FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: February 2, 2006
CONTACT: Jennifer Linker, +1 202/939-2372, jlinker@CarnegieEndowment.org

Judging by the Hamas electoral campaign slogan, “America and Israel say no to Hamas...What do you say?” it is questionable whether there are any next steps in a peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. President Bush’s State of the Union address laid out stringent conditions for Hamas, demanding that the organization “recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism and work for lasting peace.” In a new web-only commentary, Aftermath of the Hamas Tsunami, leading expert on Palestinian politics Nathan Brown analyzes what Hamas would like to accomplish for its people, what limitations it faces, and whether donor countries can coax Hamas into a more promising set of positions regarding Israel. Click here to access the commentary.

Brown’s Key Points:

• What did Palestinians vote for?
A vote for Hamas was a vote against domestic chaos and violence. The election was as much about competence and credibility as ideology, and Hamas had projected a unified image of public service and personal rectitude in sharp contrast to the internal squabbling of Fatah. 

• What is Hamas’ agenda?
Hamas is committed to its religious principles, such as religious education, but will probably stress other issues at first. Its economic agenda stresses self-reliance, but this will depend on foreign assistance either from past donors or new ones. Hamas’ approach to the conflict with Israel is its most important agenda item. It has laid out very strong positions while dropping some hints—but only hints—of moderation.

• What can Hamas do with a parliamentary majority?
Hamas’ electoral triumph does not necessarily mean that President Abbas will lose all authority. Other domestic actors and agencies as well as self-restraint may limit the influence of the Hamas-dominated parliament.

• What are Western choices?
Asking Hamas to repudiate all its positions overnight is unrealistic. Instead, careful thinking and sensible benchmarks, such as negotiating through President Abbas or the PLO, must be used to create a viable negotiating process.

Direct link to commentary: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/BrownHamasWebCommentary.pdf

Nathan Brown is a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment. He is the author of Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine, which presents research on Palestinian society and governance after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.

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