Source: Carnegie
Presented
at the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research, Boston, MA, April 21, 1999
It
is an honor to address this distinguished audience, it is an honor to be invited
by the Pioneer Institute even if the term "pioneer" was for me most of my life
connected with one special meaning ? with the communist youth organization with
red scarves and with marching at the First of May parade.
It
does not seem very productive to describe events that happened ten years ago
at the moment of the end of communism or to repeat the famous debates about
- where
to go;
- how
to get there.
We
have to go further now. I would like, therefore, first to put the transition
problem into a broader perspective of the general ideological framework of our
times and then to discuss several selected aspects of the process of transition.
The
Re-Emergence of New Third Ways
We are
? very rapidly ? approaching the end of the century and the beginning of a new
one. I do not like strong and easy but sometimes deceptive words and concepts
but they may be appropriate when talking about the 20th century.
We can say ? at least looking at the world from Central Europe ? that
the twentieth century brought us two wars, two occupations of our own territories
and two dangerous ideologies ? fascism and communism. We were three times liberated
? from the Austro-Hungarian autocratic monarchy in 1918, from German occupation
in 1945 and from communism in 1989. Only three decades ? the twenties, the thirties,
and the nineties ? were the episodes of freedom and liberty which is approximately
one third of the whole century. Knowing the circumstances, it is very difficult
to say whether it is a good result or a bad one. And especially as compared
to whom or to what other era of our history?
I agree
with Isaiah Berlin who once said that "horrors in the 20th century
were not caused by the ordinary negative human sentiments, they have been caused
by ideas". This is ? at least for me ? a very important point. I am really more
afraid of some ideas than of nasty people, of wicked or evil persons, of villains.
And I am sensitive to the dangers of personalizing history ? the current Yugoslav
crisis not withstanding. And even if communism is over, I am not alone who sees,
hears and feels ideas I consider dangerous. We should not, therefore, interpret
the end of communism as a final and comfortable victory. We should be "on guard".
Contrary
to the "end of history" or "end of ideology" schools, the end of communism
does not mean end of the great ideological debate that dominated the 20th
century. It began one. Or it should have. The debate should have taken place
much earlier and should have been deeper and subtler, but communism distracted
us from it. Looking around - in America, in Europe, in my own country - I do
not have the feeling that someone like me (or the supporters of the Pioneer
Institute) is on the winning side. I agree with one of the few of French liberals
(in the European sense) Pascal Salin that "we are not the winners of the present
time. So far the victory is that of social democracy". He is right. He sees
Mr. Clinton, Mr. Blair, Mr. Jospin, Mr. Schroeder, Mr. Prodi (the new Mr. Europe)
and I see Mr. Zeman and Mr. Havel in my own country. They all belong to the
same club, at least implicitly.
The
"Third Way" ideas are here again and I have to repeat my well-known phrase
that was made in January 1990: "The third way is the fastest way to the third
world". We should not fall into the same trap as in the past. But some of the
traps are different ? I have to mention especially environmentalism and communitarism.
Both of them represent a danger to freedom, liberty and democracy, both of them
imply that someone?s ideas are better than the ideas of the rest of us and that
someone knows what is good for you and me.
All of
that is relevant for mature developed countries, for emerging markets in developing
countries and for transition economies as well.
The
Problems of Transition
The decade
of the nineties started with many hopes connected with the fact that communism
collapsed. I always add that it was not defeated, it ? sort of ? melted down.
The long-time awaited event created enormous expectations and as a result of
it, the e-r gap, the expectation-reality gap (see my 1997 Annual Hayek
Memorial Lecture, IEA, London, 17 June 1997) ? in spite of many undeniable achievements
in most of transition countries during the decade ? has been growing
which led to a serious loss of confidence both of transformation results and
of transformation strategies. Dramatic controversy about it continues and will
be with us for some time to come.
I am sorry
to say that western intellectual contribution to this debate has not been very
helpful. There has been almost no serious academic research concerning transition
from communism to free society, and the quality of available texts is not above
the former sovietologist literature which we ? living in communism ? did not
find very helpful either. We learned a lot from ideas and concepts belonging
to mainstream economics but were not enriched by a more or less descriptive
sovietologist literature which was usually less sophisticated than our own (which
was done in a much more complicated environment). It seems to me now that almost
everyone forgot the evils and irrationalities of communism and is surprised
that its dismantling is not fast enough and that it takes non-zero time to replace
it with a full-fledged market economy.
The academic
analysis is made up for by a non-academic one. The debate about transition economies
(and emerging markets) is dominated by a very powerful rent-seeking group of
advisors and consultants, of investment bankers, of powerful auditors and especially
of bureaucrats of international financial organizations who have a vested
interest to prolong transition as much as possible, and not to let transition
countries to do it domestically (which means without them). My refusal to unconditionally
surrender to their views and my statement "I am not ready to pay hard money
for soft advice" (which Milton Friedman dubbed "Klaus´s law") made me many enemies
in this privileged group.
