception of its commitments in the region. The incoming administration’s isolationist leanings won’t arrest or reverse this declining influence. Instead, the United States must continue to engage the region by having Trump physically present at multiple summits, and Washington must not sacrifice long-term credibility by prioritizing short-term interests.

As one of Vietnam’s most important and consequential strategic partners, the United States draws significant attention in Vietnam, especially during presidential election cycles. Regardless of the election outcome, Vietnam has specific expectations of the next U.S. administration to continue and strengthen this partnership.

Maintaining Momentum in Bilateral Relations

The Vietnam-U.S. relationship has undergone dramatic developments in recent years, highlighted by numerous high-level visits and the double upgrade to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during President Biden's visit to Vietnam in September 2023. A year later, there has been substantial progress, Vietnam hopes a new administration will continue to build on this momentum, invest in trust-building, and deepen bilateral ties.

Every U.S. president has visited Vietnam since diplomatic relations resumed in 1995. Vietnam will look forward to hosting a new U.S. president since such visits help build confidence in the relationship. The year 2025 marks the thirtieth anniversary of restored diplomatic ties and the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the “American War” (or the “Vietnam War” as it is called in America). Vietnam hopes these milestones will provide an opportunity to further strengthen relations, fostering reconciliation and cooperation in addressing the lingering impacts of the war.

Vietnam also expects the United States to continue viewing it as a viable economic partner, with investments in trade, technology, education, and human resource development. These areas are not only shared priorities but are also strategic sectors that enhance the U.S. footprint in the region while supporting Vietnam’s sustainable development and resilience.

Among Vietnam’s top priorities are partnerships in digitalization, the semiconductor industry, and emerging fields like artificial intelligence, renewable energy, critical infrastructure, and critical minerals. These sectors are the backbone of the future regional and global economy, and Vietnam hopes the new administration will not overlook its growing relevance in these areas.

In terms of security, Vietnam hopes to cooperate with the new administration on nontraditional security challenges, such as transnational crime and cybersecurity. Maritime security remains a critical concern for both Vietnam and the region. Vietnam expects the new administration to continue supporting regional capacity-building in areas like law enforcement, maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and humanitarian relief.

Supporting ASEAN Centrality and a Comprehensive Regional Approach

Vietnam hopes that the United States will maintain a coherent regional strategy that supports ASEAN centrality within the regional architecture. It is essential for a new U.S. administration not only to participate in key ASEAN meetings, such as the East Asia Summit, but also to avoid turning these platforms into a stage for major power competition. The U.S. endorsement of ASEAN's centrality will also be crucial for the organization in regional issues like the South China Sea, as well as sub-regional cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion and Myanmar.

In a broader sense, Vietnam expects the United States to engage the region with long-term strategic foresight, rather than being driven solely by short-term transactional interests. Vietnam also hopes the new administration will adopt a balanced approach to the region, that is, a strategy not only founded on security interests but also sound and sustainable economic engagement plans.

Above all, Vietnam wants the United States to serve as a force for peace and stability in the region by championing the rule of law, upholding the principles of the UN Charter, and pursuing consistent policies and actions.

Demonstrating Responsible Global Leadership

Vietnam views the United States as a major power with significant global responsibilities. It hopes the new administration will exercise this role responsibly by working with the international community to prevent further global divisions and fragmentation. Vietnam also hopes the United States will actively contribute to the peaceful resolution of global conflicts based on the principles of the UN Charter and established international norms.

As the world reaches a profound inflection point, the international community—including Vietnam—is watching the U.S. transition closely. A successful U.S. election and smooth transition matters not only to American citizens but also has global implications. Vietnam hopes that the next U.S. administration will bring stability, foster international cooperation, and engage with Vietnam and the region in a mutually beneficial way.