In The Media
Minxin Pei
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Source: Getty
In The Media
Out Into the World
Although there are numerous areas of shared interest between the U.S. and China, China's approach to international responsibility is likely to be à la carte. And in a international system where Washington can no longer set the rules, striking a deal with the Chinese will be more difficult.
By Minxin Pei
Published on Jan 5, 2009
Source: Newsweek
In 2005, when the West first started asking China to abide by international rules in Africa, take a lead in climate-change talks, contribute more to international security and abandon its mercantilist trade policy, Beijing didn't respond well. Who could blame it? Until recently, Chinese leaders had been obsessed with domestic priorities and rarely considered the foreign ramifications. When they did, they figured their greatest international contribution would be to feed and house 1.3 billion Chinese.
A conspiracy-minded minority in Beijing still views the West's requests with suspicion. This group is best represented by Jiang Yong, director of the Center of Economic Security at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (an affiliate of the Ministry of State Security). Writing in mid-2007, Jiang warned that Washington's calls for China to accept more international responsibility were really just a way to frustrate China's rise. Because the existing global economic order and its rules were established by the West, Jiang argued, they serve the West's interests, not China's. Were China to comply with the WTO's intellectual-property protections, for example, it would trap China in its role as a low-tech, low-cost manufacturer. Rules on environmental protection and resource conservation, similarly, would hurt Chinese economic development. To Jiang, it all amounted to a subtle strategy of keeping China down.
Few prominent thinkers publicly embrace such theories. That said, none believe Beijing does things purely on the West's terms, either. The furthest moderates are ready to go is to accept China's new obligations as a reality and argue that China should honor them the best it can.
As Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Beijing's Renmin University, wrote in a People's Daily online forum at the end of 2007, while China need not dance to the West's tune, it risks alienating other countries—even in the developing world—if it keeps refusing to become a "responsible stakeholder." Liu Jianfei, a professor at the Central Party School in Beijing, echoed this perspective in a newspaper interview in March 2008. Shi and Liu's view, which has become dominant in Beijing, sees accepting a bigger global role as necessary, like it or not. The trick is to do so on China's terms. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's statement to the National People's Congress in March 2008 best reflects this "realist" perspective. Yang argued that China should take on more international responsibility—but in an à la carte way that serves its own interests and that it helps define.
This idea has found many adherents, including Qin Yaqing, executive vice president of the Chinese Foreign Affairs University. In a March interview with a liberal Chinese business publication, Qin noted that China and the West share more common ground on some issues (climate change, energy security and environmental protection) than on others (humanitarian intervention)—implying that China should cooperate on the former but not the latter. Other areas of cooperation might include promoting Asian economic integration and helping resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. China also needs to ensure that any important reform in the existing international system serves its interests. But above all, Beijing's foreign policy should continue to serve China's key interest: economic development.
The dominance of this realist school is a mixed blessing for Washington. The good news is that Chinese leaders now understand that it's in their interest for China to act like a good global citizen. That means they'll be receptive to overtures to cooperate in areas where U.S. and Chinese priorities overlap. The bad news is that China sees its international standing rising while America's declines—and will drive a hard bargain before making any concessions. Gone are the days when the United States set the rule. China will now insist that its engagement with the international system proceed on its own terms. As experienced business people will tell you, the Chinese are tough negotiators even when in a position of weakness. Now that the global balance of power has shifted in their favor, striking deals will be still be possible—but the costs may be much higher.
About the Author
Minxin Pei
Former Adjunct Senior Associate, Asia Program
Pei is Tom and Margot Pritzker ‘72 Professor of Government and the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College.
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Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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