I have
expressed my views about transition (and described my experience with it) in
many speeches and articles and it is probably too early to add anything to my
original "Ten Commandments of Transition" (luncheon address delivered to the
plenary meeting of the Group of Thirty, Vienna, April 1993; also published in
Renaissance: The Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe, CATO Institute,
1997). I will, therefore, make only several short remarks:
- to paraphrase
the well-known saying (ascribed to Milton Friedman) I can say that "there
is no such thing as a free reform". The change of the whole system is
very costly. The transformation costs consist of the loss of output
(and income), of the fundamental redistribution of gains and losses in
society, of the increase of inequality in income and wealth, the
loss of behavioral patterns, etc. The costs have to be paid by citizens
of the transforming countries themselves and the contribution of the rest
of the world is marginal (if any and if not a negative one);
- the reforms usually
started with emphasis on liberalization, deregulation and privatization.
Such reforms can be implemented quite rapidly. The implementation of such
reform measures is of crucial importance, but at the beginning they created
weak and shallow markets and imperfect market infrastructure. The inefficient
(or not fully efficient) markets and surrounding institutions increased
transformation costs and added something unexpected to the unpleasant feelings
of less successful participants of the transition process. We are, therefore,
heavily criticized for weak markets and imperfect institutions, but
there was no other way to proceed.
In addition
to it, our distrust of the state and its potential positive, constructive contribution
was much stronger in our part of the world than in yours. In the past we suffered
more from "government failure" than you and we believed in the idea that market
failure is much smaller and less dangerous than the failure of government. Karl
Brunner once said that the state should be "an umpire of a positive sum game
and not an operator of a negative sum game" and we accepted this approach as
a guideline in our reform strategy;
- many reforms
failed or had very high costs because of their partiality and because
of the time-inconsistency problem connected with the fact that individual
reform measures have different time dimensions. This is an unavoidable fact
of life which should not be so superficially criticized as it is usually
done with the high-brow approach of those who either do not care or have
there own interests;
- we understood
very soon the fallacy of the artificially introduced dilemma called "shock
therapy vs. gradualism" which used to be so popular in the literature. I
can confirm that the systemic change is a sequence of many distinct choices
over time on separate components of an overall reform plan and not a
single decision. It takes a whole historic period. It is not an exercise
in applied economics. The systemic change is not done in a laboratory or
in a vacuum, it is done inside a very complicated political process in an
open, democratic and pluralistic society (there is no masterminding of it);
What are
the main future dangers?
We should
be aware of the fact that the country in the moment of transition does not make
marginal changes (as a non-transition country), that it makes substantial
changes. This is a crucial difference. There has not been a long, gradual, spontaneous
evolution of institutions, rules or networks of relations based on the enormous
variety of human interests, hopes, dreams and ambitions as in your country.
Because of that, we still live in a "pre-emptied" system that does not have
the friendly, softening mechanisms of intermediation between invisible
hands of the market and visible hands of the government. Such an intermediate
structure cannot be imposed upon society from above, it has to evolve. In our
society, the strong and noisy pressure groups often succeed in using legislation
for gaining powers and priviliges at the expense of both individual citizens
and the state and for shifting society from traditional liberal democracy to
neocorporativism. It has an important connection to the currently fashionable
idea of communitarism (which I already mentioned). Communitarism is less
dangerous in a mature, sufficiently diversified society but may very easily
refeudalize society in an unmature (and in this respect shallow) society (see
my speech at the Alpbach Forum 1998 Seminar devoted to "Society and the Crisis
of Liberalism", 22 August 1998; published in Policy, No. 4, Vol. 14, 1998, Sydney).
Second
future problem is connected with the existing (and unavoidable) fragility
and vulnerability of transition economies especially when they are confronted
with the growing and merciless requirements of a globalized environment. The
transition countries have particular propensities, especially to higher inflation
and to current account deficits (see my speech "Emerging Markets and Their Current
Problems: The Czech Perspective" delivered at the Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi, 11 March 1999) which are not compatible with fixed (and stable) exchange
rates. Transition economies have, at the same time, investment-savings imbalances
and need foreign capital to ensure some sort of macroeconomic equilibrium. Foreign
capital wants, however, fixed exchange rates and easy outflow´s possibilities.
All of that does not simultaneously exist and will probably never exist.
My experience
tells me that the reconciliation of all those variables cannot be masterminded
ex-ante. It must be enforced upon the economy ex-post, as a result
of economic, financial and currency instability (or crisis). It brings about,
however, a politically and socially very complicated situation and, as a result
of it, the political support for the continuation of transformation is undermined.
This is what we have seen in recent years in many countries, and paradoxically
more often in more successful transition economies.
The problems
of transition can be discussed with many details and from many perspectives.
Transition is a very complicated mixture of political, social, economic and
cultural aspects and a mixture of intended and unintended moves and events.
I wanted to warn against their underestimation, against various misinterpretations,
against false labels as "the absence of the rule of law", "crony capitalism",
"mafia capitalism", etc. I wanted to present it as painful process connected
with dreams, hopes, ambitions, prejudices, fears and, of course, errors of human
beings. I agree with Hayekian statement that world is run by human action, not
by human design. We should not forget it.