American Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Dominance, Diffusion, Adaptation offers a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of U.S. naval presence and strategy in one of the world’s most strategically significant regions. The book spans the Cold War era to the present day, traceing the trajectory of U.S. engagement in the Indian Ocean, examining the factors driving strategic shifts, security challenges, and evolving alliances. It investigates how the United States has transitioned from a posture of dominance to one of diffusion, engaging with regional partners to address emerging threats and seize opportunities. The book also looks at the rise of China and how it has impacted U.S. presence in a somewhat transformed region, the Indo-Pacific.

Carnegie India hosted Vivek Mishra for a discussion on his new book, moderated by Srinath Raghavan.

DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS

Evolution of U.S. Strategy in the Indian Ocean Region: Participants traced the evolution of the U.S. approach to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), dating back to its earliest naval presence in the 18th century. A major transformation occurred in the 1960s as Britains’s power declined in the region with decolonization and it helped pave the way for American primacy through a process of calculated and calibrated coordination. It was a gradual transfer of responsibility rather than an abrupt handover, including joint surveys that ultimately led to the establishment of bases such as Diego Garcia. The Cold War marked the most decisive phase of U.S. involvement in the IOR and established its centrality to the region’s power structure. Yet, participants acknowledged that each U.S. president pursued a distinct approach. The Eisenhower Doctrine avoided deep military engagement in the region, while President Nixon emphasized the responsibility of regional actors for their own security. By contrast, the Carter Doctrine marked a decisive turning point, declaring the Persian Gulf a vital U.S. security interest in 1980. This stance was shaped by a series of consequential developments—the Ogaden War of 1977, and a cluster of destabilizing events in 1979, including the Iranian Revolution, the bombing of Mecca, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that brought USSR much closer to the region.

Post-Cold War Strategy and Strategic Partnerships: Participants noted that U.S. presence in the IOR reached its peak in the post-Cold War era, especially in the Western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Its strategy shifted to focus more on non-traditional threats such as terrorism, piracy, and proliferation, especially of nuclear material. Additionally, the U.S. increasingly acted within multilateral frameworks like the Combined Maritime Forces and introduced initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative, Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and Proliferation Security Initiative. Thus, participants emphasized that this period reflected a broader shift towards the “diffusion” of security. Over the years, while the distinct approach of each president has varied, there has been an emphasis on burden-sharing and encouraging regional countries to take greater responsibility. Moreover, China’s growing maritime presence led the United States to expand its focus from the Indian Ocean to the wider Indo-Pacific, combining both regions into a larger strategic framework. The United States developed key partnerships, most notably with India, Pakistan, and Australia. Given India’s centrality and naval strength, India and the United States began Exercise Malabar in 1992 and have a strategic partnership with collaboration on technology transfers under the Major Defense Partner framework. In the Cold War context, the United States engaged with the Pakistan Navy through multilateral organizations such as Central Treaty Organization and occasionally bilaterally, including through the Inspired Union exercise. Australia became consequential for the United States because of its geographical location which facilitated the operation of the U.S. navy in the IOR. Additionally, with the global war on terror, the security of the sea lines of communication became a central imperative for U.S.-Australia collaboration.

Contemporary Strategy and Uncertainties: Participants discussed that in the contemporary context, there is increasing onus on regional partners to “step-up” on matters of balance and security in the Indo-Pacific, and that U.S. strategy has emphasized diffusion. A great churn is underway in IOR strategy under the second Trump administration, most visibly in the pressure being exerted on Britain not to cede Diego Garcia. This approach would effectively dissociate the “Indo” dimension from the broader Indo-Pacific collective strategy, prioritizing the Indian Ocean as a distinct strategic theatre. It would entail a grand bargain approach with China, which, given Beijing’s expanding maritime behavior, has lowered the likelihood of a carrier strike group transiting the Taiwan Strait. Unlike in the 1970s, the United States is now the world’s largest crude oil producer. With India specifically, the United States aims to significantly expand its energy exports. During the current crisis, for instance, at least six LPG tankers have already docked at the Mangalore port from American suppliers, and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has signaled readiness to supply as much energy as India can absorb. The Trump administration has therefore emphasized Mediterranean-Indo-Pacific connectivity as central to securing its energy and financial interests.

This summary was prepared by Vrinda Sahai, research analyst, and Swasti Sachdeva, research assistant and program coordinator, with the Security Studies Program at Carnegie India.