Since the United States and the Soviet Union acquired the nuclear bomb in the 1940s, common wisdom has been that each new proliferator would trigger its regional rivals and competitors to follow suit. Yet the incidence of such reactive proliferation is low. Scholars typically attribute this gap between expectation and reality to resource constraints and potential backlash from powerful allies and adversaries. These factors, however, only focus on the cost of nuclear pursuit. 

In his co-authored paper, titled “The Cost of Restraint: India's Divergent Responses to China and Pakistan as Nuclear Rivals”, Yogesh Joshi focuses on the other side of the equation—the cost of nuclear restraint or not pursuing the bomb, which derives from a state’s assessment of the degree of nuclear threat that a rival poses. States are more likely to reactively proliferate when a proliferating rival has extensive aims and inferior conventional capabilities, factors that combine to make nuclear restraint costlier than the actual pursuit of the bomb. The study demonstrates this theoretical insight’s validity using interviews and new archival evidence pertaining to India’s divergent assessments of China and Pakistan as nuclear threats. Its findings address the long-standing puzzle of why India did not pursue nuclear weapons in response to China’s rapid nuclearization in the 1960s but acquired them in the late 1980s in response to Pakistan’s acquisition. 

Carnegie India hosted Yogesh Joshi for a discussion on “The Cost of Restraint: India’s Divergent Responses to China and Pakistan as Nuclear Rivals” at the Security Studies Seminar. The discussion was moderated by Srinath Raghavan.

DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS

The cost of restraint in nuclear decision-making: Participants explored nuclear decision-making by moving beyond conventional explanations that focus primarily on the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons and, instead, discussed the cost of restraint. They noted that acquiring nuclear weapons imposes substantial financial, technological, diplomatic, reputational, and military costs, including the possibility of sanctions, international isolation, and preventive action by other states. However, the decision to remain non-nuclear also carries potential costs when a state perceives that restraint could undermine its fundamental security. Therefore, states weigh the cost of pursuing a nuclear capability against the prospective cost of restraint, with the latter determined by how threatening a rival’s nuclear capability is perceived. Participants emphasized that the mere existence of a nuclear rival does not determine proliferation, rather, the perceived aims and relative conventional capabilities of that rival shape whether nuclear weapons are viewed as necessary, superfluous, or coercive. They agreed that nuclear proliferation should be understood as a political decision shaped by changing assessments of the relative costs of pursuit and restraint, rather than as an automatic response to the emergence of a rival’s nuclear capability.

India’s response to China and Pakistan as nuclear rivals: Participants discussed the contrasting ways in which Indian policymakers assessed China and Pakistan as nuclear rivals, highlighting that this distinction provides the central explanation for India’s divergent response. Although China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, Indian leaders generally assessed China as a rival with limited aims and superior conventional capabilities. Consequently, they considered Chinese nuclear weapons unnecessary to Beijing’s strategy toward India, particularly because China could achieve its limited objectives through conventional means and would face high costs if it resorted to nuclear coercion. Pakistan, however, was assessed differently, wherein Indian policymakers viewed Islamabad as having extensive revisionist aims toward New Delhi. Additionally, its conventional military inferiority increased the perceived utility of nuclear weapons as an instrument of coercion. As a result, Indian military assessments feared that Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would undermine India’s conventional military advantage and fundamentally alter the strategic balance. Participants noted that this difference was reflected in the responses of the Indian strategic community, wherein the Chinese nuclear capabilities did not generate sustained pressure for weaponization, however, Pakistan’s nuclear program was viewed as a geopolitical emergency. Thus, leading to the conclusion that remaining non-nuclear would be more dangerous for New Delhi than accepting the costs associated with weaponization.

Evolution of threat perceptions, assessments and feedback: The discussion emphasized that threat perceptions are not static but evolve through continuous assessments of a rival’s intentions, capabilities, and behavior. They highlighted two interconnected questions in assessing a nuclear rival. First, the objective of the rival in the broader relationship, and second, the role of nuclear weapons in achieving those objectives. These assessments are further developed through feedback loops, for instance, initial judgements about China’s limited aims and the limited utility of nuclear weapons in its strategy were repeatedly tested against subsequent Chinese behavior. Developments following the 1962 Sino-Indian war, China’s conduct during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, and broader changes in the regional balance reinforced India’s initial assessment and reduced the perceived necessity of nuclear weaponization. Whereas Pakistan’s nuclear cooperation with China, evidence of a developing weapons program, and the increasingly coercive environment reinforced Indian perceptions that nuclear weapons could become central to Pakistan’s military strategy. Thus, participants acknowledged that assessments are neither subjective nor definite, they incorporate historical experience and are continuously revised as states observe rival behavior. Moreover, this feedback process can reinforce an initial assessment or eventually falsify it, thereby changing the perceived cost of restraint and influencing a state’s decision to continue or change its nuclear posture.